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Abstract
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on U.S. monetary policy.
The first paper examines monetary policy in the early 2000s, a prolonged period
of low interest rates for which the effi cacy of policy is intensely debated. Through the
lens of an estimated simple New Keynesian (NK) model, the paper finds that when
measuring inflation using headline CPI, the Federal Reserve’s response to inflation
turns out to be passive, therefore implying indeterminacy. Only when measuring
inflation using core PCE does monetary policy appear to have been suffi ciently active
to rule out indeterminacy. Faced with this dilemma, the paper finally estimates an
extended model that distinguishes between core and headline inflation. Estimation
results from this model decisively rule out indeterminacy and suggest that indeed
the Fed has put more weight on core PCE.
The second paper contrasts interest rate rules featuring fixed versus time-varying
inflation target. It finds that the rule embedding time variation in inflation target
empirically fits better and that the Fed has been responding strongly to the inflation
gap not only in the Great Moderation period but also in the Great Inflation era.
Therefore, this finding rules out self-fulfilling inflation expectations as an explanation
of the high inflation episode in the 1970s. The paper also documents that changes
in monetary policy have dampened most of the fluctuations in the inflation gap and
contributed to the decline in its persistence and predictability.
The third paper investigates the impact of commodity price fluctuations on mon-
etary policy and estimates a NK model with an explicit role for commodity price
fluctuations. It finds that the pre-Volcker period is characterized by a determinate
version of the model featuring high degree of real wage rigidity In this environment,
the commodity price shocks of the 1970s created a severe trade-off between inflation
and output gap stabilization. Faced with this puzzle, the central bank chose to react
aggressively to both inflation and output growth, but not to the output gap, thereby
ruling out indeterminacy. The paper further documents that oil price shocks are
no longer as inflationary as they used to be due to a decline in real wage rigidity,
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I Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of monetary policy
in the U.S. by investigating nominal interest rate setting through the lens of New
Keynesian models. In this class of monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models, it has become common practice to think of the central bank as
following a kind of interest rate rule that features some feedback between economic
variables and the nominal interest rate. However, it is well known that monetary
policy can induce multiple equilibria, which is often referred to as indeterminacy. For
instance, indeterminacy can arise if the monetary authority follows an interest rate
rule that does not raise the interest rate aggressively enough in response to inflation.
Such policy-generated indeterminacy can induce instability by opening the door to
self-fulfilling inflation expectations or what is called sunspot fluctuations, thereby
reducing economic welfare. In the following chapters, I apply Bayesian estimation
techniques to evaluate the effi cacy of monetary policy in the U.S. by assessing the
quantitative relevance of equilibrium indeterminacy.
The first paper investigates the adequacy of monetary policy following the 2001
recession. The issue of loose monetary policy in the early 2000s is closely related to
Stanford economist John Taylor who asserts that the Federal Reserve kept the policy
rate too low for too long after the recession in 2001, thereby creating an environ-
ment that ultimately brought the economy close to a brink. Along these lines, the
paper estimates a simple NK model of the U.S. economy over the period following
the 2001 slump and prior to the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC). The paper
finds that when inflation is measured using headline inflation, Fed’s responsiveness
to inflation turns out to be passive, implying indeterminacy and multiplicity of ratio-
nal expectations equilibria and thereby lending some support to Taylor’s assertion.
However, when measuring inflation using core inflation as an observable, monetary
policy appear to have been suffi ciently responsiveness to inflation to rule out indeter-
minacy. This essentially poses a dilemma since the results are clearly dependent on
the particular measure of inflation being used. The paper then relaxes the assump-
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tion that inflation in the model is measured by a single indicator and re-formulate
the artificial economy as a factor model where the theory’s concept of inflation is the
common factor to the empirical inflation series. However, indeterminacy can still be
neither ruled in nor ruled out, thus leaving us essentially with the same dilemma. To
resolve this ambiguity, the paper finally estimates a version of the model that distin-
guishes between core and headline inflation. Estimation results from this extended
model suggest that the Federal Reserve has put more weight on core inflation in the
conduct of its policy and has been strongly responsive to inflation. Thus the results
corroborate the claims of Ben Bernanke who argues that the Fed has been focusing
on core inflation during much this period.
The second paper examines the drivers of the high and volatile inflationary
episodes in the 1970s as well as the decline in macroeconomic volatility and inflation
gap predictability since the mid-1980s. In this paper, I model inflation dynamics
using a NK framework with positive steady state (or trend inflation) while allowing
for indeterminacy. First of all, allowing for trend inflation is important as it alters
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) as well as the inflation dynamics and
the determinacy properties of the model. For instance, higher trend inflation makes
price-setting firms more forward-looking which flattens the NKPC and therefore the
central bank needs to respond more strongly to inflation in order to guarantee de-
terminacy. Next, on top of modeling the first moment of inflation, I compare the
empirical fit of the model featuring fixed versus time-varying inflation target. In this
line of argument, a fixed target is simply equal to steady state inflation in the model
and stands for the Federal Reserve’s long-run target compatible with its long-run
goals such as inflation stability. In contrast, time-varying inflation target can be
interpreted as short-run fluctuations around the long-run trend based on short-term
goals pursued by the Fed conditional on economic situation. First of all, I find that
when considering the model with fixed inflation target, indeterminacy cannot be
ruled out in the 1970s while determinacy prevails in the Great Moderation period.
This finding is in line with the empirical monetary policy literature. Yet, the upshot
completely differs when allowing for time-varying target. This time the posterior
density favors determinacy for both the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation
period. Using posterior odds ratio to compare fixed versus time-varying target, I
then find evidence in favor of time variation in the target inflation process. This
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result suggests that monetary policy, even in the 1970s, was suffi ciently aggressive
to inflation to rule out indeterminacy. Next, I find that diverse features of the in-
flation gap process provide mixed evidence regarding the decline in its persistence.
Specifically, I document that it is actually the target-based inflation gap process,
defined as the difference between inflation and the Fed’s time-varying target, whose
persistence has gone down, while mean-based gap, measured as the deviation of in-
flation from a constant steady-state, has continued to remain persistent. Through
counterfactual experiments, I then show that the decline in inflation gap volatility
and persistence is mainly driven by both a stronger response to the inflation gap
as well as a better anchored inflation target. However, changes in monetary policy
alone fail to explain the reduced variability of output growth which is explained by
a reduction in the volatility of technology shocks in the model. Hence, in this sense,
I find that both good policy and good luck are jointly required to explain the Great
Moderation phenomenon.
The third chapter looks at the impact of commodity price fluctuations on mone-
tary policy with a particular focus on the Great Inflation. Commodity price shocks
in general and oil price shocks in particular were an important source of economic
fluctuations in the U.S. during much of the 1970s. For instance, there were episodes
of large increases in the price of oil triggered by the Yom Kippur war in 1973 and
the Iranian revolution of 1979. Such adverse cost-push shocks arguably generated
a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the output gap for the Fed-
eral Reserve. Existing empirical investigations on monetary policy in the 1970s find
that policy failed to respond suffi ciently strongly to inflation thereby opening the
door to self-fulfilling inflation expectations. However, these studies abstract from
modeling the role of commodity price fluctuations and the associated policy trade-
off. Hence, the paper estimates a NK model with trend inflation and oil entering in
both consumption and production while paying particular attention in identifying
key features of the model through careful elucidation of observables. The paper finds
that the Federal Reserve has been responding aggressively to inflation even in the
1970s to the extent that in completely rules out indeterminacy. This finding suggests
that parameter estimates pertaining to the Taylor rule are biased when abstracting
from modeling commodity price fluctuations and the associated trade-off. In fact,
once this is taken into account, the empirical finding rules out self-fulfilling inflation
3
expectations as an explanation of the high inflation episode in the 1970s thereby
corroborating the findings of the second paper. Finally, the paper also documents
that oil price shocks are no longer as inflationary as they used to be, allowing the
central bank to respond less aggressively to an oil price shock, thereby explaining




II Monetary Policy and Indetermi-
nacy after the 2001 Slump
This paper estimates a simple New Keynesian model of the U.S. economy, allowing
for indeterminacy, over the period following the 2001 slump, an episode for which the
adequacy of monetary policy is intensely debated. We find that only when measuring
inflation with core PCE does monetary policy appear to have been suffi ciently active
to rule out indeterminacy. We then relax the assumption that inflation in the model
is measured by a single indicator and re-formulate the artificial economy as a factor
model where the theory’s concept of inflation is the common factor to the empirical
inflation series. CPI and PCE provide better indicators of the latent concept while
core PCE is less informative. Finally, we estimate an extended economy that distin-
guishes between core and headline inflation rates. This model comfortably rules out
indeterminacy and confirms the view that the Federal Reserve put more weight on
core PCE inflation when setting the policy rate during this period.
1 Introduction
It has become prevalent to think of monetary policy in terms of nominal interest
rate feedback rules. In certain situations, for example, loose monetary policy, these
rules may introduce indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria into otherwise stable eco-
nomic environments. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and many others suggest that,
empirically, such sunspots-based instability was confined to the seventies and that
the post-Volcker years can ostensibly be characterized by determinacy. The current
paper extends this analysis to more recent data leading up to the Great Recession.
The issue of loose monetary policy during the 2000s is closely related to Taylor
(2007, 2012), who asserts that the Federal Reserve kept the policy rate too low for
too long following the recession of 2001. While Taylor does not touch the issue of
indeterminacy, he nevertheless argues that this loose policy created an environment
that ultimately brought the economy close to the brink. To bolster his thesis of an
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extra easy monetary policy, Taylor constructs an artificial path for the Federal Funds
rate that follows his proposed rule. He characterizes this counterfactual rate’s loose
fitting to the actual rate as
"[...] the biggest deviation, comparable to the turbulent 1970s." [Taylor,
2007, 2]
His view is disputed by many. Amongst them, Bernanke (2010) argues that
Taylor’s use of the headline consumer price index (CPI) to measure inflation in
the Federal Reserve’s reaction function is misleading. In fact, the Federal Reserve
switched the inflation measures that inform its monetary policy deliberations several
times over the last two decades. In particular, it moved away from the CPI to the
personal consumption expenditure deflator (PCE) in early 2000. In turn, PCE was
abandoned midway through 2004 in favor of the core PCE deflator (which excludes
food and energy prices).1 Bernanke (2015) revisits Taylor’s exercise and constructs
his own counterfactual Federal Funds rate using core PCE. Bernanke’s verdict of the
Federal Reserve’s policy during the 2000s is inimical to Taylor’s and he says that
"[...] the predictions of my updated Taylor rule and actual Fed policy
are generally quite close over the past two decades. In particular, it is no
longer the case that the actual funds rate falls below the predictions of
the rule in 2003-2005." [Bernanke, 2015]
Our paper sheds further light on this debate. It takes as a point of departure
Taylor’s claim of an analogy between the 1970s and the 2000s as well as one of the
key recommendations for monetary policy that has emanated from New Keynesian
modelling: interest rates should react strongly to inflation movements to not desta-
bilize the economy. Phrased alternatively, if the central bank’s response to inflation
is tuned too passively in a Taylor rule sense, multiplicity and endogenous instabil-
ity may arise. In fact, the U.S. economy of the 1970s can be well represented by
an indeterminate version of the New Keynesian model as was shown by Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004). Along these lines, the current paper turns Taylor’s too low for
too long story into questioning whether the Federal Reserve operated on the inde-
terminacy side of the rule after the 2001 slump. Knowledge about the economy’s
1See Mehra and Sawhney (2010).
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regime is important for policymakers because indeterminacy introduces sunspots and
alters the propagation of fundamental shocks. Thus, for central banks to use models
for policy analysis, a good understanding about the presence of (in-)determinacy is
vital.
The empirical plausibility of a link between monetary policy and macroeconomic
instability was first established by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). They estimate
variants of the Taylor rule and their research suggests that the Federal Reserve’s
policy may have steered the economy into an indeterminate equilibrium during the
1970s. Yet, they also find that the changes to policy which have taken place after
1980 —essentially a more aggressive response to inflation —brought about a stable and
determinate environment. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) reinforce this point but they
refrain from using a single equation approach. They recognize that indeterminacy is a
property of a rational expectations system and apply Bayesian estimation techniques
to a general equilibrium model. Their results parallel the earlier findings that the
U.S. economy veered from indeterminacy to determinacy around 1980 —largely as
the result of a more aggressive response of monetary policy towards inflation.
Moreover, this monetary policy change had perhaps an even greater influence
on the economy: the transformation from the Great Inflation of the 1970s to the
Great Moderation is often conjoined to the conduct of monetary policy.2 Yet, the
Great Moderation came to an end sometime during the 2000s, and it was followed by
enormous economic volatility. Our aim is to examine the possible connection between
this transformation and an alteration in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. In
particular, we concentrate on the effects of a possibly too easy monetary policy after
the 2001 slump. We frame our analysis from the perspective of (in-)determinacy and
conduct it under the umbrella of the Bernanke versus Taylor dispute by considering
the measures of inflation that repeatedly occur in the discussion: CPI, PCE and core
PCE.
Accordingly, we estimate a small-scale New Keynesian model allowing for in-
determinacy over the period between the 2001 slump and the onset of the Great
Recession, thus, the NBER-dated 2002:I-2007:III window to be precise. To test for
2See, for example, Benati and Surico (2009), Bernanke (2012), Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011), Arias, Ascari, Branzoli and Castelnuovo (2014) and Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe
(2015).
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indeterminacy, we employ the method of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) to compute
the posterior probabilities of determinacy and indeterminacy. We take as starting
point the same basic New Keynesian model, priors and observables as Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004). This strategy allows us to create a continuity between their and
our results, which is important given the shortness of our period of interest.
We establish a number of new insights regarding recent U.S. monetary policy.
For example, we can indeed expose a violation of the Taylor principle for most of
the 2000s when using CPI to measure inflation. This finding supports the visual
inspection checks based on single equations in Taylor (2012) who coined the phrase
Great Deviation to refer to this period. Hence, the 2002:I to 2007:III period would
appear to be best described by an indeterminate version of the New Keynesian
model. Our upshot is different when basing the analysis on PCE data: we can neither
rule in nor rule out indeterminacy. Finally, the evidence in favor of indeterminacy
altogether vanishes when we use core PCE. Monetary policy then appears to have
been quite appropriate. This conclusion parallels the insight from Bernanke’s (2015)
counterfactual Federal Funds rate. We thus establish that tests for indeterminacy
are susceptible to the data used in the estimation.
We next consider whether our results are an artifact of the six year sample of
data. To address this issue, we re-estimate the model on rolling windows of fixed
length (23 quarters to match the length of the 2002:I-2007:III period) starting in the
mid-1960s and focussing on the same inflation measure as Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) namely CPI inflation. The outcomes of the indeterminacy test performed
on rolling windows are highly plausible. In particular, we identify only two broad
periods (i.e. several consecutive windows) in which a passive policy has likely led
to indeterminacy: the 1970s and the post-2001 period. The first period, which
coincides with the span of the Burns and Miller chairmanships, exactly matches
the indeterminacy duration, as well as the timing of the switch to determinacy in
1980, that Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) document. We take this analogy as a
reassuring validation of our small sample approach, i.e. even though our period of
interest is quite short, it is possible to infer meaningful information from it.3
We then attend the issue of how best to measure inflation in the New Keynesian
3Judd and Rudebusch (1998) is another example of an evaluation of monetary policy over sim-
ilarly short sample periods.
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model. We tackle the ambiguity between the theoretical concept and the empirical
inflation proxies by employing the DSGE-factor methodology proposed by Boivin
and Giannoni (2006). Accordingly, we combine various measures of inflation in the
measurement equation and re-estimate our model. CPI and PCE emerge as better
indicators of the concept of inflation than core PCE and indeterminacy cannot be
ruled out.
However, the finding that indeterminacy cannot be ruled out may hinge on the
fact that the baseline three-equations New Keynesian model features a single concept
of inflation. To address this question, we finally turn toward an artificial economy
that distinguishes explicitly between core and headline inflation. We find that the
Federal Reserve was responding mainly to core PCE and was suffi ciently active to
comfortably rule out indeterminacy.
Perhaps most closely related to our work are Belongia and Ireland (2016) who,
like us, evaluate monetary policy during the 2000s.4 Belongia and Ireland (2016)
estimate a time-varying VAR to track the evolution of the Federal Reserve’s behav-
ior throughout the 2000s. They find evidence of a change in the Federal Reserve’s
behavior away from stabilizing inflation towards stabilizing output and also of persis-
tent deviations from the estimated policy rule. While similar in spirit to our results
they do not address issues of indeterminacy.
Bianchi (2013) examines the Federal Reserve’s policy post-WWII taking aMarkov
switching rational expectations approach with two monetary policy regimes (i.e.
Hawk and Dove). Bianchi characterizes monetary policy in the early 2000s as Hawk-
ish and identifies a switch to a Dove regime after 2005. His approach to deal with the
issue of passive monetary policy is by requiring a linear representation of the Markov
switching model to have a unique solution. Phrased alternatively, the regime transi-
tions do not imply moving from determinacy to indeterminacy as both regimes are
determinate. Hence, Bianchi’s model cannot address questions involving sunspot
equilibria as in our paper.
The remainder of the paper evolves as follows. The next section sketches the
baseline model and its solution. Section 3 presents the econometric strategy and
baseline results. Robustness checks are conducted in section 4. Section 5 relaxes the
4See Fackler and McMillin (2015), Fitwi, Hein and Mercer (2015), Groshenny (2013) and Jung
and Katayama (2014) for related exercises.
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assumption that model inflation is properly measured by a single empirical indicator.
In section 6 we consider an economy that features more than one inflation rate.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Baseline model
The familiar three linearized equations summarize our basic New Keynesian model:
yt = Etyt+1 − τ(Rt − Etπt+1) + gt τ > 0 (1)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ(yt − zt) κ > 0, 0 < β < 1 (2)
Rt = ρRRt−1 + (1− ρR)(ψππt + ψy [yt − zt]) + εR,t 0 ≤ ρR < 1. (3)
Here yt stands for output, Rt denotes the nominal interest rate and πt symbolizes
inflation. Et represents the expectations operator. Equation (1) is the dynamic
IS relation reflecting an Euler equation. Equation (2) describes the expectational
Phillips curve. Finally, equation (3) represents monetary policy, i.e. a Taylor-type
rule in which ψπ > 0 and ψy > 0 are chosen by the central bank and echo its
responsiveness to inflation and the output gap, yt − zt. The term εR,t denotes an
exogenous monetary policy shock whose standard deviation is given by σR. The
other fundamental disturbances involve exogenous shifts of the Euler equation which
are captured by the process gt and shifts of the marginal costs of production captured
by zt. Both variables follow AR(1) processes:
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t 0 < ρg < 1
and
zt = ρzzt−1 + εz,t 0 < ρz < 1.
We denote by σg and σz the standard deviations of the innovations εg,t and εz,t.
Finally, the term ρg,z denotes the correlation between the demand and supply inno-
vations. Then, the vector of model parameters entails
θ ≡
[
ψπ, ψy, ρR, β, κ, τ , ρg, ρz, ρg,z, σR, σg, σz
]′
.
Indeterminacy implies that fluctuations in economic activity can be driven by ar-
bitrary, self-fulfilling changes in people’s expectations (i.e. sunspots). Concretely,
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in our simple New Keynesian model, indeterminacy occurs when the central bank
passively responds to inflation changes, i.e. when ψπ < 1− ψy (1− β) /κ.
To solve the model, we apply the method proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003) in which case the full set of rational expectations solutions takes on the form
%t = Φ(θ)%t−1 + Φε(θ, M̃)εt + Φζ(θ)ζt (4)
where %t is a vector of model variables,
%t ≡ [yt, Rt, πt, Etyt+1, Etπt+1, gt, zt]
′ ,
εt denotes a vector of fundamental shocks and ζt is a non-fundamental sunspot
shock.5 The coeffi cient matrices Φ(θ), Φε(θ, M̃) and Φζ(θ) are related to the struc-
tural parameters of the model. The sunspot shock satisfies ζt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2ζ).
Indeterminacy can manifest itself in two ways: (i) through pure extrinsic non-
fundamental shocks, ζt (a.k.a sunspots), disturbing the economy and (ii) through
affecting the propagation mechanism of fundamental shocks via M̃.
3 Estimation and baseline results
3.1 Data and priors
We employ Bayesian techniques for estimating the parameters of the model and test
for indeterminacy using posterior model probabilities. The measurement equation
relating the elements of %t to the three observables, xt, is given by
xt =
 0r∗ + π∗
π∗
+
 1 0 0 0 0 0 00 4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 4 0 0 0 0
 %t (5)
where π∗ and r∗ are the annualized steady-state inflation and real interest rates
respectively. Equation (4) and (5) provide a state-space representation of the lin-
earized model that allows us to apply standard Bayesian estimation techniques. The
technical appendix provides further details.
We use HP-filtered per capita real GDP and the Federal Funds Rate as our
observable for output and the nominal interest rate. These choices follow Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and make our baseline empirical analysis comparable to theirs





in all dimensions but the sample period. To draw up our analysis in the Bernanke
versus Taylor debate, we consider in turn three different measures of inflation: CPI,
PCE deflator and core PCE (all expressed in annualized percentage changes from
the previous quarter). The data covers the period between the 2001 slump and the
onset of the Great Recession, i.e. 2002:I to 2007:III.
Table 1 reports our baseline priors which are identical to the ones in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and imply a prior predictive probability of determinacy equal to
0.527. Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) we replace M̃ in equation (4) with
M∗(θ) + M where M ≡ [MRζ ,Mgζ ,Mzζ ]′. We select M∗(θ) such that the responses
of the endogenous variables to fundamental shocks are continuous at the boundary
between the determinacy and the indeterminacy regions. We set the prior mean for
M equal to zero.
3.2 Testing for indeterminacy
For each measure of inflation, we estimate the model over the two different regions
of the parameter space, i.e. determinacy and indeterminacy. To assess the quality of
the model’s fit to the data we present marginal data densities and posterior model
probabilities for both parametric zones. We approximate the data densities using
Geweke’s (1999) modified harmonic mean estimator. Table 2 reports our results.
Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Taylor (2007, 2012), we begin by
using headline CPI to measure inflation. In this case, the data favors the indetermi-
nate model: the posterior probability of indeterminacy is 0.90. This result suggests
that Taylor’s characterization of monetary policy in the aftermath of the 2001 slump
as too low for too long is in fact consistent with indeterminacy and the view that the
Federal Reserve has potentially veered the economy into instability.
Yet, the upshot differs depending on which measure of inflation we employ in the
estimation. Take Bernanke’s (2015) suggestion that Taylor’s counterfactual exper-
iment should have been performed with core PCE. When making this choice, the
posterior probability for our sample concentrates all of its mass in the determinacy
region. This result flags that the Federal Reserve had not been responding passively
to inflation during this period. However, the Humphrey-Hawkins reports to Congress
document that the Federal Reserve based monetary policy deliberations on headline
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Table 1: Priors and posteriors of DSGE parameters
Priors Posterior Mean
[5th pct, 95th pct]




































































































Notes: The inverse gamma priors are of the form p (σ|υ, ς) ∞ σ−υ−1e−
υς2
2σ2 ,
where ν = 4 and ς equals 0.25, 0.3, 0.6 and 0.2, respectively. The prior
predictive probability of determinacy is 0.527.
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Table 2: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy
Log-data density Probability
Inflation measure Determinacy Indeterminacy Determinacy Indeterminacy
CPI -95.48 -93.28 0.10 0.90
PCE -85.42 -85.75 0.58 0.42
Core PCE -64.60 -71.58 1 0
Notes: According to the prior distributions, the probability of determinacy is 0.527.
PCE from the beginning of 2000 until mid-2004. Since Taylor is particularly critical
of the monetary policy from 2002 to 2004, we next measure inflation using headline
PCE data. We repeat the estimation and the finding is now ambiguous: the proba-
bility of determinacy is 0.58. Phrased alternatively, we cannot dismiss the possibility
of indeterminacy.
Table 1 reports the posterior estimates of the parameters for the model specifi-
cation favored under CPI and core PCE respectively.6 The estimated policy rule’s
response to inflation, ψπ, which essentially governs the indeterminacy, differs sig-
nificantly depending on the way we measure inflation. In particular, when basing
the estimation on CPI, the posterior mean equals 0.84 (with 90-percent interval
[0.61, 0.98]). This result indicates that monetary policy violated the Taylor principle
over the 2002-2007 period or in the words of Taylor:
"[t]he responsiveness appears to be at least as low as in the late 1960s
and 1970s." [Taylor, 2007, 8]
The opposite result ensues when using core PCE. In that case, the posterior mean
of ψπ is well above one at 3.01 (with 90-percent interval [1.97, 4.17]).
3.3 How important are sunspots and what drives the re-
sults?
Indeterminacy can manifest itself by affecting the propagation of fundamental shocks
as well as introducing sunspot shocks. Given our above results, the question of
how important sunspot fluctuations were during the 2000s comes up naturally. To
6The appendix reports results for parameter estimates when using headline PCE inflation data.
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answer this question, we study the propagation of shocks and the unconditional
forecast error variance decomposition. A more detailed analysis can be found in
the Appendix. Based on our estimation using CPI data, sunspots played only a
marginal role with the most significant contribution being seven to eight percent in
explaining the variances of the policy rate and inflation. However, indeterminacy
qualitatively altered the propagation of demand shocks by changing the sign of the
inflation response.
In sum, we find that indeterminacy outcomes are dependent on the inflation
measure that is used. What is the intuition behind this result and which features of
the data stand behind it? Headline inflation generally tends to be more volatile than
core inflation that excludes the most volatile components, particularly in periods of
persistent commodity price shocks. In fact, CPI and PCE are both more volatile
than core PCE during our period of interest. This volatility feature of the data partly
drives our findings through its influence on the estimates of the Taylor rule. With core
PCE as the preferred measure of inflation, the monetary authority reacts to relatively
small movements in inflation. In that case, any policy response to inflation has to
be substantially larger for the estimation procedure to fit the Federal Funds rate
data. In contrast, when measuring inflation with CPI, the estimated responsiveness
to inflation turns out to be smaller due to the larger fluctuations of the inflation gap.
As monetary policy fails to guarantee a unique rational expectations equilibrium
whenever it is insuffi ciently active with respect to inflation, the posterior probability
of indeterminacy is higher with headline than with core inflation.
Beyond the difference in the volatility of the inflation measures, another feature
of the data that drives our (in)-determinacy results is a disconnect between core
and headline inflation in face of persistent commodity price shocks. Our estimation
based on CPI suggests that indeterminacy primarily affects the propagation of de-
mand shocks. In particular, the parameter Mgζ redirects the transmission of this
disturbance, making it look similar to a cost-push shock. This mix of disturbances
helps the model fit the joint behavior of headline inflation (especially CPI), real
activity and monetary policy during the 2002-2007 episode.
16
4 Sensitivity analysis
We now investigate the sensitivity of our results in various directions. The robustness
checks involve testing for indeterminacy on rolling windows and alternative measures
of output as well as using real-time data.7
We conduct further robustness checks that involve (i) estimating the policy pa-
rameters only, (ii) alternative priors for ψπ, (iii) alternative measure of inflation,
(iv) serially correlated monetary policy shocks, and (v) trend inflation. For all these
tests, our results remain unchanged.
4.1 Rolling windows
The size of our sample is undeniably short. So first and foremost, we want to
assess the extent to which our results might be an artifact of the small sample.
To do so, we re-estimate the model on rolling windows starting in the mid-1960’s,
and keeping the size of the windows fixed at 23 quarters to match the number of
observations in our period of interest. Thus the first window is 1966:I-1971:III. We
move the window forward one quarter at a time, and re-estimate all parameters each
time.8 Here we just consider CPI inflation as the Federal Reserve only began to base
its monetary policy deliberations on PCE and core PCE in the 2000s. Moreover,
doing so makes our results directly comparable to Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the posterior probability of determinacy for the
U.S. economy from 1966:I to 2008:III. The end point is chosen to avoid obvious
complications that emanate from hitting the zero lower bound. The graph suggests
that the U.S. economy was likely in a state of indeterminacy during the 1970s.
Thereafter, beginning with the Volcker disinflation policies, the economy shifted back
to a determinate equilibrium. These findings are consistent with related studies such
as Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Coibion and
7The Appendix conducts additional robustness checks that involve estimating the policy parame-
ters only; alternative priors for ψπ; an alternative measure of inflation; serially correlated monetary
shocks; trend inflation. Our results are robust to all these extensions.
8This approach to estimate linear DSGE models was recently promoted by Canova (2009),
Canova and Ferroni (2011a) and Castelnuovo (2012a,b). Rolling window estimation provides two
benefits. It allows us to uncover time-varying patterns of the model’s parameters, in particular, of
the monetary policy coeffi cients. At the same time, the procedure permits us to remain within the
realm of linear models and apply standard Bayesian methods.
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Figure 1: Probability of determinacy using rolling window estimation. The figure
plots the probability at the first quarter of a window.
Gorodnichenko (2011).9 We take this correspondence as a justification for estimating
our model on a short window.10 Our paper documents a second shift after the 2001
slump now from determinacy to indeterminacy.
4.2 Alternative measures of output
To make our baseline analysis comparable with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we
used HP-filtered real GDP per capita to measure output fluctuations. However,
as argued by Canova (1998), Gorodnichenko and Ng (2010), and Hamilton (2017)
among others, HP-filtered data may induce spurious results. Accordingly, we now
consider two alternative ways to gauge real economic activity. First, we replace the
output trend extracted using the HP filter with the Congressional Budget Offi ce’s
estimate of potential output as in Belongia and Ireland (2016) and others. Table 3
suggests that, again, our results remain robust. Second, we use output growth instead
of an output gap measure. To this end, we assume that the artificial economy now
9Figure 1 is comparable to Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011, Figure 4). They report a moving
average of the probability of determinacy which makes their series smoother than ours. Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2011) use a model with trend inflation. We explore such model in the Appendix.
10We furthermore experimented with the window length and the results appear to be robust.
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Table 3: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (Robustness)
Log-data density Probability
Inflation measure Det. Indet. Det. Indet.
CPI CBO output gap -97.89 -95.85 0.12 0.88
Output growth -93.29 -89.58 0.02 0.98
PCE CBO output gap -88.08 -88.18 0.53 0.47
Output growth -82.89 -81.80 0.25 0.75
Real-time data -83.32 -83.06 0.44 0.56
Core PCE CBO output gap -68.53 -73.63 0.99 0.01
Output growth -62.54 -67.58 1 0
Real-time data -65.85 -70.24 0.99 0.01
features trend-stationary technology —it follows a deterministic trend as in Mattesini
and Nisticò (2010) or Ascari, Castelnuovo and Rossi (2011).11 Also, we no longer
estimate the intertemporal rate of substitution, 1/τ , and instead set it equal to one
to make the model consistent with balanced growth. Then, Table 3 shows that when
using output growth, the case for indeterminacy becomes even stronger for CPI and
PCE. Yet, it remains unchanged when measuring inflation via core PCE data.12
4.3 Real-time data
One important distinction between CPI and PCE price indices is that the former are
not revised (except for seasonal adjustments), whereas the latter go through repeated
rounds of revision as more information becomes available. In particular, the PCE-
based measure of inflation in Bernanke’s (2010) speech is a real-time measure, which,
as he argues, may exhibit considerable differences relative to the revised PCE data.
Hence, like Orphanides (2004), we now take into account that monetary policymakers
make decisions based on contemporaneously available information. Therefore, our
estimation uses real-time data on output, PCE and core PCE from the Real-Time
Data Set for Macroeconomists provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia. Table 3 confirms that our findings remain robust: we can confidently rule out
11The measurement equation now writes γobsyt = γ
∗ + ∆ŷt where γobsyt is the observed growth rate
of output, γ∗ stands for the steady state growth rate and ∆ŷt is the first-differenced logarithm of
detrended model output. The prior distribution of γ∗ is N (0.5, 0.1).
12Given the indicated issues with HP-filtered data and the essentially unchanged results when
employing output growth, the remainder of this paper concentrates on output growth.
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indeterminacy when basing our estimation on core PCE, while there is a possibility
that indeterminacy might have prevailed under PCE.
4.4 Further tests of robustness
We conduct further robustness checks that involve (i) estimating the policy para-
meters only, (ii) alternative priors for ψπ, (iii) alternative measure of inflation, (iv)
serially correlated monetary policy shocks, and (v) trend inflation.13 For all these
tests, our main result so far that the basic New Keynesian model provides mixed
evidence about indeterminacy is robust.
5 Which measure of inflation to choose?
Our baseline estimations have delivered mixed evidence regarding the probability
of indeterminacy for the 2002:I to 2007:III period. The results are consistently
dependent on the specific inflation measure used in estimation —only with core PCE
series can we comfortably rule out indeterminacy. However, each inflation proxy may
only provide an imperfect indicator of the model concept. Put differently, all three
measures of inflation may contain relevant information. In this line of thinking, we
will now depart from the assumption that model inflation is measured by a single
series and draw on Boivin and Giannoni’s (2006) dynamic factor analysis of DSGE
models.14 In a nutshell, we want to exploit the information from all the inflation
series in the estimation to deliver more robust results. We treat the model concept
of inflation as the unobservable common factor for which data series are imperfect
proxies. More concretely, the estimation involves the transition equation (4)
%t = Φ(θ)%t−1 + Φε(θ, M̃)εt + Φζ(θ)ζt





13In the model with trend inflation, it is no longer possible to analytically derive the indeterminacy
conditions. Hence, we follow Hirose’s (2014) numerical solution strategy for finding the boundary
between determinacy and indeterminacy by perturbing the parameter ψπ in the monetary policy
rule (see also Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008).
14Canova and Ferroni (2011b) and Castelnuovo (2013) are recent applications.
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Here ∆GDPt stands for the growth rate of per-capita real GDP, FFRt denotes the
Federal Funds rate, Xt ≡ [∆CPIt,∆PCEt,∆corePCEt,∆DEFt]′ is the vector of
empirical inflation proxies,15 Λ =diag(λCPI , λPCE, λcorePCE, λDEF ) is a 4×4 diagonal
matrix of factor loadings relating the latent model concept of inflation to the four
indicators, πt ≡ 4[πt, πt, πt, πt]′ and ut = [uCPIt , uPCEt , ucorePCEt , uDEFt ]′ ∼ i.i.d.(0,Σ)
is a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated indicator-specific measurement er-






DEF ). We jointly estimate the parameters
(Λ,Σ) of the measurement equation (6) along with the structural parameters θ. We
calibrate π∗ equal to 2.5 percent - a value roughly in line with the average of the
sample means of the inflation series. We standardize the four indicators to have mean
zero and unit variance. This standardization permits us to interpret the factor load-
ings, λjs, as correlations between the latent theoretical concept of inflation and the
respective observables.16 Our prior distribution for the loadings and measurement
errors are λj ∼ Beta(0.50, 0.25) and ujt ∼ Inverse Gamma(0.10, 0.20) respectively.
By employing a beta distribution, the support of the λj is restricted to the open
interval (0, 1) which is a necessary sign restriction.
Table 4 reports the resulting log-data densities which are−162.50 for determinacy
and −161.83 for indeterminacy. Phrased differently, the posterior probabilities of
determinacy and indeterminacy are 34% versus 66%, hence, we cannot rule out
indeterminacy.17
Table 5 reports the posterior estimates of the model parameters along with the
factor loadings (i.e. the correlations between the latent factor and the proxies) as
well as the standard deviations of the measurement errors. Conditional on both
determinacy and indeterminacy the loadings on CPI and PCE are about three times
as large as the loading on core PCE. Furthermore, there is evidence of substantial
15DEF is the acronym for the GDP Deflator.
16See Geweke and Zhou (1996) and Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2000).
17We also replicated Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) with the DSGE factor model approach. The
outcomes of the indeterminacy test for the pre-Volcker and post-1982 sample periods remain unal-
tered to this extension.
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Table 4: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (DSGE-Factor)
Log-data density Probability
Determinacy Indeterminacy Determinacy Indeterminacy
-162.50 -161.83 0.34 0.66
Notes: The prior predictive probability of determinacy is 0.527.
indicator-specific component for core PCE as evident in the high standard deviation
of its measurement error. These results imply that CPI and PCE provide better
indicators of the latent concept of inflation, while core PCE, despite being promoted
by Bernanke (2015), is less informative. In other words, while core PCE might better
fit the Federal Reserve’s behavior in isolation, the other inflation measures are more
consistent with the New Keynesian model as a whole.
In sum, when taking the considered variants of the New Keynesian model, inde-
terminacy cannot be ruled out. What these model versions have in common though
is that they all feature only one measure of inflation. In the next section we turn to
an economy that explicitly differentiates between core and headline inflation rates.
6 An economy that distinguishes between core
and headline inflation
Our baseline results on the issue of equilibrium determinacy were clearly dependent
on the particular measure of inflation used in the estimation, thus leaving us with
essentially the same dilemma that Taylor and Bernanke originally posed: should we
measure inflation with CPI or Core PCE? In the previous section we have attempted
to resolve this ambiguity by taking an econometric approach that draws on the
DSGE-Factor analysis. Our estimation results there suggest that, for our period of
interest, the concept of inflation in the basic New Keynesian model is more strongly
correlated with broad indicators such as CPI and PCE than with narrower proxies
such as core PCE. The immediate implication of this finding is that the indeterminate
version of the model fits better than its determinate analogue.
However, the result that indeterminacy cannot be ruled out may hinge on the fact
that the three-equation New Keynesian model features a single concept of inflation.
Indeed, our DSGE-Factor approach forces the central bank to respond to the exact
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Table 5: Parameter Estimation Results (DSGE-Factor)
Determinacy Indeterminacy
Mean [5th pct, 95thpct] Mean [5th pct, 95th pct]
ψπ 2.13 [1.29,3.13] 0.80 [0.61,0.98]
ψy 0.30 [0.07,0.65] 0.21 [0.05,0.45]
ρR 0.81 [0.72,0.88] 0.81 [0.73,0.88]
r∗ 1.00 [0.45,1.67] 1.23 [0.57,2.00]
κ 0.74 [0.41,1.15] 1.00 [0.57,1.49]
γ∗ 0.53 [0.45,0.62] 0.51 [0.44,0.58]
ρg 0.79 [0.68,0.87] 0.60 [0.45,0.74]
ρz 0.68 [0.50,0.85] 0.70 [0.54,0.84]




σR 0.18 [0.13,0.25] 0.16 [0.12,0.21]
σg 0.19 [0.14,0.27] 0.28 [0.18,0.42]
σz 0.69 [0.50,0.94] 0.73 [0.53,1.00]
σζ 0.18 [0.12,0.27]
λCPI 0.76 [0.55,0.93] 0.57 [0.37,0.79]
λPCE 0.79 [0.59,0.95] 0.59 [0.40,0.82]
λCorePCE 0.28 [0.07,0.52] 0.21 [0.06,0.40]
λDEF 0.53 [0.31,0.77] 0.41 [0.23,0.64]
σCPI 0.31 [0.20,0.43] 0.32 [0.22,0.43]
σPCE 0.18 [0.10,0.31] 0.18 [0.10,0.29]
σCorePCE 0.91 [0.72,1.14] 0.91 [0.72,1.14]
σDEF 0.71 [0.56,0.90] 0.70 [0.56,0.88]
Notes: The table reports posterior means and 90 percent probability intervals
of the DSGE-Factor model parameters.
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same measure of inflation (i.e. same combination of indicators) as the one that
households consider in their consumption-spending decisions. But what (would be
the consequences for equilibrium determinacy) if the Federal Reserve was actually
focusing on core inflation in its conduct of monetary policy, as claimed by Bernanke
(2015), while private-sector agents were looking at a different, broader, measure of
inflation?
To address this question, we now turn toward a structural approach by employing
an artificial economy that distinguishes explicitly between core and headline inflation,
i.e. both inflation concepts simultaneously appear in the model.
6.1 Model
The artificial economy builds on Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Blanchard and
Riggi (2013) who introduce imported oil into an otherwise standard New Keynesian
model. We present the key aspects of the linearized model here and delegate the full
description to the Appendix. Our exposition draws heavily on Blanchard and Gali
(2010).
Oil is used by firms in production and by households in consumption. In partic-
ular, technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function that uses labor, nt,
and oil, mt :
qt = αmt + (1− α)nt 0 < α < 1 (7)
where qt stands for gross output. Similarly, final consumption, ct, is made up of
domestically produced good, cq,t, and imported oil, cm,t:18
ct = (1− χ)cq,t + χcm,t 0 < χ < 1. (8)
Denoting the price of domestic output and the price of consumption by pq,t and pc,t
respectively, and letting pm,t be the nominal price of oil, the following relationship
arises between consumption-price inflation πc,t and domestic output-price inflation
πq,t:
πc,t = πq,t + χ∆st (9)
where st is the real price of oil, st ≡ pm,t − pq,t , which is exogenous. Following
Aoki (2001) and Blanchard and Gali (2010), we interpret πc,t and πq,t as headline
18If the shares α and χ are set to zero, the economy boils down to a simple three-equation New
Keynesian model, similar to the one we have used in the previous sections.
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and core inflation respectively. Utility maximization by the household yields the
standard intertemporal optimality condition
ct = Etct+1 + Etzt+1 −Rt + Etπc,t+1 + dt − Etdt+1 (10)
and the intratemporal leisure-consumption trade-off
wt − pc,t = γ(wt−1 − pc,t−1) + (1− γ)[ϕnt + ct]. (11)
Here Rt denotes the nominal interest rate, dt is a discount-factor shock, zt is a shock
to the growth rate of technology, wt denotes the nominal wage and ϕ stands for
the inverse Frisch elasticity. The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] captures the extent of real
wage rigidity where larger values indicate higher degrees of rigidity. Notice in the
household’s Euler equation (10) that the model-consistent real interest rate that
drives consumption dynamics involves headline consumption price inflation. Domes-
tic firms are monopolistic competitors facing nominal rigidities à la Calvo. Firms’
profit-maximizing pricing decisions result in the familiar aggregate New Keynesian
Phillips curve which governs the dynamics of domestic-good sticky-price inflation
(i.e. core inflation):
πq,t = βEtπq,t+1 − κµt (12)
where the slope coeffi cient κ ≡ (1−ξ)(1−βξ)
ξ
, ξ denotes the probability of not being
able to reset prices, β represents the household’s discount factor and µt is the price
markup over nominal marginal costs. Cost minimization by firms gives rise to the
following demand for oil:
mt = qt − µt − st. (13)
The requirement that trade be balanced (as oil is imported) delivers the following
relationship between final consumption and domestic output:
ct = qt − χst + ηµt (14)
where η ≡ αMP−α andM
P denotes the steady-state gross markup. Value added (i.e.
GDP), denoted by yt, is given by:
yt = qt +
α
1− αst + ηµt. (15)
25
Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule which reacts to inflation, deviations of GDP
from the balanced-growth path and the growth rate of GDP, gyt ≡ yt − yt−1 + zt:
Rt = ρRRt−1 + (1− ρR)[ψπ{ωπc,t + (1− ω)πq,t}+ ψyyt + ψgygyt] + εR,t
where the monetary policy shock εR,t is i.i.d. N(0, σ2R). Notice that the central bank
responds to a convex combination of headline and core inflation (with the parameter
ω governing the relative weights; setting ω to zero implies that the central bank
responds to core inflation only). As we have seen, the controversy between Taylor
and Bernanke essentially boils down to the choice of the inflation measure in the
monetary policy rule. By estimating ω, we will let the data speak as to whether the
Federal Reserve was actually focusing on headline (Taylor, 2007) or core inflation
(Bernanke, 2015). Lastly the structural disturbances st, zt, and dt are assumed to
follow independent stationary AR(1) processes:
st = ρsst−1 + εst zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt and dt = ρddt−1 + εdt.
We find that the Taylor Principle continues to hold in the Blanchard-Gali model.19
In line with Carlstrom, Fuerst and Ghironi (2006), the indeterminacy condition is
not dependent on any particular measure of inflation: as long as the central bank
sets its response coeffi cient greater than unity to either headline or core inflation (or
any convex combination of these two measures), such policy will ensure equilibrium
determinacy.
6.2 Econometric strategy and results
To address typical identification issues, we calibrate a subset of the model parameters.
We set the discount factor β to 0.99, the steady-state markup at ten percent, and
the inverse of the labor-supply elasticity ϕ to one. Following the computations in
Blanchard and Gali (2010) for their post-1984 sample period, we calibrate the shares
of oil in production and consumption to α = 0.012 and χ = 0.017. Furthermore,
we assume that shocks to the growth rate of technology are i.i.d., i.e. ρz = 0. We
estimate the remaining parameters with Bayesian techniques. We use a loose Beta
distribution centered at 0.5 to place an agnostic prior on both the wage-rigidity
19Figure A5 in the Appendix shows the determinacy region for combinations of ψπ with the other
policy parameters as well as with the degree of real wage rigidity γ.
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parameter, γ, and the weight on headline inflation in the monetary policy rule, ω.
The other priors are similar to the ones we have used in the earlier sections and are
reported in Table 6.
For our purpose, the main appeal of the Blanchard-Gali model is that it offers
a micro-founded distinction between core and headline inflation which permits us
to use both headline and core inflation data in the estimation. This approach will
hopefully resolve some of the ambiguity that characterized our previous results.
At first, however, to maintain a continuity with our earlier findings, we estimate
the new model using the exact same dataset with only three observables: the quar-
terly growth rate of real GDP per-capita, the Federal Funds rate and one of two
alternative inflation rates, CPI or core PCE. Since we are initially using only one
inflation series at a time, the weight ω in the Taylor rule is not well identified. Hence,
when using CPI data, we calibrate this parameter to one, so that the central bank
responds solely to headline inflation as in Taylor (2007). Similarly, when measuring
inflation with core PCE, we set ω equal to zero, so that the monetary authority
reacts to core inflation as Bernanke (2015) suggests. Table 6 reports the posterior
estimates while Table 7 gives the log-data densities. In line with all our previous
results, the estimation favors the indeterminate version of the model whenever we
use CPI data, while it unambiguously selects determinacy under core PCE. Since
we are using our original dataset, we can compare the marginal data densities of the
augmented economy with the ones of the baseline model shown in Table 3 (the row
labelled ‘Output Growth’). The fact that these densities are of similar magnitude
indicates that the additional micro-foundations of the Blanchard-Gali model are not
rejected by the data.
We can now move on to our next exercise: treating simultaneously both headline
and core inflation as observables. Hence, our dataset will now include four variables.
This step enables us to properly identify the commodity-price shock as well as the
weight ω in the policy rule. First, we measure headline and core inflation using PCE
and core PCE data respectively. Then, we consider CPI as the proxy for headline
inflation, while still using core PCE data to measure core inflation. Using CPI and
core PCE data simultaneously to estimate the model helps us tackle the controversy
between Taylor and Bernanke in a more direct way.20 Table 7 (cf. the two rows
20However, this combination of headline CPI and core PCE data is not ideal to measure the
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Table 6: Priors and posteriors for DSGE parameters
Posterior Mean [5th pct, 95th pct]
Three obs Four obs Five obs







































































































































































































− − − − −
Mzζ N(0,1) −0.36
[−0.63,−0.11]
− − − − −
MRζ N(0,1) −0.17
[−1.12,0.90]
− − − − −
Msζ N(0,1) 0.01
[−0.71,0.76]
− − − − −
Mdζ N(0,1) −1.20
[−1.66,−0.87]
− − − − −
Notes: N stands for Normal, B Beta, G Gamma, and IG inverse gamma distribution. For each
prior distribution, the parameters in parenthesis are the mean and standard deviation.
28
Table 7: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy
Log-data density Probability
Inflation measure Det. Indet. Det. Indet.
Three obs (CPI) −93.98 −88.06 0 1
Three obs (CorePCE) −61.14 −67.33 1 0
Four obs (PCE, CorePCE) −111.55 −123.16 1 0
Four obs (CPI, CorePCE) −126.01 −138.31 1 0
Five obs (PCE, CorePCE) −156.30 −161.86 1 0
Five obs (CPI, CorePCE) −174.66 −181.61 1 0
Notes: The prior predictive probability of determinacy is 0.51.
labelled “Four obs”) shows that, no matter whether we measure headline inflation
with PCE or CPI data, the whole posterior probability mass concentrates in the de-
terminacy region. Looking at Table 6 (cf. the two columns labelled “Four obs”), the
posterior mean of the weight on headline inflation in the policy rule, ω, is 0.25 with
PCE data and 0.17 when we use CPI. Our estimation results therefore provide some
empirical support for Bernanke’s (2015) claim that the Federal Reserve was actively
reacting to core inflation (as opposed to headline) during this period. Moreover, as
anticipated, the parameters pertaining to the commodity-price shock are now better
identified: the posterior mean estimates of ρs and σs are both significantly higher
than the estimates we obtain when using only three observables.
A key parameter in the Blanchard and Gali (2010) model is the degree of real
wage rigidity, γ. To sharpen the identification of this feature, we finally add real
wage data, i.e. we ultimately employ five observables to estimate the model. We use
observations on hourly compensation for the non-farm business sector for all persons
as a measure of nominal wages. To get real wages, we then divide this proxy by,
alternatively, the PCE or CPI price deflator (depending on how we measure headline
inflation). To circumvent the issue of stochastic singularity, we add a labor supply
theory’s concepts of headline and core inflation: In the model, the core deflator is defined implicitly
by excluding oil (the imported commodity) from the consumer’s basket, without altering the weights
of others goods. Yet, the CPI and PCE price index are assembled in different ways and attach
different weights to different goods.
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shock, νt.21 As a result, the labor supply equation (11) becomes:
wt − pc,t = γ(wt−1 − pc,t−1) + (1− γ)[ϕnt + ct] + νt. (16)
Our main finding, that the data favors determinacy in this extended model, remains
unchanged. The parameter estimate of γ becomes twice as large when we use real
wage data, suggesting a substantial degree of real wage rigidity. This result con-
trasts with Blanchard and Riggi (2013) who find that real wages were highly flexible
during the Great Moderation period. This divergence might be due to the different
estimation strategy we employ. While Blanchard and Riggi (2013) adopt a limited-
information approach that matches impulse responses to a commodity price shock
in the DSGE model and in a structural VAR, we use a full-information Bayesian
estimation with multiple shocks.
In summary, our estimation of the Blanchard-Gali model provides evidence that
the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy in the aftermath of the 2001 slump was re-
sponding mainly to core PCE and was suffi ciently active to ensure equilibrium de-
terminacy. These results line up with Bernanke’s (2015) account.22
7 Concluding remarks
Using the Taylor rule as a benchmark for evaluating the Federal Reserve’s interest-
rate setting decisions, some commentators have argued that monetary policy was too
accommodative during the 2002-2005 period. Along these lines, this paper starts by
estimating a basic New Keynesian model of the U.S. economy for the time following
the 2001 slump. Our assessment of the Federal Reserve’s performance varies with
the measure of inflation that is put into the model estimation. When measuring
inflation with CPI or PCE, we find some support for the view that monetary policy
during these years was extra easy and led to equilibrium indeterminacy. Instead,
if the estimation involves core PCE, monetary policy comes out as active and the
21As in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010), we normalize
the labor supply shock such that it enters the household’s intratemporal optimality condition with
a unit coeffi cient. This procedure improves the identification of the standard deviation of the labor
supply disturbance and facilitates the convergence of the MCMC algorithm.
22Likewise we have estimated the model with CPI and core CPI data. Furthermore, we have also
used real-time data on per-capita real GDP growth rate, PCE and core PCE inflation. Our results
remain robust and are reported in the Appendix.
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evidence for indeterminacy dissipates. This divergence of results remains robust to
several extensions. Our take is that each inflation series only provides an imperfect
proxy for the model’s concept of inflation. We re-formulate the artificial economy as
a factor model where the theory’s concept of inflation is the common factor to the
alternative empirical inflation series. Again, extra easy monetary policy as well as
indeterminacy cannot be ruled out. This finding, however, may hinge on the fact
that the model features a single concept of inflation. Thus, we finally move to an
economy that explicitly distinguishes between headline and core inflation. We find
that the Federal Reserve was responding mainly to core PCE and was suffi ciently
active to comfortably rule out indeterminacy.
We chose to make these arguments while staying in relatively standard models.
This choice enables to establish a bridge from existing research to our study which we
believe is important given the short sample period that we consider. We specifically
did not add asset markets to the model or in the estimation. Thus, in terms of
possible extensions, it would be worthwhile to introduce housing into the model and
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Appendix A
This Appendix presents several extensions and robustness checks to our paper. Sec-
tion A.1 describes the plain-vanilla New Keynesian model used in our baseline analy-
sis, the solution method under indeterminacy as well as the data and estimation strat-
egy. The section also discusses about the propagation of shocks, both fundamental
and sunspots, and also the unconditional forecast error variance decomposition of
shocks along with some extra results. Section A.2 presents various robustness checks.
Finally, Section A.3 describes in details an artificial economy that distinguishes be-
tween core and headline inflation. The theoretical model in that section builds on
Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Blanchard and Riggi (2013).
A.1 Framework of the structural analysis
Baseline New Keynesian Model
The artificial economy can be summarized in terms of the familiar linearized three
equations of the plain-vanilla New Keynesian (NK) model:
yt = Etyt+1 − τ(Rt − Etπt+1) + gt (17)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ(yt − zt) (18)
Rt = ρRRt−1 + (1− ρR)(ψππt + ψy [yt − zt]) + εR,t. (19)
Here yt stands for the output, Rt denotes the interest rate and πt symbolizes the
inflation rate. Et represents the expectations operator. Equation (1) is the dy-
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namic IS-relation reflecting an Euler equation in which τ can be interpreted as the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Equation (2) describes the expectational
Phillips curve where 0 < β < 1 is the agents’discount factor. Finally, equation
(3) describes monetary policy, i.e. a Taylor-type nominal interest rate rule in which
ψπand ψy are chosen by the central bank and echo its responsiveness to inflation
and the output gap, yt − zt. 0 < ρR < 1 is the usual smoothing term. εR,t denotes
an exogenous monetary policy shock whose standard deviation is given by σR. Fun-
damental disturbances involve exogenous shifts of the Euler equation captured by
the process gt and shifts of the marginal costs of production captured by zt. Both
variables follow AR(1) processes:
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t 0 < ρg < 1 (20)
zt = ρzzt−1 + εz,t 0 < ρz < 1. (21)
The standard deviations for the demand and supply shocks are denoted by σg and σz.
We allow for a non-zero correlation, ρg,z, between the demand and supply innovations.
Indeterminacy implies that fluctuations in economic activity can be driven by
arbitrary, self-fulfilling changes in people’s expectations (i.e. sunspots). Concretely,
in the above New Keynesian model this can occur if the central bank only irresolutely
responds to inflation changes. The precise analytical condition for indeterminacy
corresponds to φπ < 1− φy (1− β) /κ.
Rational-expectations solution under indeterminacy
Here we will outline the solution to this model which follows Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003). Let us denote by ηt the vector of one-step ahead expectational errors. More-
over, define %t as the vector of endogenous variables and εt as vector of fundamental
shocks. Then, the linear rational expectation system can be compactly written as
Γ0(θ)%t = Γ1(θ)%t−1 + Ψ(θ)εt + Π(θ)ηt (22)
where Γ0(θ), Γ1(θ), Ψ(θ), and Π(θ) are appropriately defined coeffi cient matrices. We
follow Sims’(2002) solution algorithm that was revisited by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003). This has the advantage of being general and explicit in dealing with expec-
tation errors since it makes the solution suitable for solving and estimating models
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which feature multiple equilibria. In particular, under indeterminacy ηt will be a lin-
ear function of the fundamental shocks and the purely extrinsic sunspot disturbances,
ζt. Hence, the full set of solutions to the LRE model entails
%t = Φ(θ)%t−1 + Φε(θ, M̃)εt + Φζ(θ)ζt (23)
where Φ(θ), Φε(θ, M̃) and Φζ(θ)23 are the coeffi cient matrices.24 The sunspot shock
satisfies ζt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2ζ). Accordingly, indeterminacy can manifest itself in one of
two different ways: (i) pure extrinsic non-fundamental disturbances can affect model
dynamics through endogenous expectation errors and (ii) the propagation of fun-
damental shocks cannot be uniquely pinned down and the multiplicity of equilibria
affecting this propagation mechanism is captured by the arbitrary matrix M̃ .
Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) we replace M̃ withM∗(θ)+M and in the
subsequent empirical analysis set the prior mean forM equal to zero. The particular
solution employed in their paper selects M∗(θ) by using a least squares criterion
to minimize the behavior of the model under determinacy and indeterminacy by
assuming that it remains unchanged across the boundary. "Behavior" needs be
described in some meaningful way and we follow them by choosing M∗(θ) such
that the response of the endogenous variables to fundamental shocks, ∂%t/∂ε
′
t, are
continuous at the boundary between the determinacy and the indeterminacy region.
Data
Figure 2 plots the three different measures of inflation, namely, CPI, PCE and
core PCE. Headline inflation (both CPI and PCE) is more volatile than core inflation
over the relevant period. In fact, headline inflation tends to be more volatile than
core inflation measures that exclude or downweight the most volatile components,
particularly in periods of persistent commodity price shocks.
Figure 3 plots the autocorrelation pattern (with five leads and lags) of the three
different measures of inflation along with their cross-correlation with the growth
rate of GDP and the Federal Funds rate. As seen in the figure, the cross-correlation
patterns of headline inflation measures (CPI and PCE) on the one hand, and of core
23Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) express this term as Φζ(θ,Mζ), whereMζ is an arbitrary matrix.
For identification purpose, they impose the normalization such that Mζ = I.
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Figure 3: Correlation pattern of various inflation measures
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PCE on the other hand, with the other two observables are notably different during
our period of interest.
Estimation Strategy
We employ Bayesian techniques for estimating the parameters of the model and
test for indeterminacy using posterior model probabilities. In order to construct a
likelihood function the DSGE model is turned into a Bayesian model. Toward that
purpose we need to define a set of measurement equations that relate the elements
of %t to a set of observables xt which is given by
xt =
 γ∗r∗ + π∗
π∗
+
 1 0 0 0 0 0 00 4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 4 0 0 0 0
 %t (24)
where π∗, r∗and γ∗ are annualized steady state inflation, annualized steady state real
interest rates and quarterly steady state growth rate of real GDP per capita respec-
tively.25 Equations (7) and (8) provide a state-space representation for the linearized
DSGE model that allows us to continue to apply standard Bayesian methodologies.
First priors are described by a density function of the form
p(θS|S)
where S ∈ {D, I} stands for a specific model, θS represents the parameter of the
model S, p(.) stands for probability density function. Next, the likelihood function
describes the density of the observed data:
L(θS|XT , S) ≡ p(XT |θS, S)
where XT are the observations until period T . By using Bayes theorem we can
combine the prior density and the likelihood function to get the posterior density:
p(θS, XT , S) =
p(XT |θS, S)p(θS|S)
p(XT , S)
where p(XT |S) is the marginal marginal density of the data conditional on the model
which is given by






Finally, the posterior kernel corresponds to the numerator of the posterior density:
p(θS|XT , S)∞p(XT |θS, S)p(θS|S) ≡ κ(θS|XT , S).
We maximize the posterior kernel and find the posterior mode in the two regions
of the parameter space using Sims’ csminwel. The inverse Hessian is calculated
at the posterior mode.26 Next for each region of the parameter space we estimate
the likelihood function with the help of the Kalman filter and generate 250,000
draws with a random-walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm. The algorithm is tuned to
achieve 25 to 30 percent acceptance rate. Half of the parameter draws are discarded
to ensure convergence and the remaining draws are used to generate our results.
The marginal data densities for the two regions are computed with Geweke’s (1999)
modified harmonic mean estimator.
Propagation of Shocks
Here we study the propagation of sunspots as well as of fundamental shocks.
Figure 4 depicts the impulse responses of output, inflation and the nominal interest
rate under determinacy (the model being estimated using core PCE inflation) while
Figure 5 graphs the responses under indeterminacy (using CPI inflation). Solid lines
track the posterior means while the shaded areas cover the 90 percent probability
intervals.
Let us begin with the model’s reaction to sunspots. The bottom panels of Figure
4 display the reaction to an inflationary sunspot shock. The impulse responses show
that the shock reduces the expected real return which subsequently increases current
consumption and hence output. The Phillips curve then translates this into a rise of
inflation thereby creating a self-fulfilling cycle: higher inflation expectations lead to
higher actual inflation.
Fundamental shocks follow next. The first and second rows of Figures 4 and 5
plot the responses to monetary policy and cost-push shocks. The patterns of the key
26For our rolling windown approach, if for a particular sample a region of the parameter space
does not have a local mode, we use the inverse Hessian obtained from the nearest previous sample
for that region.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses under determinacy from the model estimated over the
period 2002:I - 2007:III using Core PCE inflation.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses under indeterminacy from the model estimated over the
period 2002:I - 2007:III using CPI inflation.
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Table 8: Variance Decomposition
Variables\Shocks εR εg εz ζ
CPI (Indet.) y 9.44 7.47 82.37 0.71
π 21.82 54.53 16.45 7.2
R 1.29 74.28 16.24 8.20
Core PCE (Det.) y 1.99 83.57 14.43 -
π 39.25 31.03 29.72 -
R 7.51 69.37 23.12 -
model variables look similar for both the indeterminate and the determinate versions
of the model. This contrasts with the responses to aggregate demand shocks. While
at impact we observe an increase of output in both regimes, the responses of inflation
are quite different. The determinate model’s response of inflation is conventional: it
increases which is matched by the central bank tightening its policy —the nominal
interest rate rises. However, inflation falls under indeterminacy which appears to
reflect the alternative propagation of fundamental shocks in model versions that
feature indeterminacy. These propagation dynamics are captured by the elements of
the matrix M. In particular, the posterior estimate ofMGζ is far from zero at −1.99
and as such qualitatively alters the dynamics of a demand shock.
Variance Decomposition
The unconditional forecast error variance decomposition at the posterior mean
for output (deviations from trend), inflation and interest rates are reported in Table
8. The εgt and εzt shocks are orthogonalized such that the cost-push shock only
affects εzt and the demand shock affects both εgt and εzt. The rationale is that
demand shocks will affect the labor supply decisions, hence, the firms’cost function.
The main message we take from this exercise is that in the indeterminacy regime,
cost-push shocks cause over 80 percent of output fluctuations whereas in determinacy
case aggregate demand disturbances are the main driver of aggregate fluctuations.
Sunspot shocks play only a marginal role with the most significant contribution
being eight percent in explaining the variance decomposition of the policy rate. This
is in line with the results reported above. In conclusion, using different measures
of inflation results in drastically different interpretations of the potential causes of
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Table 9: Benchmark Model versus Determinate Model with Habit
Log-data density
Inflation measure Specification Det. Indet. Probability
CPI Benchmark -95.48 -93.28 0.87
Habit -95.18 0.13
PCE Benchmark -85.42 -85.75 0.26
Habit -84.70 0.74




It is well known that the determinate New Keynesian model features a poor in-
ternal propagation mechanism while the model potentially exhibits richer dynamics
under indeterminacy. Accordingly, the posterior mass might be biased toward the
indeterminacy region.27Hence, following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we extend
the model by adding consumption habits. Log-data densities for the habit specifica-
tion conditional on determinacy are reported in Table 9: the habit model fits better
than the no-habit specification restricted to determinacy. The last column of Table
9 compares the respective posterior probabilities of the baseline model under inde-
terminacy and the habit model under determinacy. For example, when measuring
inflation with CPI, the data favors the benchmark model under indeterminacy over
the habit specification restricted to determinacy. Again, the results carry over from
the benchmark exercise i.e. Table 2 in the paper.
Estimation Results under PCE
According to the semi-annual monetary policy reports to Congress (Humphrey-
Hawkins reports), the Federal Reserve has also been looking at headline PCE infla-
tion from 2000 to 2004. Hence, we employ PCE to measure inflation while estimating
our model and the evidence is mixed at best, the probability of determinacy is 0.58.
Phrased alternatively, we can neither exclude nor rule in indeterminacy. Table 10
27See the discussion between Beyer and Farmer (2007) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).
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Table 10: Parameter Estimation Results
PCE (Indeterminacy) PCE (Determinacy)
Mean 90-percent interval Mean 90-percent interval
ψπ 0.82 [0.58,0.97] 2.13 [1.30,3.09]
ψy 0.21 [0.05, 0.45] 0.27 [0.06,0.59]
ρR 0.83 [0.74, 0.90] 0.85 [0.77,0.91]
π∗ 3.36 [1.30, 6.21] 2.24 [1.63,2.84]
r∗ 1.26 [0.55, 2.10] 1.17 [0.56,1.90]
κ 0.73 [0.40, 1.16] 0.75 [0.39,1.22]
τ−1 1.69 [1.02 2.50] 1.83 [1.09,2.72]
ρg 0.60 [0.45, 0.73] 0.79 [0.70,0.86]
ρz 0.81 [0.70, 0.90] 0.62 [0.46,0.78]
ρgz -0.27 [-0.72, 0.25] 0.64 [0.23,0.92]
MRζ -0.16 [-1.51, 1.40]
Mgζ -1.91 [-2.80, -1.01]
Mzζ 0.43 [0.09, 0.81]
σR 0.15 [0.12, 0.20] 0.16 [0.12,0.21]
σg 0.26 [0.17, 0.38] 0.19 [0.14,0.27]
σz 0.69 [0.50, 0.94] 0.70 [0.51,0.96]
σζ 0.19 [0.12, 0.28]
Notes: The table reports posterior means and 90-percent probability
intervals of the model parameters. The posterior summary statistics are
calculated from the output of the Metropolis Hastings algorithm.
reports posterior estimates of the model parameters under both determinacy and
indeterminacy.
A.2 Sensitivity analysis
We now investigate the sensitivity of our results in various directions. The robustness
checks involve (i) estimating the policy parameters only, (ii) alternative priors for ψπ,
(iii) alternative measure of inflation, (iv) serially correlated monetary policy shocks,
and (v) trend inflation.
Estimating the policy parameters only
As a further robustness check to address the small sample issue, we only estimate
the policy parameters over the 2002-2007 period. More concretely, we exclusively
estimate the three Taylor rule parameters along with the standard deviation of the
monetary policy shock (as well as the sunspots related parameters, i.e. the Ms and
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σζ , for the indeterminacy version of the model). As for the other parameters, all were
calibrated at the posterior means obtained from estimating the determinate model
over the period 1991:II to 2001:IV. The reason for beginning right after the 1990-91
recession is closely connected to Figure 1: it comfortably rules out indeterminacy
even for “short” periods. Table 11 reports strong evidence for indeterminacy not
only when we measure inflation with CPI but also with PCE. However, as before, the
posterior probability puts all its weight on determinacy when inflation is measured
using Core PCE.
Alternative priors
One possible drawback to using a small sample size is that the prior might speak
louder than the data. To make our empirical analysis transparent, the priors we
employ in our baseline estimation (Table 1) were set identical to the ones used
by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Accordingly, our baseline specification implies
a prior probability of determinacy equal to 0.53. To assess the sensitivity of our
results to the priors, we alter the prior distribution for the key parameter that drives
indeterminacy. Specifically, we change the prior mean of ψπ from 1.1 to 1.3 and in
doing so we ramp up the prior probability of determinacy from 0.53 to 0.7. Thus, the
indeterminacy test will now find it harder to favor indeterminacy. Table 11 reports
the posterior probabilities of (in-)determinacy under this alternative prior for each
measure of inflation. The results remain largely unaltered. For example, the odds
of indeterminacy versus determinacy are still five to one when estimating the model
using CPI inflation. This finding provides some further support for our results.
GDP deflator
While not mentioned in the Humphrey-Hawkins reports to have informed Fed-
eral Reserve’s policy deliberations during the 2000s, we lastly re-do the analysis
with the GDP deflator as the inflation measure (as in Smets and Wouters, 2007).
Then, the log-data densities are very close at −73.26 for determinacy and −74.16 for
indeterminacy. Phrased differently, the posterior probabilities of determinacy and
indeterminacy are 71% versus 29% and again we cannot rule out indeterminacy.
Serially correlated monetary policy shocks
Our findings so far have lend some support to the conjecture that monetary
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Table 11: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (Robustness)
Log-data density Probability
Inflation measure Det. Indet. Det. Indet.
CPI Policy parameters only -99.97 -95.50 0.01 0.99
Alternative prior for ψπ -95.04 -93.58 0.19 0.81
CBO output gap -97.89 -95.85 0.12 0.88
Output growth -93.29 -89.58 0.02 0.98
AR(1) policy shocks -89.51 -85.68 0.02 0.98
Trend Inflation with standard TR -91.38 -87.13 0.02 0.98
Trend Inflation with alternative TR -85.16 -83.25 0.13 0.87
PCE Policy parameters only -99.36 -88.79 0.07 0.93
Alternative prior for ψπ -85.04 -85.98 0.72 0.28
CBO output gap -88.08 -88.18 0.53 0.47
Output growth -82.89 -81.80 0.25 0.75
Real-time data -83.32 -83.06 0.44 0.56
AR(1) policy shocks -77.59 -77.25 0.42 0.58
Trend Inflation with standard TR -81.54 -82.01 0.62 0.38
Trend Inflation with alternative TR -75.79 -77.41 0.83 0.17
Core PCE Policy parameters only -63.49 -69.49 1 0
Alternative prior for ψπ -64.47 -71.74 1 0
CBO output gap -68.53 -73.63 0.99 0.01
Output growth -62.54 -67.58 1 0
Real-time data -65.85 -70.24 0.99 0.01
AR(1) policy shocks -53.91 -62.09 1 0
Trend Inflation with standard TR -61.13 -64.53 0.97 0.03
Trend Inflation with alternative TR -56.68 -60.75 0.98 0.02
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policy was extra easy following the 2001 recession. Our exercise interprets this
view as a reduction in the Federal Reserve’s systematic response to the inflation
gap (thereby leading to indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium).
However, alternatively, extended periods of low interest rates could also arise due to
discretionary deviations from the monetary policy rule (see also Rudebusch, 2002,
Groshenny, 2013, and Belongia and Ireland, 2016). To assess the robustness of our
interpretation, we next allow the monetary policy shocks to be serially correlated.
Specifically, we assume that the policy shocks follow the AR(1) process
εR,t = ρεRεR,t−1 + vt 0 ≤ ρεR < 1
where vt is i.i.d.N(0, σ2v) and jointly estimate the autocorrelation parameter, ρεR ,
and the standard deviation of the shock, σ2v, along with the other parameters of the
model.28 Table 11 confirms that our results remain unaltered: we still cannot rule
out passive responsiveness to inflation and thereby the possibility of indeterminacy.
Trend inflation
So far, our analysis had assumed that the U.S. economy is reasonably approx-
imated by the standard New Keynesian model linearized around a zero inflation
steady state. However, the Federal Reserve’s implicit inflation target as well as the
average inflation rate during the Great Moderation period was around two to three
percent (depending on the chosen price index). Thus, we extend the baseline model
to allow for positive trend inflation. This extension becomes meaningful for at least
two further reasons as (i) positive trend inflation alters the determinacy properties
of the model and (ii) as the determinate plain-vanilla New Keynesian model features
a poor internal propagation mechanism, the posterior mass might be biased toward
the indeterminacy region29, however, trend inflation generates more endogenous per-
sistence of inflation and output even in the determinacy case.
The estimation is based on a version of Ascari and Sbordone’s (2014) Generalized
New Keynesian model (GNK). Unlike Ascari and Sbordone, we assume deterministic
growth and we replace their labor supply disturbance by a discount factor shock, dt,
as our stand-in for demand shocks. Also, our Taylor rule involves responses to the
28The AR(1) coeffi cient of the policy shock follows a beta prior with mean 0.5 and standard
deviation 0.2.
29See the discussion between Beyer and Farmer (2007) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).
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output gap instead of log-deviations from the steady state. This then makes our
setup similar to Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2015).30 The log-linearized
(detrended) model consists of the Euler equation
yt = Etyt+1 − (Rt − Etπt+1) + dt − dt+1
where we have set the intertemporal rate of substitution equal to one to make the
model compatible with balanced growth as well as the Taylor rule
Rt = ρRRt−1 + (1− ρR)(ψππt + ψy[yt − zt]) + εR,t 0 ≤ ρR < 1
to capture the central bank’s behavior. The supply side is no longer summarized by a
single Phillips curve expression but rather it consists of the following three equations
for inflation, an auxiliary variable, ψt, and price dispersion, st:
πt = κEtπt+1 + ϑ [ϕst + (1 + ϕ)yt − (1 + ϕ)zt]−$Etψt+1 +$dt













where ϑ ≡ (1 − ξπε−1)(1 − ξβπε)/ξπε−1, κ ≡ β [1 + ε(π − 1)(1− ξπε−1)], and $ ≡
β(1−π)(1−ξπε−1). The term ξ denotes the Calvo-parameter and β stands in for the
steady state discount factor. We set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ϕ, equal
to one and calibrate the elasticity of substitution ε = 11 such that the steady state
mark-up equals ten percent.
As mentioned above, the GNK model exhibits richer dynamics and the usual
Taylor principle (ψπ > 1) is no longer a suffi cient condition for local determinacy
of equilibrium. Due to the higher-order dynamics of the GNK model and our as-
sumption of a unit Frisch elasticity of labor supply, it is not possible to analytically
derive the indeterminacy conditions. To continue solving the model via Lubik and
Schorfheide’s (2004) continuity solution (where M∗(θ) is selected such that the re-
sponses of the endogenous variables to the fundamental shocks are continuous at the
boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy region) one needs to resort to
numerical methods. In particular, we follow Hirose’s (2014) numerical solution strat-
egy for finding the boundary between determinacy and indeterminacy by perturbing
the parameter ψπ in the monetary policy rule.
31
30They, however, assume firm-specific labor as well as stochastic growth.
31See also Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
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Table 12: Priors and posteriors for DSGE parameters (Trend Inflation)
Posterior Mean [5th pct, 95th pct]
Standard TR Alternative TR








































































































































































Notes: The inverse gamma priors are of the form p (σ|υ, ς)∞σ−υ−1e−
υς2
2σ2 , where ν = 2 and
ς = 0.282.
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Table 13: Posteriors for DSGE parameters estimated using PCE (Trend Inflation)
Posterior Mean


































































































































As before we use the growth rate of GDP, the Federal Funds rate and the three
measures of inflation sequentially. Table 11 provides the marginal data densities
along with the posterior model probabilities while Table 12 reports the priors and
the posterior estimates.32 The emerging results parallel our earlier findings. When
basing the estimation on CPI, the U.S. economy was very likely in an indeterminacy
region, however, the opposite holds, again, under core PCE. Notably, as mentioned
above, the posterior estimate of trend inflation under CPI is higher than under core
PCE while the Calvo parameter is smaller implying more flexible prices under CPI.
Lastly, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s
(2011) Taylor rule that allows for interest rate smoothing of order two, as well as a re-
sponse to inflation, output growth, and the output gap. Coibion and Gorodnichenko
document a shift in the Federal Reserve’s response from output gap to output growth
for the Great Moderation period and also show that the two lags of interest rate are
required to remove the serial correlation in the monetary policy shocks. Thus, we
re-estimate the GNK model by replacing the standard policy rule with the following
formulation:
Rt = ρR1Rt−1 + ρR2Rt−2 + (1− ρR1 − ρR2)(ψππt + ψy[yt − zt] + ψgy∆yt) + εR,t.
Even though the posterior probabilities of indeterminacy are now lower across the
board, Table 11 shows that the only case in which we can confidently rule out the
possibility of indeterminacy is when we use core PCE. Apart from the parameter
estimates of the responsiveness to output growth, ψgy, and the interest rate lags, ρR1
and ρR2, all other parameter estimates remain essentially unchanged.
Table 13 displays the estimation results under PCE for both the standard Taylor
rule and the alternative rule following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011). Most of
our parameter estimates are in line with the results from the previous table.
Estimation Results under Core CPI
Table 14 reports the marginal data densities for the benchmark specification as
well as the various robustness exercises for the model estimated using core CPI.
In line with the results of the model when estimated using core PCE, determinacy
prevails in all cases.
32The prior predictive probability is 0.539 for the standard rule and 0.503 for the alter-
native rule
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Table 14: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (Core CPI)
Log-data density Probability
Inflation measure Specification Det. Indet. Det. Indet.
Core CPI Benchmark -62.06 -69.64 1 0
Policy parameters only -63.64 -66.52 0.95 0.05
Alternative prior for ψπ -61.61 -70.07 1 0
CBO Output Gap -65.60 -71.61 1 0
Output Growth -59.73 -64.68 0.99 0.01
AR(1) policy shocks -51.30 -58.78 1 0
Trend Inflation with standard TR -58.78 -62.40 0.97 0.03
Trend Inflation with alternative TR -53.88 -57.64 0.98 0.02
A.3 A micro-founded distinction between core and headline
inflation
The artificial economy is a variant of Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Blanchard and
Riggi (2013) and so our description of the model below draws heavily from their
exposition. It is a New Keynesian economy with a commodity product which they
interpret as oil. This model offers a micro-founded setup that naturally features var-
ious inflation rates. The economy consists of monopolistically competitive wholesale
firms who produce differentiated goods using labor and oil. These goods are bought
by perfectly competitive firms (retailers) that weld them together into the final good
that can be consumed. People rent out their labor services on competitive markets.
Firms and people are price takers on the market for oil.
People
The representative agent’s preferences depend on consumption, Ct, and hours




βtdtu(Ct, Nt) 0 < β < 1
which the agent acts to maximize. Here, E0 represents the expectations operator.
The term dt stands for a shock to the discount factor, β, which follows the stationary
autoregressive process
ln dt+1 = ρd ln dt + εd,t+1
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where εd,t+1 is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation that is normally dis-
tributed with standard deviation σd. The period utility is additively separable in
consumption and hours worked and it takes on the functional form
u(Ct, Nt) = lnCt − φνt
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
φ > 0, ϕ ≥ 0.
Logarithmic utility is the only additive-separable form consistent with balanced
growth. The term ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity and φ governs
the disutility of working in steady state. νt denotes a shock to the disutility of labor
and it follows
ln νt+1 = ρν ln νt + εν,t+1
where εν,t is N(0, σ2ν). The overall consumption basket, Ct, is a Cobb-Douglas bundle
of output of domestically produced goods, Cq,t, and the imported oil, Cm,t. In
particular, we assume that
Ct = χ
−χ(1− χ)−(1−χ)Cχm,tC1−χq,t 0 < χ < 1.
The parameter χ equals the share of energy in total consumption.
Retail firms combine the domestically-produced intermediate varieties Cq,t(i),











Here, the term ε measures the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
The agent sells labor services to the wholesale firms at the nominal wage Wt and
has access to a market for one-period riskless bonds, Bt, at the interest rate Rt. Any
generated profits, Πt, flow back to the representative household. Thus, the period
budget is constrained by
WtNt +RtBt−1 + Πt ≥ Pq,tCq,t + Pm,tCm,t +Bt








with Pq,t(i) the price of intermediate good i.
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where Pc,t is the price of the overall consumption basket.






In the optimal allocation, we have
Pq,tCq,t = (1− χ)Pc,tCt
and
Pm,tCm,t = χPc,tCt
where Pc,t ≡ P χm,tP 1−χq,t and Pm,t is the nominal price of oil. Also note that Pc,t ≡
Pq,tS
χ
t , where St ≡
Pm,t
Pq,t
is the real price of oil.
Monopolistically competitive wholesale firms
Intermediate goods are produced using labor, Nt(i), and oil,Mt(i), both supplied




α 0 < α < 1.
Here, α is the share of oil in production and At stands for labor augmenting techno-
logical progress whose growth rate, zt ≡ AtAt−1 , follows an exogenous process
ln zt = ln z + εz,t
with z > 1 and εz,t is N(0, σ2z). Each intermediate good-producing firm’s nominal













The intermediate goods producers face a constant probability, 0 < 1− ξ < 1, of







P ∗t −Mpψt+τ |t(i)
]
= 0,
where Qt denotes gross output, Λt,t+τ denotes the household’s stochastic discount
factor andMp ≡ ε
ε−1 is the desired gross markup.
The domestic price level evolves as
Pq,t =
[
ξP 1−εq,t−1 + (1− ξ)P ∗1−εt
] 1
1−ε .






















where Py,t is the GDP deflator defined via Pq,t ≡ P 1−αy,t Pαm,t.
Finally, the growth of the real price of oil follows an AR(1) process
lnSt+1 = (1− ρs) lnS + ρs lnSt + εs,t+1.
where the innovation εs,t is i.i.d. N (0, σ2s) .
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Log-linearized equations
Here we present the detailed log-linearized equations of the model. Lower case
letters are proportional deviations from steady state.
Production is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function in labor and oil33:
qt = αmt + (1− α)nt, (25)
Consumption is given by a Cobb-Douglas consumption function in output and
oil:
ct = (1− χ)cq,t + χcm,t, (26)
The relationship between consumption price inflation and the domestic output
price inflation is given by
πc,t = πq,t + χ∆st, (27)
where πc,t ≡ pc,t−pc,t−1 is headline inflation and πq,t ≡ pq,t−pq,t−1 is core inflation.
Note that if we set α and χ to zero, the Blanchard and Gali (2010) model boils
down to a simple New Keynesian model similar to the one used in the previous
sections of the paper.
The behavior of households is characterized by two equations. The first one is
an inter-temporal Euler equation:
ct = dt − Etdt+1 + Etct+1 + Etzt+1 − {Rt − Etπc,t+1}, (28)
where zt is a shock to the growth rate of technology. Note that to be compatible
with balanced growth we assume that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
one.
The second condition characterizes labor supply and is given by34:
wt − pc,t = γ(wt−1 − pc,t−1) + (1− γ)[ϕnt + ct] + νt, (29)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] captures the extent of real wage rigidity. When γ = 0, the supply
wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution. The higher the value of γ, the
higher the degree of real wage rigidity.
33We assume that firms operate under constant returns to labor and oil. So, 1 − α is then the
share of labor in output.
34As in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010), the labor
supply shock is re-normalized such that it enters the labor supply equation with a coeffi cient of one
as seen here. In this way, it is easier to choose a reasonable prior for its standard deviation denoted
by σν .
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Domestic goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption, and firms are thus
monopolistic competitors. Given the production function, cost minimization implies
that the firms’demand for oil is given by:
mt = −µt − st + qt. (30)
Using this expression to eliminate mt in the production function (9) gives a
reduced-form production function:





Combining the cost minimization conditions for oil and for labor with the aggre-
gate production function yields the following factor price frontier:
(1− α)(wt − pc,t) + (α + (1− α)χ)st + µt. (32)
Firms are assumed to set prices à la Calvo (1983). The resulting inflation dy-
namics are described by the following expectational Phillips curve:
πq,t = βEtπq,t+1 − κµt, (33)
where κ ≡ (1−ξ)(1−βξ)
ξ
is the slope of the Phillips curve.
Balanced trade gives us a relation between consumption and output:
ct = qt − χst + ηµt, (34)
where η ≡ αMP−α , withM
P denoting the steady state gross markup.
Combining the reduced form production function (15) with the above equation
gives a relationship between consumption and employment:
ct = nt − (
α
1− α + χ) + (η −
α
1− α)µt. (35)
The characterization of the equilibrium does not require us to introduce valued
(or GDP). But it is needed to undertake the estimation of the model where we use
GDP growth data. The definition of value added, combined with the demand for oil,
yields the following relation between GDP and gross output:
yt = qt +
α
1− αst + ηµt. (36)
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Table 15: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy
Log-data density Probability
Inflation measure Determinacy Indeterminacy Determinacy Indeterminacy
5 obs (PCE, CorePCE) -156.30 -161.86 1 0
5 obs (CPI, CorePCE) -174.66 -181.61 1 0
5 obs (CPI, CoreCPI) -177.12 -183.41 1 0
5 obs (Real-time data) -173.66 -179.39 1 0
Notes: According to the prior distributions, the probability of determinacy is 0.51.
The shocks st, νt and dt are assumed to follow independent stationary AR(1)
processes:
st = ρsst−1 + εst, νt = ρννt−1 + ενt, dt = ρddt−1 + ε.
Lastly, to close the model, the central bank’s policy is described by a Taylor rule
Rt = ρRRt−1 +(1−ρR)[ψπ{ωπc,t+(1−ω)πq,t}+ψyyt+ψgygyt]+εR,t, 0 ≤ ρR < 1,
(37)
where εR,t is N(0, σ2R) and gyt ≡ yt−yt−1 +zt stands for the growth rate of detrended
output.35 The central bank responds to a convex combination of headline and core
inflation with the parameter ω governing the relative weights. For instance, setting
ω to zero implies that the central bank responds to core inflation only.
Apart from estimating the model using PCE-core PCE and CPI-core PCE com-
binations as in the published paper (see Table 7), we have also estimated the model
with CPI-core CPI data. Furthermore, we have also used real-time data on per-
capita real GDP growth rate, PCE and core PCE inflation. Our results remain
robust and are reported in Tables 15 and 16.
35Unlike Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Blanchard and Riggi (2013), we assume that the central
bank is perfectly credible. While these authors allow for a role of central bank credibility to explain
the reduced impact of oil shocks in the 2000s, they restrict their attention to determinacy only. Our
purpose in this present paper is to specifically test for indeterminacy due to passive monetary policy
during our period of interest while allowing for a distinction between headline and core inflation.
Hence, we assume that the central bank is perfectly credible.
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Table 16: Priors and posteriors for DSGE parameters.
Posterior Mean [5th pct, 95th pct]






























































































































































































Notes: The inverse gamma priors are of the form p (σ|υ, ς)∞σ−υ−1e−
υς2
2σ2 , where
ν = 2 and ς = 0.282. The prior predictive probability is 0.51.
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Determinacy region
Figure 6 below shows the determinacy region for combinations of ψπ with the
other policy parameters as well as with the degree of real wage rigidity γ. As can be
seen from the figure, the Taylor Principle continues to hold in this micro-founded
model with a distinction between core and headline inflation. In line with the find-
ings of Carlstrom, Fuerst and Ghironi (2006), equilibrium determinacy criterion does
not imply a preference to any particular measure of inflation. As long as the cen-
tral bank responds with a coeffi cient greater than unity to either headline inflation,
core inflation or a combination of the two, then such policy will ensure equilibrium
determinacy.
Figure 6: Determinacy region for the Blanchard and Gali (2009) model
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III Monetary Policy, Inflation Tar-
get and the Great Moderation:
An Empirical Investigation
This paper estimates a New Keynesian model with positive trend inflation and com-
pares the empirical fit of the model featuring a Taylor rule with fixed versus time-
varying inflation target while allowing for indeterminacy. The estimation is con-
ducted over two different periods covering the Great Inflation and the Great Modera-
tion. The rule embedding time variation in inflation target turns out to be empirically
superior and determinacy prevails in both sample periods. This finding, therefore,
rules out self-fulfilling inflation expectations as an explanation of the high inflation
episode in the 1970s. Counterfactual simulations find that the decline in inflation-
gap volatility and predictability is driven by better monetary policy. In contrast, the
reduction in output growth variability is mainly explained by reduced volatility of
technology shocks.
1 Introduction
Post-World War II U.S. economy is generally characterized by two particular eras:
the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation. There is strong evidence that the
former era is represented by highly volatile inflation and output growth while there
has been a marked decline in macroeconomic volatility in the latter period (Blan-
chard and Simon, 2001; McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; and Stock and Watson,
2002). The Great Moderation is also associated with changes in the predictability
of inflation. For instance, Stock and Watson (2007) document that inflation has
become absolutely easier, but relatively harder to forecast, in the Volcker-Greenspan
era. They argue that forecasting inflation has become absolutely easier because of its
reduced volatility while predicting inflation has become relatively harder due to its
reduced persistence. What are the reasons behind this shift from the Great Inflation
to the Great Moderation era?
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One prominent explanation, put forth by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and
further advocated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), suggests that the shift is at-
tributable to changes in the behavior of the Federal Reserve. This literature argues
that U.S. monetary policy in the 1970s failed to respond suffi ciently strongly to
inflation thereby generating indeterminacy.1 Consequently, self-fulfilling inflation
expectations is regarded as the driver of the high inflation episode in the 1970s.
According to this view, a switch from a passive to an active response to inflation
brought about a stable and determinate environment since the early 1980s.2 In a
conceptually related study, Boivin and Giannoni (2006) find that this switch has
also been instrumental in reducing observed output and inflation volatility. More-
over, Benati and Surico (2008) show that by responding more strongly to inflation,
monetary policy has contributed to the decline in persistence and predictability of
inflation relative to a trend component.
While these studies only consider a constant zero inflation target (i.e. a zero
inflation steady state), a different picture emerges from studies allowing for posi-
tive trend inflation. For instance, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Hirose,
Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) argue that a stronger response to inflation is
not enough to explain the shift to determinacy after the Great Inflation. Instead,
they document that a decline in trend inflation as well as a change in the policy re-
sponse to the output gap and output growth have played a crucial role. Nonetheless,
there is a large literature disputing the view of a fixed inflation target. Amongst
them Kozicki and Tinsley (2005, 2009), Ireland (2007), Stock and Watson (2007),
Cogley and Sbordone (2008) and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) find evidence
in favor of time-varying inflation target. Furthermore, Cogley, Primiceri and Sar-
gent (2010) argue that the decline in the variability of the Federal Reserve’s inflation
target is the single most important factor behind the reduction in inflation volatility
and persistence.
Empirical investigations conducted so far have either looked at the plausibility of
1Roughly speaking, indeterminacy refers to the multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria
while an equilibrium that is locally isolated and uniquely determined by preferences and technologies
is called determinate. See Farmer (1999) for a formal definition.
2A policy response to inflation is called active if it satisfies the Taylor Principle - an aspect
of the Taylor rule that describes how, for each one percent increase in inflation, the central bank
should raise the nominal interest rate by more than one percentage point to ensure determinacy.
Otherwise, it is labelled as passive.
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a switch from indeterminacy to determinacy through the lens of a model featuring
fixed (either zero or positive) target or allowed for time-varying inflation target while
restricting the model to determinacy alone.3 Unfortunately, the assumption of a
fixed versus time-varying inflation target is not innocuous for both the determinacy
properties and the role of monetary policy in the Great Moderation. For instance,
the parameter estimate of the Taylor rule’s response to the inflation gap depends on
whether the Federal Reserve is responding to deviations from a fixed target or time-
varying target. This feature then affects the probability of being in a determinate
or indeterminate regime.
This paper estimates a New Keynesian model with positive trend inflation and
compares the empirical fit of the model featuring a Taylor rule with fixed versus
time-varying inflation target while allowing for indeterminacy. The estimation is
conducted over two different periods: a pre-Volcker sample from 1966:I - 1979:II and
a post-1984 sample from 1984:I - 2008:II. In doing so, it makes two contributions.
First, the paper shows that the rule embedding time variation in inflation target
turns out to be empirically superior and determinacy prevails not only in the Great
Moderation era but also in the pre-Volcker period. Therefore, unlike the literature’s
preponderant view, this finding rules out self-fulfilling inflation expectations, i.e.
sunspots, as an explanation of the Great Inflation. Second, it shows that both
good policy and good luck are jointly required to explain the Great Moderation.4
Counterfactual exercises suggest that better monetary policy, both in terms of a
stronger response to the inflation gap and smaller fluctuations of the inflation target
process, has dampened most of the fluctuations in the inflation gap and contributed
to the decline in its predictability. In contrast, changes in monetary policy alone fail
to explain the reduced variability of output growth which is explained by a reduction
3One exception is Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) who use a limited information single-
equation approach to estimate a Taylor rule with time-varying coeffi cients which allow them to
extract a measure of trend inflation and construct a time-series for the probability of determinacy
for the U.S. economy. However, (in-)determinacy is a property of a rational expectations system
that requires a full information estimation approach. Moreover, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)
estimate a constant term of the Taylor rule which contains trend inflation but also the equilibrium
real interest rate and the Fed’s targets for real GDP growth and the output gap. Consequently,
the level of trend inflation is not separately indentified and hence they need to make additional
assumptions.
4The good luck interpretation - a decline in the variance of the exogenous shocks hitting the
economy - is supported by a number of authors including Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri
(2005), Sims and Zha (2006), Smets and Wouters (2007), and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
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in the volatility of technology shocks.
In contrast to the existing literature, the current paper distinguishes between
trend inflation and time-varying inflation target. Trend inflation, a term coined by
Ascari (2004), stands for a strictly positive level of steady state inflation around which
to approximate firms’first-order conditions in the derivation of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (henceforth NKPC). Allowing for positive trend inflation is crucial as it
affects the determinacy properties of the model. Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009) show
that trend inflation makes price-setting firms more forward-looking which flattens the
NKPC and widens the indeterminacy region. On the other hand, following Sargent
(1999), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2006), and Sargent, Williams and Zha
(2006) time-varying inflation target is interpreted as the short-term goal pursued
by the Federal Reserve conditional on economic situation and its knowledge about
the inflation-output volatility trade-off. In this line of argument, trend inflation
stands for the Federal Reserve’s long-run target compatible with its long-run goals
such as inflation stability and sustainable economic growth. A fixed inflation target
is simply equal to trend inflation in the model. In contrast, time-varying inflation
target follows a persistent exogenous autoregressive process as in Cogley, Primiceri
and Sargent (2010), but one whose unconditional mean is equal to positive trend
inflation.5
The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, when considering the
model with constant positive inflation target, indeterminacy can neither be ruled
in nor ruled out before 1979 while determinacy prevails after 1984. This stands in
contrast to Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) who estimate a similar
model allowing for positive constant trend inflation and find that the U.S. economy
was explicitly in the indeterminacy region of the parameter space before 1979 and
switched to determinacy afterwards. While these authors employ a model with firm-
specific labour following Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017), the current paper
uses a model with homogenous labor in the benchmark specification following Ascari
and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014). Indeed, when using firm-specific
labor, this paper finds that the pre-Volcker period is unambiguously characterized by
indeterminacy as well. Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) show that the model
5For models in which inflation target evolves partly or fully endogenously, see Ireland (2007)
and Eo an Lie (2017).
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with firm-specific labor is more susceptible to indeterminacy induced by higher trend
inflation than the model with homogeneous labor which explains the difference.
Yet, the upshot completely differs when allowing for time-varying inflation target.
This time the posterior density favors determinacy for both the pre-1979 and post-
1984 sub-samples. This result suggests that monetary policy, even during the pre-
Volcker period, was suffi ciently active to ensure determinacy. Using posterior odds
ratio to compare the two specifications under the assumption of homogenous labor,
the paper then reports evidence in favor of time variation in the inflation target
process for both the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation period. Furthermore,
when assuming firm-specific labor, the paper finds the fit of fixed versus time-varying
inflation target to be comparable for both sample periods.
Perhaps most closely related to this paper are studies by Castelnuovo (2010),
Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014), and
Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017). Both Castelnuovo (2010) and Cogley,
Primiceri and Sargent (2010) estimate a New Keynesian model log-linearized around
a zero inflation steady state and perform counterfactual simulations to assess the
drivers of the Great Moderation. The current paper departs along the following
dimensions. First, it estimates a model log-linearized around a positive steady state
inflation. Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) document that
positive trend inflation substantially alters the NKPC relationship and therefore it
changes the inflation dynamics and determinacy regions. Moreover, Ascari, Castel-
nuovo and Rossi (2011) and Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) show
that a model with positive steady state inflation fits better than its simple New
Keynesian counterpart which is log-linearized around zero inflation steady state.
Second, it compares the fit of fixed versus time-varying target while also allowing for
indeterminacy. Finally, it employs the Sequential Monte Carlo (henceforth SMC)
algorithm developed by Herbst and Schorfheide (2014, 2015) while both Castelnuovo
(2010) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) employ Random-Walk Metropo-
lis Hastings (henceforth RWMH) algorithm. Herbst and Schorfheide (2014, 2015)
demonstrate that the SMC algorithm is better suited for multi-modal and irregular
posterior distributions.6
6See also Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) who are the first ones to apply Bayesian
estimation using the SMC algorithm to test for indeterminacy using Lubik and Schorfheide’s (2003,
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Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) estimate a regime-switching policy rule
featuring time-varying inflation target and compare it to a specification with fixed
target. The authors find support in favor of time variation in inflation target as
well. However, they employ a partial equilibrium single-equation approach with two
monetary regimes, active and passive. They characterize monetary policy during
much of the 1970s as passive and identify a switch to an active regime soon after
Paul Volcker’s appointment as Chairman of the Federal Reserve. First of all, using
a partial equilibrium approach to characterize the likelihood of determinacy is not
innocuous. As mentioned earlier, (in-)determinacy is a property of a rational expec-
tations system that requires a full information estimation approach such that the
parameter estimates of the Taylor rule account for the endogeneity of its targeted
variables. Moreover, their approach to deal with the issue of passive monetary pol-
icy does not allow for multiplicity of equilibria. Phrased alternatively, the regime
transitions do not imply moving from determinacy to indeterminacy as both regimes
are determinate. Hence, their regime-switching policy rule cannot address questions
involving self-fulfilling inflation expectations as in the current paper.
Finally, Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) estimate a New Keynesian
model with firm-specific labor and fixed inflation target (equal to positive steady
state or trend inflation). They find that the pre-Volcker period is ostensibly charac-
terized by indeterminacy while better systematic monetary policy as well as changes
in the level of trend inflation resulted in a switch to determinacy after 1982.7 In
contrast, the current paper estimates a similar model with homogenous labor and
allows for time variation in the inflation target process. The paper documents that
time-varying inflation target empirically fits better (or at least no worse in the case
of firm-specific labor) than a fixed target and determinacy prevails in both sample
periods. Moreover, it conducts counterfactual exercises to uncover the driving forces
of the Great Moderation. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first one
to test for indeterminacy using a full-information structural approach while allowing
2004) methodology.
7Arias, Ascari, Branzoli and Castelnuovo (2017) corroborate these findings as well as those in
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) by revisiting the relation between the sytematic component of
monetary policy, trend inflation and determinacy within a medium-scale DSGE model. However,
due to the complexities arising from the medium-scale nature of their model, they stop short by
estimating the model over the period 1984:I - 2008:II focusing on determinacy alone.
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for both positive trend inflation and time variation in the Federal Reserve’s inflation
target. The finding that the pre-Volcker period could possibly be characterized by a
unique equilibrium is a novel result.8
2 Model
The estimation is based on a version of Ascari and Sbordone’s (2014) Generalized
New Keynesian (henceforth GNK) model. The model economy consists of an inter-
temporal Euler equation obtained from the household’s optimal choice of consump-
tion and bond holdings, a discrete-time staggered price-setting model of Calvo (1983)
that features a positive steady state trend inflation, and a Taylor rule that character-
izes monetary policy. As discussed earlier, allowing for positive steady state inflation
is important for the following reasons: (i) positive trend inflation makes price-setting
firms more forward-looking which flattens the NKPC and makes the inflation rate
less sensitive to current economic conditions; (ii) it alters the determinacy proper-
ties of the model; and (iii) trend inflation generates more endogenous persistence
of inflation and output even in the determinacy case.9 Unlike Ascari and Sbordone
(2014), the paper assumes stochastic growth modelled as the technology level follow-
ing a unit root process, replaces their labor supply disturbance by a discount factor
shock as a stand-in for demand shocks and introduces external habit formation in
consumption to generate output persistence. In light of the result of Cogley and
Sbordone (2008) regarding the lack of empirical support for intrinsic inertia in the
GNK Phillips curve, the model is estimated in the absence of rule-of-thumb price-
setting. Finally, the Taylor rule involves responses to the output gap and output
growth instead of log-deviations of output from the steady state. These assumptions
8An exception is Orphanides (2004) who finds an active response to expected inflation in a
Taylor-type rule estimated for the pre-1979 period, thereby claiming that self-fulfilling expectations
cannot be a source of macroeconomic instability during the Great Inflation. However, Ascari
and Ropele (2007, 2009) show that an active response to inflation does not guarante equilibrium
determinacy when allowing for positive trend inflation. Moreover, Orphanides’ (2004) finding is
based on a single-equation framework. Instead, the current paper recognizes indeterminacy as the
property of a system and hence uses full-information structural estimation.
9The plain-vanilla New Keynesian model features a poor internal propagation mechanism. As
a result the posterior mass might be biased toward the indeterminacy region. See the discussion
between Beyer and Farmer (2007) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2007). However, trend inflation
generates more endogenous persistence of inflation and output even under determinacy thus making
the indeterminacy test less susceptible to bias.
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then make the model similar to the one estimated by Hirose, Kurozumi and Van
Zandweghe (2017). One important distinction is that the current paper allows for
time variation in the Federal Reserve’s inflation target.10
2.1 The log-linearized model






















[dt − Etdt+1] , (1)





[yt − yt−1 + gt]−$Etψt+1+$dt, (2)













rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)
{
ψπ (πt − π∗t ) + ψxxt + ψ∆y (yt − yt−1 + gt)
}
+ εr,t, (5)
xt = yt − ynt , (6)
ynt =
h





where κ ≡ β [1 + ε(π − 1)(1− ξπε−1)], ϑ ≡ (1 − ξπε−1)(1 − ξβπε)/ξπε−1, χ ≡ (1 −
ξπε−1)(1 − ξβπε−1)/ξπε−1 and $ ≡ β(1 − π)(1 − ξπε−1). Lower case letters denote
log-deviations from steady state. Here yt and ynt stand for de-trended output and
natural level of output respectively, xt is the output gap, rt denotes the nominal
interest rate, πt symbolizes inflation, π∗t represents the Federal Reserve’s time-varying
10Moreoever, following Ascari and Sbordone (2014), the paper assumes homogenous labor
whereas Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) assume firm-specific labor.
11A full description of the model is delegated to the Appendix to conserve space.
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inflation target, ψt is an endogenous auxiliary variable, st denotes the resource cost
due to relative price dispersion and Et represents the expectations operator. Eq. (1)
is the dynamic IS relation reflecting an Euler equation where h ∈ [0, 1] represents the
degree of habit persistence and g stands for the steady state gross rate of technological
progress which is also equal to the steady state gross rate of balanced growth. Eq.
(2) and (3) represent the GNK Phillips curve where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective
discount factor, ξ ∈ [0, 1) is the fraction of firms whose prices remain unchanged from
previous period, π is the steady state gross inflation rate or trend inflation, ε > 1 is
the price elasticity of demand, and ϕ is the inverse elasticity of labour supply. Eq.
(2) boils down to a standard NKPC when trend inflation is zero (i.e. π = 1) and this
assumption also implies that ψt = 0. Eq. (4) is a recursive log-linearized expression
for the price dispersion measure under Calvo pricing mechanism. Eq. (5) represents
monetary policy, i.e. a Taylor-type rule in which ψπ, ψx, ψ∆y,ρr are chosen by the
central bank and echo its responsiveness to the inflation gap, output gap, output
growth and the degree of inertia in interest rate setting respectively. The term εr,t
is an exogenous transitory monetary policy shock whose standard deviation is given
by σr. Eq. (6) is the definition of the output gap while the law of motion for the
natural level of output is given by Eq. (7).
The remaining fundamental disturbances involve a preference shock dt, a non-
stationary technology shock gt, and an inflation target shock π∗t . Each of these three
shocks follow AR(1) processes:
dt = ρddt−1 + εd,t 0 < ρd < 1,
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t 0 < ρg < 1,
and
π∗t = (1− ρπ∗)π + ρπ∗π∗t−1 + επ∗,t 0 < ρπ∗ < 1,
where the standard deviations of the innovations εd,t, εg,t and επ∗,t are denoted by
σd , σg and σπ∗ respectively.
Under a fixed inflation target, the paper assumes that the policy rules becomes
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rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)
{
ψππt + ψxxt + ψ∆y (yt − yt−1 + gt)
}
+ εr,t,
where the central bank’s target is equal to steady-state inflation or trend inflation π.
2.2 Rational expectations solutions under indeterminacy
To solve the model, the paper applies the method proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003). The linear rational expectations (henceforth LRE) system can be compactly
written as
Γ0(θ)%t = Γ1(θ)%t−1 + Ψ(θ)εt + Π(θ)ηt,
where %t, εt and ηt denote the vector of endogenous variables, fundamental shocks and
one-step ahead expectation errors respectively and Γ0(θ), Γ1(θ), Ψ(θ) and Π(θ) are
appropriately defined coeffi cient matrices. From a methodological perspective, the
solution algorithm of Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) follows from that of Sims (2002).
However, it has the added advantage of being general and explicit in dealing with
expectation errors since it makes the solution suitable for solving and estimating
models which feature multiple equilibria. In particular, under indeterminacy, ηt
becomes a linear function of the fundamental shocks and purely extrinsic sunspot
disturbances, ζt. Hence, the full set of solutions to the LRE model entails
%t = Φ(θ)%t−1 + Φε(θ, M̃)εt + Φζ(θ)ζt, (8)
where Φ(θ), Φε(θ, M̃) and Φζ(θ)12 are the coeffi cient matrices.13 The sunspot shock
satisfies ζt ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2ζ). Accordingly, indeterminacy can manifest itself in one
of two different ways: (i) purely extrinsic non-fundamental disturbances can affect
the model dynamics through endogenous expectation errors; and (ii) the propaga-
tion of fundamental shocks cannot be uniquely pinned down and the multiplicity of
equilibria affecting this propagation mechanism is captured by the arbitrary matrix
M̃ .
Following the methodology proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), M̃ is
replaced withM∗(θ)+M and the prior mean forM is set equal to zero. The particular
solution employed selects M∗(θ) by using a least squares criterion to minimize the
12Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) express this term as Φζ(θ,Mζ), whereMζ is an arbitrary matrix.
For identification purpose, the paper imposes their normalization such that Mζ = I.





distance between the impact response of the endogenous variables to fundamental
shocks, ∂%t/∂ε
′
t, at the boundary between the determinacy and the indeterminacy
region.14 Analytical solution for the boundary in this model is unavailable and hence,
following Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Hirose (2014), this paper resorts to
a numerical procedure to find the boundary by perturbing the parameter ψπ in the
monetary policy rule.
2.3 Equilibrium determinacy and trend inflation
Before moving onto the empirical investigation, this subsection shows how allow-
ing for trend inflation affects the determinacy properties of the model. Ascari and
Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) argue that trend inflation makes
price-setting firms more forward-looking thereby flattening the NKPC and widening
the indeterminacy region. Figure 1 documents how trend inflation affects the deter-
minacy region. Since analytical solution is infeasible unless one assumes indivisible
labor, the determinacy results shown here are numerical.15
The determinacy region shrinks with trend inflation as documented by Ascari
and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014).16 In other words, a stronger
response to the inflation gap together with a weaker response to the output gap
is required to generate determinacy at higher levels of trend inflation. Therefore,
monetary policy should respond more to the inflation gap and less to the output gap
in order to stabilize inflation expectations. Moreover, in the case of positive trend
inflation, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) show that interest rate smoothing as
well as stronger response to output growth, instead of the output gap, widen the
determinacy region thereby making it easier for policy to guarantee determinacy.
14This methodology has been used in previous studies, such as Benati and Surico (2009), Doko
Tchatoka, Groshenny, Haque and Weder (2017) and Hirose (2007, 2008, 2013, 2014).
15The parameter values used in the numerical computation are: β = 0.99, ε = 11, ξ = 0.75, h = 0
implying no habit formation in consumption, and g = 1.005 such that the steady state growth rate
of real per capita GDP is 2 per cent per year. The policy rule is a simple Taylor rule of the form
rt = ψππt + ψxxt.
16The figure is the same as Figure 4 in Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Figure 11 in Ascari and
Sbordone (2014).
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Figure 1: Determinacy region and trend inflation
3 Econometric strategy
3.1 Bayesian estimation with Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)
algorithm
The paper uses Bayesian techniques for estimating the parameters of the model and
tests for indeterminacy using posterior model probabilities. It employs the SMC
algorithm proposed by Herbst and Schorfheide (2014, 2015) which is particularly
suitable for irregular and non-elliptical posterior distributions. Another practical
advantage of using an importance sampling algorithm like SMC is that the process
does not require one to find the mode of the posterior distribution, a task that can
prove to be diffi cult particularly under indeterminacy.
First priors are described by a density function of the form
p(θS|S),
where S ∈ {D, I}, D and I stand for determinacy and indeterminacy respectively, θS
represents the parameters of the model S and p(.) stands for the probability density
function. Next, the likelihood function, p(XT |θS, S), describes the density of the
observed data where XT are the observations through to period T . Following Bayes
theorem, the posterior density is constructed as a combination of the prior density
and the likelihood function:
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Following Herbst and Schorfheide (2014, 2015), the paper builds a particle approx-
imation of the posterior distribution through tempering the likelihood. A sequence






where φn is the tempering schedule that slowly increases from zero to one.
The algorithm generates weighted draws from the sequence of posteriors {πn(θS)}
Nφ
n=1,
where Nφ is the number of stages. At any stage, the posterior distribution is repre-







, where W in is the weight associated with
θin and N denotes the number of particles. The algorithm has three main steps.
First, in the correction step, the particles are re-weighted to reflect the density in
iteration n. Next, in the selection step, any particle degeneracy is eliminated by
resampling the particles. Finally, in the mutation step, the particles are propagated
forward using a Markov transition kernel to adapt to the current bridge density.
In the first stage, i.e. when n = 1, φ1 is zero. Hence, the prior density serves
as an effi cient proposal density for π1(θS). That is, the algorithm is initialized by
drawing the initial particles from the prior. Likewise, the density of πn(θS) is a good
proposal density for πn+1(θS).
Number of particles, Number of stages, Tempering schedule
The tempering schedule is a sequence that slowly increases from zero to one and





where τ controls the shape of the schedule. The
tuning parameters N,Nφ and τ are fixed ex ante. The estimation uses N = 10, 000
particles and Nφ = 200 stages. The parameter that controls the tempering schedule,
τ , is set at 2 following Herbst and Schorfheide (2015).
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Resampling
Resampling is necessary to avoid particle degeneracy. A rule-of-thumb measure
of this degeneracy, proposed by Herbst and Schorfheide (2014, 2015), is given by
the reciprocal of the uncentered variance of the particles and is called the effective
sample size (ESS). Following them, the estimation employs systematic resampling
whenever ESSn < N2 .
Mutation
Finally, one step of a single-block RWMH algorithm is used to propagate the
particles forward.
3.2 Data
The paper employs three U.S. quarterly time series: per capita real GDP growth rate
100∆ log Yt, quarterly growth rate of the GDP deflator 100 log Πt and the Federal
Funds rate 100 logRt. To compare the fit of fixed versus time-varying inflation target
and to test for indeterminacy, it estimates the model over two sample periods. The
first sample, 1966:I - 1979:II, corresponds to the Great Inflation period. The second
one, 1984:I - 2008:II, corresponds to the Great Moderation period characterized by
dramatically milder macroeconomic volatilities. The measurement equations relating






 yt − yt−1 + gtπt
rt
 , (9)
where g∗ = 100(g − 1), π∗ = 100(π − 1) and r∗ = 100(r − 1).
3.3 Calibrated parameters
The discount factor β is set to 0.99, the steady-state markup to ten percent (i.e.
ε = 11), and the inverse of the labor-supply elasticity to one. Following Cogley,
Primiceri and Sargent (2010), the autoregressive parameter of the inflation target
shock is fixed at ρπ∗ = 0.995. Alternatively, one may follow Ireland (2007) by
assuming that the inflation target shock follows a unit-root process. Instead, the
paper follows Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent’s (2010) calibration as they show that
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a unit-root inflation target process may counterfactually imply low inflation-gap
predictability. The remaining parameters are estimated.
3.4 Prior distributions
Table 1 summarizes the specification of the prior distributions. The prior for the
inflation coeffi cient ψπ follows a gamma distribution centered at 1.10 with a standard
deviation of 0.50 while the response coeffi cient to the output gap and output growth
are centered at 0.125 with standard deviation 0.10. The paper uses Beta distributions
with mean 0.50 for the smoothing coeffi cient ρr, the Calvo probability ξ, and habit
persistence in consumption h, and 0.70 for the persistence of the discount factor
shock. The autoregressive parameter of the TFP shock is centered at 0.40 since this
process already includes a unit-root. The priors for the quarterly steady state rates
of output growth, inflation and interest rate denoted by g∗, π∗ and r∗ respectively
are distributed around their averages over the period 1966:I-2008:II.
For the shocks, the prior distributions for all but one follow an inverse-gamma
distribution with mean 0.60 and standard deviation 0.20. The exception is the stan-
dard deviation of the innovation to the inflation target shock which is an important
parameter in the analysis. Following Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), the paper
adopts a weakly informative uniform prior on (0, 0.15) for this parameter.
Finally, in line with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), the coeffi cients M follow
standard normal distributions. Hence, the prior is centered around the baseline
solution of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). The choice of the priors leads to a prior
predictive probability of determinacy of 0.498, which is quite even and suggests no
prior bias toward either determinacy or indeterminacy.
4 Estimation results
This section presents the findings in terms of model comparison, parameter estimates
and forecast error variance decomposition.
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Table 1: Prior distributions for parameters










































Note: The inverse gamma priors are of the form p (σ|υ, ς)∞σ−υ−1e−
υς2
2σ2
where ν = 4 and ς = 0.45. The prior probability of determinacy is 0.498.
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Table 2: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy
Log-data density Probability
Sample Inflation target Det Indet Det Indet
1966:I-1979:II Fixed -125.40 -125.94 0.60 0.40
Time-varying -122.48 -126.55 0.98 0.02
1984:I-2008:II Fixed -31.73 -42.08 1 0
Time-varying -28.64 -47.33 1 0
4.1 Model comparison
Table 2 collects the results for the empirical performance of the model with fixed
versus time-varying inflation target. To assess the quality of the model’s fit to the
data, the paper uses log marginal data densities and posterior model probabilities for
both parametric regions. The SMC algorithm-based approximation of the marginal














where w̃in is the incremental weight defined by
w̃in = [p(X|θin−1, S)]φn−φn−1 .
In case of fixed inflation target, the evidence for (in-)determinacy for the pre-
Volcker period is mixed while determinacy prevails after 1984. Phrased alterna-
tively, the possibility of indeterminacy cannot be ruled out in the first sub-sample.
Indeed, when assuming firm-specific labor instead of homogenous labor as in Hirose,
Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017), the pre-Volcker period is unambiguously char-
acterized by indeterminacy (as shown in a later section).
However, when allowing for time variation in the inflation target pursued by the
Federal Reserve, the results are drastically different. Both the pre-Volcker and post-
1984 sample periods are now ostensibly characterized by determinacy as the posterior
concentrates all of its mass in the determinacy region. This finding suggests that
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monetary policy, even during the Great Inflation period, was stabilizing and did not
open the door for any sunspot fluctuations.
In terms of posterior odds ratio, the marginal likelihood points toward the em-
pirical superiority of the specification featuring time variation in the inflation target.
The Bayes factor involving fixed versus time-varying target reads about 20 for both
the pre-Volcker and post-1984 sample periods. According to Kass and Raftery (1995),
a Bayes factor between 1 and 3 is “not worth more than a bare mention”, between 3
and 20 suggests a “positive”evidence in favor of one of the two models, between 20
and 150 suggests a “strong”evidence against it, and larger than 150 “very strong”
evidence. Hence, this result points toward a “positive”evidence in favor of the model
where the Federal Reserve follows a time-varying inflation target.
4.2 Parameter estimates
Table 3 reports the posterior means and the standard deviations of the parameters
under time-varying inflation target.17 As seen in the table, the Taylor rule’s response
to the inflation gap was strongly active in the pre-1979 period. In fact, the point
estimate is close to two which justifies why the posterior favors determinacy under
time-varying target. Moving across the sample, the policy responses to the inflation
gap and output growth more than doubled while trend inflation fell considerably by
a third in line with the findings of Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017).
Moreover, like Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), the innovation variance of the
two shocks, επ∗,t and εr,t, declined quite notably. According to the posterior mean
estimates, the innovation variance fell from 0.07 to 0.04 for the inflation target shock,
and from 0.42 to 0.21 for the policy-rate shock. However, unlike Cogley, Primiceri
and Sargent (2010) who find a moderate increase in the responsiveness to the inflation
gap, this paper finds quite a substantial increase across the two periods. This finding
suggests that both the systematic response to the inflation gap and better anchoring
of the inflation target might have played a key role in the decline in inflation-gap
volatility and predictability.
Among the other parameters, habit remained unchanged while the degree of price
stickiness increased slightly. As noted by Smets and Wouters (2007), the increase
17Table 11 in the appendix reports parameter estimates under fixed target.
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Table 3: Posterior estimates for DSGE parameters under time-varying target

































































Note: Results are based on 10,000 particles from the final
stage in the SMC algorithm
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in price stickiness is consistent with the hypothesis that low and stable inflation
may reduce the cost of not adjusting prices and therefore lengthen the average price
duration. In fact, Kurozumi (2016) shows that when the degree of price stickiness
is endogenously determined in the Calvo model, the probability of price adjustment
rises with trend inflation and this mitigates the effect of higher trend inflation on
the likelihood of indeterminacy. However, following Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009),
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014), the paper as-
sumes that price stickiness is exogenously determined.
Among the non-policy shocks, there is an increase in the persistence and volatil-
ity of the discount factor shock, a finding shared with Hirose, Kurozumi and Van
Zandweghe (2017). However, there is a decline in the volatility of technology shocks,
which is in line with Smets and Wouters (2007) and Leduc and Sill (2007).
4.3 Forecast error variance decomposition
This section assesses the role of the various shocks by appealing to the forecast error
variance decomposition (henceforth FEVD). The FEVDs are constructed by comput-
ing the contribution of each shock in explaining the forecast errors of the variables of
interest. The computations, conditional on the estimated posterior means, refer to
several horizons ranging from 1-step ahead up to ∞-step ahead to assess the contri-
bution of each shock at various business cycle frequencies as well as the unconditional
variances. Tables 4 and 5 report the results for the two sub-samples.
First of all, technology shocks play a dominant role in explaining the fluctuations
in output growth for both sample periods accounting for over 95% of the fluctuations
across all forecast horizons. This finding stands in contrast to Ireland (2004), who
finds a secondary role for technology shocks and concludes that other shocks appear
to be more important (or at least as important) than the technology shock in the
New Keynesian model. One key difference is that the present paper log-linearizes the
model around a positive steady state trend inflation while Ireland (2004) assumes zero
inflation in the steady state. This modeling assumption is not innocuous as Ascari
and Sbordone (2014) show that trend inflation substantially affects the propagation
of technology shocks.
Yet technology shocks play a negligible role in explaining the fluctuations of the
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Table 4: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions: Pre-1979 Sub-sample
Quarters Ahead Policy Preference Technology Inflation Target
Output Growth
1 1.27 0.21 98.52 0.00
4 1.46 0.23 98.28 0.03
8 1.46 0.23 98.28 0.03
20 1.46 0.23 98.28 0.03
40 1.46 0.23 98.28 0.03
∞ 1.46 0.23 98.28 0.03
Inflation Gap (Mean-based)
1 41.65 27.52 6.72 24.10
4 25.85 24.33 6.40 43.43
8 18.80 18.70 4.65 57.84
20 10.88 10.90 2.69 75.53
40 6.81 6.82 1.69 84.68
∞ 2.54 2.54 0.63 94.30
Inflation Gap (Target-based)
1 49.18 32.50 7.93 10.39
4 37.01 34.83 9.16 19.00
8 31.98 31.81 7.91 28.29
20 24.03 24.07 5.95 45.96
40 17.78 17.81 4.40 60.00
∞ 8.19 8.21 2.03 81.57
Interest Rate
1 23.46 58.98 0.12 17.43
4 8.57 58.49 1.14 31.80
8 6.07 47.29 0.82 45.83
20 3.67 29.07 0.49 66.77
40 2.36 18.69 0.32 78.63
∞ 0.91 7.17 0.12 91.80
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Table 5: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions: Post-1984 Sub-sample
Quarters Ahead Policy Preference Technology Inflation Target
Output Growth
1 1.76 0.72 97.50 0.01
4 1.94 0.81 97.21 0.04
8 1.94 0.81 97.21 0.04
20 1.94 0.81 97.21 0.04
40 1.94 0.81 97.21 0.04
∞ 1.94 0.81 97.21 0.04
Inflation Gap (Mean-based)
1 42.29 35.53 8.62 13.56
4 32.34 34.41 8.13 25.12
8 26.60 31.19 6.69 35.52
20 18.51 23.48 4.65 53.35
40 13.13 16.84 3.30 66.73
∞ 5.71 7.32 1.44 85.54
Inflation Gap (Target-based)
1 47.32 39.74 9.65 3.29
4 41.34 43.97 10.39 4.30
8 39.04 45.76 9.81 5.39
20 36.34 46.09 9.14 8.43
40 34.49 44.22 8.67 12.62
∞ 28.56 36.62 7.18 27.64
Interest Rate
1 18.91 75.08 0.10 5.91
4 4.73 86.41 0.38 8.48
8 2.94 85.79 0.24 11.03
20 2.04 79.09 0.17 18.71
40 1.72 69.08 0.14 29.05
∞ 1.08 43.27 0.09 55.56
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nominal variables. Here the paper focuses on both mean-based and target-based
inflation gap. Mean-based inflation gap is defined as the difference between inflation
and the central bank’s long-run inflation target which is also the steady state inflation
in the model; whereas target-based inflation gap is the difference between inflation
and the central bank’s time-varying short-run inflation objective. Importantly, the
inflation target shock plays a considerable role as regards the inflation gap and policy
rate, mainly at medium to low frequency. This result corroborates the findings in
Castelnuovo (2010) who documents a similar role for inflation target shocks. As
pointed out by Castelnuovo (2010), this finding is not necessarily a consequence
of the calibration imposed on the autoregressive parameter for the inflation target
(ρπ∗ = 0.995) since the volatility of the process, which is estimated, clearly matters
as well. Moreover, while being relevant for the unconditional FEVDs of mean-based
inflation gap (given its high persistence), the role of such a calibration is less obvious
for the FEVDs of target-based gap even at lower frequencies.
As regards the policy-rate shock and the preference shock, the contribution is
considerable in explaining the fluctuations in the inflation gap and policy rate at
shorter horizons. For instance, the preference shock is most important in driving
movements in the nominal interest rate at higher frequencies.
Finally, it is also interesting to compare the differences in the relevance of the
shocks across sub-samples. As mentioned above, technology shock is the key driver
of fluctuations in output growth in both sample periods. While in the Great Infla-
tion era, inflation target shocks play a dominant role in explaining the fluctuations
of target-based inflation gap and the policy rate, however, when moving to the Great
Moderation sub-sample there are notable differences. The variance decompositions
reveal that both preference and policy-rate shocks are important in explaining move-
ments in target-based inflation gap even at longer horizons. Moreover, for policy-rate
fluctuations, preference shocks play a key role at all horizons.
Overall, the variance decomposition exercise suggests that the decline in the
innovation variance of inflation target shocks might have played a significant role
with regard to the decline in inflation-gap volatility while technology shocks might
have been more important for the decline in output growth volatility.
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5 What explains the switch from indeterminacy
to determinacy in the pre-Volcker period?
The finding that allowing for time-varying inflation target leads to determinacy for
both sample periods might be surprising given that the literature has established
the pre-Volcker period as characterized by indeterminacy. Yet, this finding relies
on inflation dynamics which has been shown by Stock and Watson (2007) to be
mostly driven by a permanent component during the Great Inflation. The question
is: how can the model explain this phenomenon? Fujiwara and Hirose (2012) argue
that a model under indeterminacy can generate richer persistent inflation dynamics
compared to determinacy as fewer autoregressive roots in (8) are being suppressed.
To highlight their argument, the paper presents a simple heuristic example that
borrows from their illustration and also from Bianchi and Nicolò (2017).
Consider a classical monetary model characterized by the Fisher relation
rt = Etπt+1 + νt, (10)
and a simple Taylor rule
rt = ψππt, (11)
where rt, πt and νt denote the nominal interest rate, inflation rate and real interest
rate respectively and Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator. Following
Bianchi and Nicolò (2017), the real interest rate follows a mean-zero Gaussian i.i.d.
process. The rational expectations forecast error ηt is defined such that
ηt = πt − Et−1πt. (12)
The system is expressed as
Etπt+1 = ψππt − νt. (13)













which implies that πt follows an i.i.d. process and the last equality is obtained by
recalling the assumption on νt.
In contrast, if ψπ ≤ 1, the solution to (13) is obtained by combining (13) with
(12) and it takes the form
πt = ψππt−1 − νt−1 + ηt, (16)
where the stability requirement imposes no restriction on the one-step ahead forecast
error ηt.
For the present purpose, note that πt in equation (16) exhibits richer dynamics
than that in equation (15). As a result, the endogenous persistence implied by
equation (16) suggests that indeterminacy cannot be ruled out under the assumption
of a fixed inflation target.
On the other hand, this is not the case when allowing for time-varying inflation
target. As documented by Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), inflation target
shocks induce persistent responses to the inflation gap and capture the permanent
component of inflation. According to the posterior estimates, inflation target was
loosely anchored during the pre-Volcker period as evident from its higher innovation
variance. This led to higher inflation-gap persistence due to a strengthening of the
relative importance of this permanent component. As such, the model does not
require the richer endogenous inflation dynamics that arises under indeterminacy.
As a result, the posterior concentrates all of its mass in the determinacy region and
the parameter estimate of the Taylor rule’s response to the inflation gap turns out
to be much stronger when the Federal Reserve is responding to deviations from a
time-varying target.
6 Federal Reserve’s inflation target
Before moving on to study the drivers of the Great Moderation, this section assesses
the model-implied evolution of the Federal Reserve’s inflation target. Here, the
paper employs the Kalman smoother to obtain ex-post estimates of π∗t based on the
observations that are included in the construction of the likelihood function. As such,
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Figure 2: Federal Reserve’s Inflation Target
this serves as an external validity check. Figure 2 plots the smoothed estimates of the
(latent) inflation target process on top of actual annualized quarterly inflation of the
GDP implicit price deflator. As seen in the figure, inflation target began rising in the
mid-1960s and jumped above 6% in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis. Subsequently,
it dropped significantly during the Volcker-disinflation period and somewhat settled
around 2.5% since the mid-1980s.
How does the implicit inflation target compare with the evidence in the literature?
Figure 3 compares the estimate with a selection of other proposed measures: Kozicki
and Tinsley (2005), Ireland (2007), Leigh (2008), Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent
(2010), Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011), and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014).18
Each panel plots GDP deflator inflation rate as well.
Several notable findings arise. First of all, there is a striking difference between
the estimated target and that of Kozicki and Tinsley (2005). These authors estimate
a VAR model allowing for shifts in the inflation target and imperfect policy credibil-
ity, defined by differences between the perceived and the actual inflation target. The
disparity may be due to their imperfect credibility and learning mechanism whereby
the private sector cannot perfectly distinguish between permanent target shocks and
18Sources: Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), Ireland (2007), Leigh (2008), Cogley, Primiceri and Sar-
gent (2010) and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) - original files provided by the authors;
Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) - American Economic Review (website).
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Figure 3: A comparison of inflation target estimates
transitory policy shocks.
As regards the estimates of Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), the co-movement
between the two series is very similar: with a correlation of 0.98 and 0.87 for the
pre-Volcker and post-1984 sub-sample respectively.19 However, the fourth panel in
Figure 3 documents clear evidence of a gap between the two inflation target series
and points to the essence of trend inflation. While Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent
(2010) leave the first moment of observed inflation unmodelled, the current paper
overcomes this shortcoming by explicitly modelling inflation’s long-run value (by
log-linearizing around a positive steady state) on top of its dynamics.
The implicit inflation target is also close to that of Ireland (2007)20, Aruoba and
Schorfheide (2011) and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014), particularly for the
pre-Volcker period for which the correlation reads 0.99, 0.99 and 0.97 respectively.
However, the estimated target turns out to be much smoother and somewhat different
than theirs in the second sub-sample. In particular, since the early 2000s, there is
a clear divergence. During this period, the estimate turns out to be higher than
19The numbers are conditional on overlapping periods, i.e. 1966:I - 1979:II for the first sub-sample
and 1984:I - 2006:IV for the second sub-sample.
20Ireland (2007) studies different inflation target processes, including some which allow for a
systematic reaction to structural shocks hitting the economy. The second panel in Figure 3 plots the
one labelled as “Federal Reserve’s Target as Implied by the Constrained Model with an Exogenous
Inflation Target”(see Figure 5, page 1869 in the published paper).
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the alternative measures as well as actual inflation itself. This finding is intuitive
and captures the fear of deflation among policymakers at that time which led to
extra easy monetary policy and lowering of the Federal Funds rate.21 As noted by
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), keeping interest rates low for an extended period
of time is equivalent to a rise in the time-varying inflation target.
The estimated target is also similar to Leigh (2008) who uses a time-varying pa-
rameter Taylor rule and the Kalman filter focusing on the post-1980 sample period
alone.22 As in Leigh (2008, p. 2022-23), the time-varying implicit inflation target for
the post-1984 sub-sample can be divided into separate chunks: (i) ‘the opportunistic
approach to disinflation’- a period covering from mid-1980s to mid-1990s - during
which according to Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) the Fed did not take deliberate
anti-inflation action but rather waited for external circumstances to deliver the de-
sired reduction in inflation; (ii) ‘the low-inflation equilibrium’in the late 1990s; and
(iii) ‘the deflation scare’ in the early 2000s during which the inflation target rose
above actual inflation.23
Finally, as a note of caution, one must be careful in drawing these comparisons.
The differences could be due to differences in investigated samples, data transforma-
tion, structure imposed on the data and vintage of the data.
7 What explains the Great Moderation in the
U.S.?
What are the reasons behind the decline in macroeconomic volatility and inflation
gap predictability? To answer this question, the paper conducts counterfactual ex-
ercises following Castelnuovo (2010) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010). The
objective here is to disentangle the role played by good policy and good luck. In
comparison to these studies, the exercises are still meaningful as the current paper
estimates a model log-linearized around a positive steady state inflation rate. Ascari
21See Bernanke (2002, 2010) and Bernanke and Reinhart (2004).
22Leigh (2008) focuses on estimating the implicit target based on both core PCE inflation and
GDP/GNP implicit deflator inflation. The third panel in Figure 3 plots the one labelled as “Esti-
mate of GDP/GNP deflator target (real-time forecasts)”(see Figure 5, page 2028 in the published
paper).
23For alternative interpretation of monetary policy during the 2000s, see Groshenny (2013),
Belongia and Ireland (2016) and Doko Tchatoka, Groshenny, Haque and Weder (2017).
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Table 6: Implications of the model for volatility and predictability





Output growth 1966:I-1979:II 1.10 - - -
1984:I-2008:II 0.58 - - -
Percent Change -47 - - -
Mean-based 1966:I-1979:II 1.46 0.94 0.90 0.87
Inflation Gap
1984:I-2008:II 0.52 0.88 0.82 0.79
Percent Change -64 -6 -9 -9
Target-based 1966:I-1979:II 0.81 0.84 0.78 0.74
Inflation Gap
1984:I-2008:II 0.23 0.45 0.31 0.27
Percent Change -72 -46 -60 -64
and Ropele (2007, 2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) show that this modelling
assumption substantially alters the NKPC relationship and hence it changes the in-
flation dynamics. This assumption also facilitates analysis using both mean-based
and target-based inflation gap.
Table 6 summarizes the model’s implications for the volatility and predictability
of the inflation gap and the volatility of output growth at the posterior mean of
the model parameters. First and foremost, the estimated model is able to replicate
the observed drop in output growth and inflation-gap volatility. The paper finds
a fall of output growth variability of 47%, and a drop of mean-based and target-
based inflation gap volatility of about 64% and 72% respectively.24 The figures are
similar to those reported in the literature. For instance, Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008) report a fall of output growth variability of about 25% and a drop of inflation
variability of about 75%. The numbers in Smets and Wouters (2007) read 35% and
58% respectively.
24The data used in estimation implies a fall of the standard deviation of output growth of about
48% and that of inflation of about 57%.
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This paper also focuses on the persistence of the inflation gap using the R2j
statistic proposed by Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010).25 To measure persistence
at a given date t, these authors propose to calculate the fraction of the total variation
in the inflation gap that is due to shocks inherited from the past relative to those
that will occur in the future. They suggest that this is equivalent to one minus the
fraction of the total variation due to future shocks. Since future shocks account for
the forecast error, they express this as one minus the ratio of the conditional variance
to the unconditional variance where j denotes the forecast horizon.
Table 6 reports R2j statistic for inflation-gap predictability for forecast horizons of
one, four and eight quarters. Similar to the findings reported in Cogley, Primiceri and
Sargent (2010), there is a marked decline in the persistence of time-varying target-
based gap at all three horizons. However, it is remarkably muted for mean-based
inflation gap. This result shows that the persistence of these two series is considerably
different, a finding in line with the autocorrelation of the two series based on pre
and post-Volcker data reported in Ascari and Sbordone (2014). Moreover, it is also
in line with Benati (2008) who fails to detect a change in raw inflation persistence in
the U.S. around the time of the Volcker stabilization. Importantly, both mean-based
inflation gap and raw inflation remained persistent as inflation target continued to
drift after the Volcker disinflation. Instead, it is time-varying target-based inflation
gap that has become less persistent. Hence, the results shed further light on the
findings of Cogley and Sargent (2002), Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) on the
one hand and Benati (2008) on the other.
7.1 Counterfactuals
Next the paper conducts counterfactual exercises designed to disentangle the role
played by good policy and good luck in explaining the Great Moderation where
it closely follows the counterfactual scenarios studied in Castelnuovo (2010) and
Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010). Following these authors, the paper divides the
25Using this measure of persistence based on short- and medium-term predictability within a
simple New Keynesian model, Benati and Surico (2008) show that a more aggressive poliy stance
towards inflation causes a decline in inflation predictability. However, they estimate the model
for the Great Moderation period only, thus stopping short of using the methodology of Lubik
and Schorfheide (2003, 2004) to allow for indeterminacy and estimate the model during the Great
Inflation period as well.
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Table 7: Counterfactual standard deviations
Scenarios Output growth Mean-based Target-based
inflation gap inflation gap
St. Dev % Change St. Dev % Change St. Dev % Change
Policy 2, Private 1 1.09 -1 0.58 -60 0.26 -68
ψπ, ψx, ψ∆y, ρr 1.09 -1 0.97 -34 0.39 -52
ψπ 1.10 0 0.93 -36 0.28 -65
π∗ 1.10 0 1.44 -1 0.79 -2
σπ∗ 1.10 0 0.90 -38 0.55 -32
Policy 1, Private 2 0.59 -46 1.49 +2 0.85 +5
σg 0.59 -46 1.45 -1 0.80 -1
experiment into two broad categories. First, it combines the parameters pertaining
to the Taylor rule, i.e. ψπ, ψx, ψ∆y, ρr, π
∗, σr, σπ∗, of the post-1984 sub-sample
with the private sector parameters of the pre-1979 period which is called ‘Policy 2,
Private 1’. This exercise is designed to capture the role of better monetary policy in
reducing the volatility of the inflation gap (both mean-based and target-based) and
output growth and the persistence of target-based inflation gap series. In the second
category, it combines private sector parameters of the second sub-sample with the
policy parameters of the first. This scenario, labelled ‘Policy 1, Private 2’, is designed
to study the contribution of non-policy factors.
Table 7 reports the counterfactual results for the volatility of output growth and
the two inflation gap series. The table reports the standard deviations and the
percentage deviations with respect to the pre-Volcker scenario. First and foremost,
the decline in inflation-gap volatility is driven by monetary policy (Policy 2, Private
1). However, changes in monetary policy alone cannot explain the decline in output
growth variability, a finding shared with Leduc and Sill (2007) and Castelnuovo
(2010). As in Leduc and Sill (2007), the decline in output growth variability is
mainly explained by the reduction in the volatility of technology shocks. Hence,
both good policy and good luck are jointly required to explain the reduction in
output growth and inflation-gap volatility.
Digging further, the paper finds that both stronger response to the inflation
gap (ψπ) and better anchored inflation objective, i.e. a reduction in the volatility
of inflation target shocks (σπ∗), are key ingredients in the reduction of inflation-
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Table 8: Counterfactual predictability
Scenarios Target-based inflation gap
R21 % Change R
2
4 % Change R
2
8 % Change
Policy 2, Private 1 0.36 -57 0.24 -69 0.23 -69
ψπ, ψx, ψ∆y, ρr 0.40 -52 0.32 -59 0.31 -58
ψπ 0.69 -18 0.62 -21 0.59 -20
π∗ 0.83 -1 0.77 -1 0.73 -1
σπ∗ 0.68 -19 0.58 -26 0.55 -26
Policy 1, Private 2 0.89 +6 0.81 +4 0.75 +1
gap variability. This outcome stands in contrast to Castelnuovo (2010) and Cogley,
Primiceri and Sargent (2010) who both find that a stronger response to the inflation
gap during the Great Moderation period only plays a minor role. Interestingly,
the decline in the Federal Reserve’s long-run inflation target (π∗) plays a negligible
role. That a reduction in π∗ is negligible for the reduced variability of target-based
inflation gap is a-priori expected as π∗ cancels out when looking at log-deviations
of the inflation gap, πt − π∗t . However, that it is quantitatively unimportant for
the variability of mean-based inflation gap as well is much less obvious given the
qualitative result in Ascari and Sbordone (2014) that trend inflation affects the
volatility of macroeconomic variables.
As regards the decline in inflation-gap persistence, the paper focuses on time-
varying target-based inflation gap alone as the decline in the persistence of mean-
based gap is rather muted. Table 8 reports the results. The main message from
these experiments goes hand in hand with the counterfactuals related to volatility
reduction. In particular, better monetary policy, mainly in terms of a stronger
response to the inflation gap and a reduced variability of inflation target shocks, is
the key driver of the decline in inflation-gap predictability. Moreover, the decline
in the Federal Reserve’s long-run inflation target, i.e. π∗, plays a quantitatively
negligible role.
8 Further investigation
The robustness checks involve (i) testing for indeterminacy using a GNK model
with firm-specific labor; and (ii) estimating the model over the entire region of the
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Table 9: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (firm-specific labor)
Log-data density Probability
Sample Inflation Target Det Indet Det Indet
1966:I-1979:II Fixed -132.27 -120.86 0 1
Time-varying -120.68 -123.41 0.94 0.06
1982:IV-2008:IV Fixed -46.96 -61.83 1 0
Time-varying -47.63 -70.96 1 0
parameter space, i.e. over both determinacy and indeterminacy.
8.1 Firm-specific labor
In contrasting fixed versus time-varying inflation target, the analysis so far has re-
lied on a GNK model with homogenous labor following Ascari and Ropele (2009)
and Ascari and Sbordone (2014). The paper finds that a model with time-varying
inflation target empirically fits better than one featuring fixed inflation target and
determinacy prevails in both the pre-Volcker as well as the post-1984 sample pe-
riods. However, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) show that a similar model
with firm-specific labor is more susceptible to indeterminacy induced by higher trend
inflation than a model with homogenous labor. Hence, the paper conducts further
investigation along this dimension and estimates the model of Hirose, Kurozumi and
Van Zandweghe (2017) who employ firm-specific labor. In order to establish a valid
comparison, it uses the exact same set of priors, observables and sample periods as
they do.26 However, to achieve identification between the inflation target process
and the policy-rate shock, this paper assumes that the latter follows a transitory
i.i.d. process while the former is a highly persistent AR(1) process as before. Ta-
ble 9 collects the results for the marginal data densities and the posterior model
probabilities.27
26The pre-1979 period in Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) is the same as in the
current paper, i.e. 1966:I - 1979:II, while for the second sub-sample they use a slightly different
period ranging from 1982:IV - 2008:IV. The choice of the second sub-sample is innocuous for the
findings.
27Table 12 in the appendix reports parameter estimates.
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In line with Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017), the pre-Volcker pe-
riod is unambiguously characterized by indeterminacy while the post-1982 period is
characterized by determinacy under the assumption of a fixed inflation target equal
to trend inflation. However, when allowing for time-varying inflation target, deter-
minacy prevails as before. In terms of the empirical fit of fixed versus time-varying
target, it is comparable for both the pre-Volcker and the post-1982 period. Given
that firm-specific labor makes the model more prone to indeterminacy due to higher
trend inflation, this set of results somewhat mitigates, yet does not completely over-
turn, the main findings. The hypothesis that the Federal Reserve might have pursued
a time-varying inflation target and as a consequence determinacy might have pre-
vailed even in the pre-Volcker period is a possibility that cannot be empirically ruled
out.
8.2 Estimation over the entire parameter spacer
A diffi culty in the methodology of Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) is that the likelihood
function of the model is possibly discontinuous at the boundary between the deter-
minacy and indeterminacy region. In order to bridge the gap between the likelihood
function and improve the test for indeterminacy, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) pick
M∗(θ) such that the impulse responses of the endogenous variables to fundamental
shocks are continuous at the boundary. Yet, to test for indeterminacy, the authors
estimate the model twice, first under determinacy, then under indeterminacy. Ar-
guably, they do so because of the sampling technology available back then, i.e. the
RWMH algorithm. However, it can get stuck near a local mode and fail to find the
true posterior distribution. While, an importance sampling algorithm like SMC can
use a single chain to explore the entire parameter space.
So far this paper has followed the conventional procedure of Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) by estimating separately under determinacy and indeterminacy. Instead, to
take full advantage of the SMC algorithm, here the paper estimates the GNK model
with homogenous labor over the entire parameter space just as Hirose, Kurozumi
and Van Zandweghe (2017) do.28 The likelihood function is now given by
28For an alternative approach that allows estimation over the entire parameter space while using
standard packages and estimation algorithms see Bianchi and Nicolò (2017).
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Table 10: Posteriors distribution (Estimation over entire parameter space)
Posterior Mean
[Standard Deviation]

































































































































































log p(XT ) −124.87 −122.36 −32.31 −28.76
P{θS∈ Θ
D|XT} 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00
log p(XT ) represents the SMC-based approximation of the log marginal data density
and P{θS∈ Θ
D|XT} denotes the posterior probability of determinacy of equilibrium.
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p(XT |θS, S) = 1{θS ∈ ΘD}pD(XT |θD, D) + 1{θS ∈ ΘI}pI(XT |θI , I),
whereΘD, ΘI are the determinacy and indeterminacy regions of the parameter space,
1{θS ∈ ΘS} is the indicator function that equals 1 if θS ∈ ΘS and zero otherwise,
and pD(XT |θD, D), pI(XT |θI , I) are the likelihood functions under determinacy and
indeterminacy respectively.
Table 10 confirms that the findings are robust: indeterminacy can be confidently
ruled out during the pre-Volcker period under time-varying inflation target, while
there is still a possibility that it might have prevailed under a fixed target. Moreover,
time-varying target fits better in both periods. The parameter estimates are also
similar to the ones from the respectively favored models when estimated separately
under determinacy and indeterminacy. Finally, the paper also estimates the model
with firm-specific labor over the entire region. Once again, the results remain robust
and are delegated to the appendix.29
9 Conclusion
This paper estimates a Generalized New Keynesian model with positive trend infla-
tion. While allowing for indeterminacy, it assesses the empirical fit of fixed versus
time-varying inflation target for the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation pe-
riod. Several notable findings arise. First, when considering the model with fixed
inflation target, the paper finds that indeterminacy cannot be ruled out in the pre-
Volcker period while there is a switch to determinacy after the Volcker-disinflation.
However, determinacy unambiguously prevails in both sample periods when the mon-
etary authority follows a time-varying inflation target instead. The data support
the model with time variation in the central bank’s inflation objective as being
empirically superior with respect to the standard constant-target model. To the
best of my knowledge, this paper is the first one to test for indeterminacy using a
full—information likelihood-based approach while comparing the fit of fixed versus
time-varying target. The finding that even the pre-Volcker period could possibly be
characterized by determinacy is a novel result. Furthermore, counterfactual simu-
lations suggest that both good policy and good luck are jointly required to explain
29See Table 13 in the appendix.
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the Great Moderation. The decline in inflation-gap volatility and predictability is
driven by better monetary policy, both in terms of a more active response to the in-
flation gap and a more anchored inflation target. In contrast, the reduction in output
growth variability is mainly explained by reduced volatility of technology shocks.
The paper choose to make these arguments by assuming that trend inflation
is positive but constant while the Federal Reserve pursues a time-varying inflation
target. This choice helps to keep the analysis simple yet related to existing re-
search. However, one could depart instead by log-linearizing the equilibrium con-
ditions around a steady state characterized by drifting trend inflation which would
result in a New Keynesian Phillips curve with drifting coeffi cients. DSGE mod-
els with time-varying coeffi cients and stochastic volatilities have been estimated by
Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) and Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-
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Appendix A
The artificial economy is a variant of the Generalized New Keynesian (GNK) model
of Ascari and Sbordone (2014) and so the description of the model below draws
heavily from their exposition. The model consists of a representative household, a
representative final-good firm, a continuum of intermediate-good firms, and a central
bank. The behavior of these agents are described as follows.
A.1 Model
Households
The representative agent’s preferences depend on consumption of final goods, C̃t,




βtdtu(C̃t, Nt) 0 < β < 1
which the agent acts to maximize. Here, E0 represents the expectations operator.
The term dt stands for a shock to the discount factor, β, which follows the stationary
autoregressive process
ln dt = ρd ln dt−1 + εd,t
where εd,t is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation that is normally distributed
with standard deviation σd. The period utility is additively separable in consumption
101
and labor and it takes on the functional form







dn > 0, ϕ ≥ 0.
Logarithmic utility is the only additive-separable form consistent with balanced
growth. The term ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity and dn
governs the disutility of working in steady state.
The period by period budget constraint is given by
PtC̃t +R
−1
t Bt = WtNt − Tt +Dt +Bt−1
where Rt is the gross nominal interest rate on bonds, Bt is one-period bond holdings,
Wt is the nominal wage rate, Tt is lump sum taxes, and Dt is the profit income. The
representative consumer’s problem is to maximize the expected discount intertempo-
ral utility subject to the budget constraint. The first-order conditions with respect
















where Ξt is the marginal utility of consumption, and πt = PtPt−1 is the gross inflation
rate of the final-good price.
Firms
Firms come in two forms. Final-good firms produce output that can be consumed.
This output is made from the range of differentiated goods that are supplied by
intermediate-good firms who have market power.
Final-good firm
In each period t, a final good, Yt, is produced by a perfectly competitive rep-
resentative final-good firm, by combining a continuum of intermediate inputs, Yi,t,












where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate inputs. The first-








The final-good market clearing condition is given by
Yt = Ct.
Intermediate-good firms
Each intermediate-good firm i produces a differentiated good Yi,t under monop-
olistic competition using the production function
Yi,t = AtNi,t,
where At denotes the level of technology and follows the stochastic process
lnAt = ln g + lnAt−1 + gt,
where g is the steady-state gross rate of technological progress which is also equal to
the steady-state balanced growth rate, and gt is a non-stationary technology shock
which follows an AR(1) process
ln gt = ρg ln gt−1 + εg,t,
where εg,t is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation that is normally distributed
with standard deviation σg.
Unlike, Ascari and Sbordone (2014) I assume stochastic growth modelled as the
technology level following a unit root process. The labor demand and the real mar-











Due to the assumption of constant returns to scale and perfectly competitive labor
markets, the real marginal cost of firm i,MCi,t, depends only only aggregate variables
and thus are the same across firms, i.e. MCi,t = MCt.
Firms’price-setting
The intermediate goods producers face a constant probability, 0 < ξ < 1, of being



































for j > 1
= 1 for j = 0
where π denotes the central bank’s long-run inflation target and is equal to the level of
trend inflation, Λt,t+j = β
j λt+j
λ0
is the stochastic discount factor. This formulation is
general as ω ∈ [0, 1] allows for any degree of price indexation and µ ∈ [0, 1] allows for
any degree of geometric combination of the two types of indexation usually employed
in the literature: to steady state inflation and to past inflation rates.
The first order condition for the optimized relative price p∗i,t(=
P ∗i,t
Pt
































































)−εdi. Under the Calvo price mechanism,
the above expression can be written recursively as:





Recursive formulation of the optimal price-setting equation
The joint dynamics of the optimal reset price and inflation can be compactly








where ψt and φt are auxiliary variables that allow one to rewrite the infinite sums





























Lastly, the central bank’s policy is described by a Taylor rule
logRt = ρr logRt−1+(1−ρr)
[







+εr,t 0 ≤ ρr < 1.
where xt is the output gap, εr,t is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock, r ≥ 1 is the steady
state gross policy rate. The parameters ψπ, ψx and ψ∆y govern the central bank’s
responses to inflation, output gap and output growth respectively, and ρr ∈ [0, 1]
is the degree of policy rate smoothing . Here π∗t denotes the central’s banks time
varying inflation target that is assumed to follow an exogenous process
lnπ∗t = ρπ∗ ln π
∗
t−1 + επ∗,t,
where επ∗,t is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation that is normally distrib-
uted with standard deviation σπ∗. Under fixed inflation target, I assume that the
policy rules becomes
logRt = ρr logRt−1 + (1− ρr)
[








where the central bank’s inflation target is equal to steady-state inflation or trend





and Y nt is the natural rate of output. By considering flexible prices, the law of motion















Table 11: Fixed target and Homogenous labor
Posterior Mean
[Standard Deviation]
1966:I - 1979:II 1984:I - 2008:II


































































































Mπ∗,ζ − − −
107
Table 12: Firm-specific labor
Posterior Mean
[Standard Deviation]









































































































































Mπ∗,ζ − − − −
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Table 13: Firm-specific labor - estimation over entire parameter space
Posterior Mean
[Standard Deviation]

































































































































































log p(XT ) −120.23 −120.87 −48.42 −49.42
P{θS∈ Θ
D|XT} 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00
Results are based on 10,000 particles from the final stage in the SMC algorithm.
log p(XT ) represents the SMC-based approximation of the log marginal data density
and P{θS∈ Θ
D|XT} denotes the posterior probability of determinacy of equilibrium.
109
References
[1] Arias, J.E., Ascari, G., Branzoli, N. and Castelnuovo, E., 2017. Positive Trend
Inflation And Determinacy In A Medium-Sized New Keynesian Model, Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 17-16.
[2] Aruoba, B. and Schorfheide, F., 2011. Sticky prices versus monetary frictions:
An estimation of policy trade-offs. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
3(1), pp.60-90.
[3] Ascari, G., 2004. Staggered prices and trend inflation: some nuisances. Review
of Economic Dynamics, 7(3), pp.642-667.
[4] Ascari, G., Castelnuovo, E. and Rossi, L., 2011. Calvo vs. Rotemberg in a trend
inflation world: An empirical investigation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 35(11), pp.1852-1867.
[5] Ascari, G. and Ropele, T., 2007. Optimal monetary policy under low trend in-
flation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(8), pp.2568-2583.
[6] Ascari, G. and Ropele, T., 2009. Trend inflation, taylor principle, and indetermi-
nacy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(8), pp.1557-1584.
[7] Ascari, G. and Sbordone, A.M., 2014. The macroeconomics of trend inflation.
Journal of Economic Literature, 52(3), pp.679-739.
[8] Belongia, M.T. and Ireland, P.N., 2016. The evolution of US monetary policy:
2000—2007. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 73, pp.78-93.
[9] Benati, L., 2008. Investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3), pp.1005-1060.
[10] Benati, L., 2009. Are ‘intrinsic inflation persistence’models structural in the
sense of Lucas (1976)?. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 1038.
[11] Benati, L. and Surico, P., 2008. Evolving US monetary policy and the decline
of inflation predictability. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2-3),
pp.634-646.
110
[12] Benati, L. and Surico, P., 2009. VAR Analysis and the Great Moderation. The
American Economic Review, 99(4), pp.1636-1652.
[13] Bernanke, B.S., 2002. Deflation: making sure "It" doesn’t happen here. Remarks
before the National Economists Club, Washington, DC, November 21, 2002.
[14] Bernanke, B.S., 2010. Monetary policy and the housing bubble. Speech at the
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia.
[15] Bernanke, B.S. and Reinhart, V.R., 2004. Conducting monetary policy at very
low short-term interest rates. The American Economic Review, 94(2), pp.85-90.
[16] Beyer, A. and Farmer, R.E., 2007. Testing for indeterminacy: An application to
US monetary policy: Comment. The American Economic Review, 97(1), pp.524-
529.
[17] Bianchi, F. and Nicolò, G., 2017. A Generalized Approach to Indeterminacy in
Linear Rational Expectations Models (No. w23521). National Bureau of Economic
Research.
[18] Blanchard, O. and Simon, J., 2001. The long and large decline in US output
volatility. Brookings papers on economic activity, 2001(1), pp.135-164.
[19] Boivin, J. and Giannoni, M.P., 2006. Has monetary policy become more effec-
tive?. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(3), pp.445-462.
[20] Calvo, G.A., 1983. Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 12(3), pp.383-398.
[21] Castelnuovo, E., 2010. Trend inflation and macroeconomic volatilities in the
post-WWII US economy. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance,
21(1), pp.19-33.
[22] Castelnuovo, E., Greco, L. and Raggi, D., 2014. Policy rules, regime switches,
and trend inflation: An empirical investigation for the United States. Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics, 18(4), pp.920-942.
111
[23] Clarida, R., Gali, J. and Gertler, M., 2000. Monetary policy rules and macroeco-
nomic stability: evidence and some theory. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115(1), pp.147-180.
[24] Cogley, T., Primiceri, G.E. and Sargent, T.J., 2010. Inflation-gap persistence in
the US. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(1), pp.43-69.
[25] Cogley, T. and Sargent, T.J., 2002. Evolving Post-World War II US Inflation
Dynamics. In NBERMacroeconomics Annual 2001, Volume 16 (pp. 331-388). MIT
Press.
[26] Cogley, T. and Sargent, T.J., 2005. The conquest of US inflation: Learning and
robustness to model uncertainty. Review of Economic dynamics, 8(2), pp.528-563.
[27] Cogley, T. and Sbordone, A.M., 2008. Trend inflation, indexation, and inflation
persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The American Economic Review,
98(5), pp.2101-2126.
[28] Coibion, O. and Gorodnichenko, Y., 2011. Monetary policy, trend inflation, and
the great moderation: An alternative interpretation. The American Economic
Review, 101(1), pp.341-370.
[29] Doko Tchatoka, F., Groshenny, N., Haque, Q. and Weder, M., 2017. Monetary
Policy and Indeterminacy after the 2001 Slump. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 82, pp. 83-95.
[30] Eggertsson, G.B. and Woodford, M., 2003. The zero bound on interest rates
and optimal monetary policy. Brookings papers on economic activity, 2003(1),
pp.139-233.
[31] Eo, Y. and Lie, D., 2017. The role of the inflation target adjustment in sta-
bilization policy. Economics Working Paper Series, 2017-06, The University of
Sydney.
[32] Farmer Roger, E.A., 1999. Macroeconomics of Self-fulfilling Prophecies. Cam-
bridge, Mass. : MIT Press
112
[33] Fernández-Villaverde, J. and Rubio-Ramírez, J.F., 2007. Estimating macroeco-
nomic models: A likelihood approach. The Review of Economic Studies, 74(4),
pp.1059-1087.
[34] Fernández-Villaverde, J., Guerrón-Quintana, P. and Rubio-Ramírez, J.F., 2010.
Fortune or virtue: Time-variant volatilities versus parameter drifting in us data
(No. w15928). National Bureau of Economic Research.
[35] Fujiwara, I. and Hirose, Y., 2014. Indeterminacy and forecastability. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 46(1), pp.243-251.
[36] Groshenny, N., 2013. Monetary policy, inflation and unemployment: In defense
of the federal reserve. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17(6), pp.1311-1329.
[37] Herbst, E. and Schorfheide, F., 2014. Sequential Monte Carlo sampling for
DSGE models. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 29(7), pp.1073-1098.
[38] Herbst, E.P. and Schorfheide, F., 2015. Bayesian Estimation of DSGE Models.
Princeton University Press.
[39] Hirose, Y., 2007. Sunspot fluctuations ulnder zero nominal interest rates. Eco-
nomics Letters, 97(1), pp.39-45.
[40] Hirose, Y., 2008. Equilibrium indeterminacy and asset price fluctuation in
Japan: A Bayesian investigation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40(5),
pp.967-999.
[41] Hirose, Y., 2013. Monetary policy and sunspot fluctuations in the United States
and the Euro area. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17(1), pp.1-28.
[42] Hirose, Y., 2014. An Estimated DSGE Model with a Deflation Steady State.
CAMA Working Paper Series, 2014, 52/2014, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic
Analysis, Australian National University.
[43] Hirose, Y., Kurozumi, T. and Van Zandweghe, W., 2017. Monetary Policy and
Macroeconomic Stability Revisited. CAMA Working Paper Series, 2017, 38/2017,
Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Australian National University.
113
[44] Ireland, P.N., 2004. Technology shocks in the new Keynesian model. The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 86(4), pp.923-936.
[45] Ireland, P.N., 2007. Changes in the Federal Reserve’s inflation target: Causes
and consequences. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39(8), pp.1851-1882.
[46] Justiniano, A. and Primiceri, G.E., 2008. The time-varying volatility of macro-
economic fluctuations. The American Economic Review, 98(3), pp.604-641.
[47] Kass, R.E. and Raftery, A.E., 1995. Bayes factors. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 90(430), pp.773-795.
[48] Kozicki, S. and Tinsley, P.A., 2005. Permanent and transitory policy shocks
in an empirical macro model with asymmetric information. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 29(11), pp.1985-2015.
[49] Kozicki, S. and Tinsley, P.A., 2009. Perhaps the 1970s FOMC did what it said
it did. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(6), pp.842-855.
[50] Kurozumi, T., 2016. Endogenous price stickiness, trend inflation, and macro-
economic stability. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 48(6), pp.1267-1291.
[51] Kurozumi, T. and Van Zandweghe, W., 2017. Trend Inflation and Equilibrium
Stability: Firm-Specific Versus Homogeneous Labor. Macroeconomic Dynamics,
21(4), pp.947-981.
[52] Leduc, S. and Sill, K., 2007. Monetary policy, oil shocks, and TFP: accounting
for the decline in US volatility. Review of Economic Dynamics, 10(4), pp.595-614.
[53] Leigh, D., 2008. Estimating the Federal Reserve’s implicit inflation target: A
state space approach. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32(6), pp.2013-
2030.
[54] Lubik, T.A. and Schorfheide, F., 2003. Computing sunspot equilibria in linear
rational expectations models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28(2),
pp.273-285.
[55] Lubik, T.A. and Schorfheide, F., 2004. Testing for Indeterminacy: An Applica-
tion to US Monetary Policy. The American Economic Review, 94(1), p.190.
114
[56] Lubik, T.A. and Schorfheide, F., 2007. Testing for indeterminacy: An appli-
cation to US monetary policy: Reply. The American Economic Review, 97(1),
pp.530-533.
[57] McConnell, M.M. and Perez-Quiros, G., 2000. Output fluctuations in the United
States: What has changed since the early 1980’s?. The American Economic Re-
view, 90(5), pp.1464-1476.
[58] Orphanides, A., 2004. Monetary policy rules, macroeconomic stability, and in-
flation: A view from the trenches. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(2),
pp.151-175.
[59] Orphanides, A. and Wilcox, D.W., 2002. The opportunistic approach to disin-
flation. International Finance, 5(1), pp.47-71.
[60] Primiceri, G.E., 2005. Time varying structural vector autoregressions and mon-
etary policy. The Review of Economic Studies, 72(3), pp.821-852.
[61] Primiceri, G.E., 2006. Why inflation rose and fell: policy-makers’beliefs and US
postwar stabilization policy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(3), pp.867-
901.
[62] Sargent, T.J., 1999. The conquest of American inflation. Princeton University
Press.
[63] Sargent, T., Williams, N. and Zha, T., 2006. Shocks and government beliefs:
The rise and fall of American inflation. The American Economic Review, 96(4),
pp.1193-1224.
[64] Sims, C.A., 2002. Solving linear rational expectations models. Computational
Economics, 20(1), pp.1-20.
[65] Sims, C.A. and Zha, T., 2006. Were there regime switches in US monetary
policy?. The American Economic Review, 96(1), pp.54-81.
[66] Smets, F. and Wouters, R., 2007. Shocks and frictions in US business cycles: A
Bayesian DSGE approach. The American Economic Review, 97(3), pp.586-606.
115
[67] Stock, J.H. and Watson, M.W., 2002. Has the business cycle changed and why?.
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 17, pp.159-218.
[68] Stock, J.H. and Watson, M.W., 2007. Why has US inflation become harder to
forecast?. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39(s1), pp.3-33.
116
117
IV Do we really know that U.S.
monetary policy was destabi-
lizing in the 1970s?
This paper examines the role played by oil price shocks and monetary policy with a
particular focus on the Great Inflation. Using Bayesian estimation techniques with
a Sequential Monte Carlo algorithm while allowing for indeterminacy, we estimate a
sticky price model with trend inflation and oil entering in both consumption and pro-
duction. We find that the US economy during the pre-Volcker period is best described
by a determinate version of the model that features a high degree of real wage rigid-
ity. In this environment, the oil price shocks of the 1970s created an acute trade-off
between inflation and output-gap stabilization. Faced with this dilemma, the Fed-
eral Reserve chose to react forcefully both to inflation and output growth, but not to
the output gap, thereby preventing the appearance of multiple equilibria and sunspot
shocks. We further document that oil price shocks are no longer as stagflationary as
they used to be owing to lower real wage rigidity, thereby explaining the resilience of
the U.S. economy to the sustained oil price increases in the 2000s.
1 Introduction
The Great Inflation episode is one of the defining macroeconomic events of the 20th
century. From the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the U.S. economy not only
went through rates of unemployment not seen since the 1930s but also at the same
time experienced high and volatile inflation. This historical record was followed by
a decline in macroeconomic volatility since the early 1980s, a phenomenon dubbed
the Great Moderation. Since the seminal work of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)
and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), the monetary policy literature has attributed the
high inflation episode in the 1970s to self-fulfilling expectations-driven fluctuations
arising due to “dovish”monetary policy. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) were the
first to argue that passive response to inflation in the pre-Volcker period resulted in
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equilibrium indeterminacy and opened the door to sunspot fluctuations which ulti-
mately led to a higher level and volatility of inflation as well as overall macroeconomic
instability. The switch to “hawkish”policy with the appointment of Paul Volcker
as Federal Reserve Chairman stabilized inflation expectations, led to determinacy
and removed sunspots as a source of economic instability. However, as pointed out
by Bilbiie and Straub (2013), this ‘indeterminacy-based’explanation of the Great
Inflation has one obvious complication: sunspot shocks are demand-driven in nature
as it increases both inflation and output whereas there were recurrent episodes of
recession in the 1970s (hence the term Great Stagflation).
In contrast, an alternative hypothesis points to the role of commodity price shocks
as an important source of economic fluctuations. For instance, Hamilton (1983)
argues that most U.S. recessions were Granger caused by increases in the price of
crude oil. A competing view suggested by Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997)
is that the Great Stagflation is linked to the endogenous response of the Federal
Reserve to exogenous oil price shocks. According to this view, policy-makers raised
interest rates in response to the inflationary pressures caused by oil price shocks,
thereby causing a deep recession that wouldn’t have occurred otherwise. Yet, this
view is also disputed by many. Amongst them, Barsky and Kilian (2002) challenge
the view that oil price changes were exogenous and provide evidence that the rise
in oil prices in the 1970s was a response to macroeconomic forces, ultimately driven
by shifts toward a less restrictive monetary policy regime following the breakdown
of Bretton Woods. Nonetheless, such adverse cost-push shocks arguably generated a
trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the output gap for the Federal
Reserve.
Existing empirical investigations that find passive response to inflation in the
1970s have largely disregarded the effect of commodity price fluctuations and the
associated trade-off. Indeed with no trade-off between stabilizing inflation and the
output gap, full price stability becomes optimal. The fact that inflation was highly
volatile in the 1970s suggests that either policy was far from optimal or indeed there
was a policy trade-off.
In this paper, we revisit the ‘indeterminacy-based’explanation of the Great In-
flation by adopting a framework which takes into account this trade-off faced by
the central bank in the wake of adverse commodity price shocks. Toward this end,
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we extend the simple NK model with a role for oil in production and consumption
and further allow for real wage rigidity as a mechanism that generates quantita-
tively meaningful trade-off faced by the central bank following Blanchard and Gali
(2007, 2010). In this endeavor, what sets us apart from them is that we model in-
flation’s long-run value on top of its dynamics by allowing for positive steady state
or trend inflation. Recent theoretical work by Hornstein and Wolman (2005), Kiley
(2007) and Ascari and Ropele (2009) has shown that the Taylor principle breaks
down when trend inflation is positive. For instance, using a NK framework Ascari
and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) show that trend inflation makes
price-setting firms more forward-looking which flattens the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (henceforth NKPC) and widens the indeterminacy region. To achieve a unique
rational expectations equilibrium thus requires a stronger response to the inflation
gap at higher levels of trend inflation. Moreover, the stronger the response to the
output gap, the stronger the response to the inflation gap needs to be in order to
guarantee determinacy. In a related study, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) doc-
ument that inertial policies also tend to stabilize inflation expectations as does a
stronger response to output growth. Hence, to reassess the evidence of indetermi-
nacy in the 1970s in the face of commodity price shocks, one must also take into
account the level of trend inflation.
We estimate the model using Bayesian estimation techniques over the Great
Inflation and the Great Moderation period. On top of reassessing the evidence
of loose monetary policy in the 1970s, this further allows us to study changes in
monetary policy as well as changes in the propagation of commodity price shocks
over time. Our results read as follows. First, we find that when considering the model
without any role for oil, indeterminacy prevails in the 1970s while determinacy gets
favored in the Great Moderation period. This finding is in line with the empirical
monetary policy literature, for instance, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011). Second, once we turn
on oil in the model, we find mixed evidence for indeterminacy in the 1970s, i.e. we
can neither rule in nor rule out indeterminacy. However, important aspects of the
analysis, such as commodity price shocks and the degree of real wage rigidity, remain
not properly identified. Third, through careful elucidation of observables to sharpen
the identification of these key features of the model, we then find that the Federal
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Reserve has been responding aggressively to inflation even in the 1970s to the extent
that it completely rules out indeterminacy as a possibility. These findings suggest
that parameter estimates pertaining to the Taylor rule are biased when abstracting
from modelling commodity price fluctuations and the associated trade-off. In fact,
once we take this into account, our empirical finding rules out self-fulfilling inflation
expectations as an explanation of the high inflation episode in the 1970s. Fourth,
our results indicate that there have been important changes in the U.S. economy in
terms of both the policy parameters as well as the stochastic environment, i.e. the
shock processes, between the two sub-samples. Most notably, the policy response to
inflation and output growth almost doubled while trend inflation fell considerably.
We also find that the Federal Reserve moved its focus away from responding to
headline inflation during the pre-1979 period toward core inflation during the post-
1984 period. Finally, we document that oil price shocks are no longer as inflationary
as they used to be, allowing the central bank to respond less aggressively to a given oil
price shock, thanks to a shift toward more flexible wages in the second sub-sample.
Therefore, this finding corroborates the claim of Blanchard and Gali (2010) that
real wage rigidities have greatly reduced, thereby explaining why the economy has
remained remarkably resilient to sustained oil price hikes in the 2000s.
Our paper is closely related to the empirical literature studying the link between
monetary policy and macroeconomic stability, with a particular focus on the Great
Inflation episode. Some recent contributions along this dimension include Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017). They
find that the pre-Volcker period is characterized by indeterminacy while better sys-
tematic monetary policy as well as changes in the level of trend inflation resulted in a
switch to determinacy in the early 1980s. In contrast, the current paper estimates a
similar model while taking into account commodity price fluctuations and the trade-
off faced by the central bank. The paper documents that once we take these key
features into account, determinacy prevails not only in the Great Moderation period
but also in the Great Inflation era. The outcome that pre-Volcker period is char-
acterized by determinacy is in line with the findings of Orphanides (2004), Bilbiie
and Straub (2013) and Haque (2017). Both Orphanides (2004) and Haque (2017)
document strong anti-inflationary stance pursued by the Federal Reserve even in the
1970s. While Orphanides (2004) points toward the mismeasurement of output gap
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in real time, Haque (2017) suggests time variation in inflation target and its impli-
cations for the inflation gap as explanations for this finding. On the other hand,
Bilbiie and Straub (2013) argue that limited asset market participation resulted in
an inverted IS curve and inverted aggregate demand logic, i.e. interest rate increases
becoming expansionary. Accordingly, they document passive monetary policy during
the pre-Volcker period being consistent with equilibrium determinacy. However, to
the best of our knowledge, the explanation proposed in this paper based on com-
modity price fluctuations and the associated trade-off is novel and may be seen as
complementary to theirs.
The remainder of the paper evolves as follows. The next section sketches the
model while the following sections present the solution and the estimation strategy.
Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 illustrates the trade-off between
inflation and output gap stabilization and the role of real wage rigidity. In Section 7,
we study the propagation of commodity price shock as well as how it has changed over
time. Robustness checks are conducted in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Model
The artificial economy is a Generalized New Keynesian (GNK) economy with a
commodity product which we interpret as oil. This model offers a micro-founded
setup that naturally features various inflation rates and also accounts for positive
trend inflation. The economy consists of monopolistically competitive wholesale
firms that produce differentiated goods using labor and oil. These goods are bought
by perfectly competitive firms (retailers) that weld them together into the final good
that can be consumed. People rent out their labor services on competitive markets.
Firms and households are price takers on the market for oil. The economy boils down
to a variant of the model in Blanchard and Gali (2010) when approximated around
a zero inflation steady state. Hence, the exposition below closely follows Blanchard
and Gali (2010).
2.1 Households
The representative agent’s preferences depend on consumption, Ct, and hours worked,





βtdtu(Ct, Nt) 0 < β < 1 ,
which the agent acts to maximize. Here, Et represents the expectations operator.
The term dt stands for a shock to the discount factor β which follows the stationary
autoregressive process
ln dt = ρd ln dt−1 + εd,t ,
where εd,t is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation that is normally distributed
with standard deviation σd. The period utility is additively separable in consumption
and hours worked and it takes on the functional form








Logarithmic utility is the only additive-separable form consistent with balanced
growth. The term ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, h ∈ [0, 1]
stands for the degree of (external) habit persistence in consumption, and νt denotes
a shock to the disutility of labor which follows
ln νt = ρν ln νt−1 + εν,t ,
where εν,t is N(0, σ2ν). The overall consumption basket, Ct, is a Cobb-Douglas bundle






q,t 0 < χ < 1,
where Θχ ≡ χ−χ(1 − χ)−(1−χ). The parameter χ equals the share of energy in total










Here, the term ε measures the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
The agent sells labor services to the wholesale firms at the nominal wage Wt and
has access to a market for one-period riskless bonds, Bt, at the interest rate Rt. Any
generated profits, Πt, flow back and the period budget is constrained by





where Pq,t denotes the domestic output price index.
The Euler equation is given by
dt
Pc,t (Ct − hCt−1)
= βEt
Rtdt+1
Pc,t+1 (Ct+1 − hCt)
,
where Pc,t is the price of the overall consumption basket.





t (Ct − hCt−1) ≡MRSt.
Following Blanchard and Gali (2007, 2010) and Blanchard and Riggi (2013), we









where γ is the degree of real wage rigidity.
In the optimal allocation, we have
Pq,tCq,t = (1− χ)Pc,tCt
and
Pm,tCm,t = χPc,tCt
where Pc,t ≡ P χm,tP 1−χq,t and Pm,t is the nominal price of oil. Also note that Pc,t ≡
Pq,ts
χ
t , where st ≡
Pm,t
Pq,t
is the real price of oil that follows an exogenous process given
by
ln st = ρs ln st−1 + εs,t.
2.2 Firms
Final good firm
The representative final good firm produces homogenous good Qt by choosing
a combination of intermediate inputs Qt(i) to maximize profit. Specifically, the


















where Pq,t(i) is the price of the intermediate good i and ε > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods.

















Intermediate goods are produced using labor, Nt(i), and oil,Mt(i), both supplied




α 0 < α < 1,
where α is the share of oil in production and At denotes non-stationary labor-
augmenting technology
lnAt = ln g + lnAt−1 + zt.
Here, g is the steady-state gross rate of technological change and zt is a shock to the
growth rate of technology following
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + εz,t,















Given the production function, cost minimization implies that the firms’demand

























where we have used the demand schedule faced by intermediate good firm i and




Next combining the cost minimization conditions for oil and for labor with the



















αα (1− α)1−α .
Price setting
The intermediate goods producers face a constant probability, 0 < 1 − ξ < 1,































Pc,t+j (Ct+j − hCt+j−1)
.
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The joint dynamics of the optimal reset price and inflation can be compactly








where κt and φt are auxiliary variables that allow one to rewrite the infinite sums


























where we have used the definition λ̃t = λtPc,t. Note that κt and φt can be interpreted
as the present discounted value of marginal costs and marginal revenues respectively.





































The GDP deflator Py,t is implicitly defined by
Pq,t ≡ (Py,t)1−α (Pm,t)α .
GDP
















)−εdi. Under the Calvo
price mechanism, the above expression can be written recursively as:
∆t = (1− ξ)p∗q,t(i)−ε + ξπεq,t∆t−1.
2.3 Monetary policy
Lastly, the model is closed by assuming that short-term nominal interest rate follows
a feedback rule, of the type that has been found to provide a good description of
actual monetary policy in the U.S. since Taylor (1993). Our specification of this
policy rule features interest rate smoothing, a systematic response to deviations of

















where π denotes the central bank’s inflation target (and is equal to the gross
level of trend inflation), R is the gross steady-state policy rate, x is the steady state
output gap, g is the gross steady state growth rate of the economy and εR,t is an
i.i.d. monetary policy shock. The output gap xt measures the deviation of the
actual level of GDP Yt from the effi cient level of GDP, i.e. the counterfactual level
of GDP that would arise in the absence of monopolistic competition, nominal price
stickiness and real wage rigidity. The central bank responds to a convex combination
of headline and core inflation (with the parameter τ governing the relative weights;
setting τ to one implies that the central bank responds to headline inflation only).
The coeffi cients ψπ, ψx and ψg govern the central bank’s responses to inflation,
welfare-relevant output gap and output growth from their respective target values,
and ρR ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of policy rate smoothing .
3 Solution under indeterminacy
To solve the rational expectations system, we follow the methodology of Lubik and
Schorfheide (2003). This approach has the advantage of being general and explicit
in dealing with expectation errors, thereby making the method suitable for solving
models featuring multiple equilibria. Let us denote by ηt the vector of one-step ahead
expectation errors. Moreover, define %t as the vector of endogenous variables and εt
as vector of fundamental shocks. Then, the linear rational expectations system can
be compactly written as
Γ0(θ)%t = Γ1(θ)%t−1 + Ψ(θ)εt + Π(θ)ηt, (1)
where Γ0(θ), Γ1(θ), Ψ(θ) and Π(θ) are appropriately defined coeffi cient matrices.
Under indeterminacy, ηt will be a linear function of the fundamental shocks and the
purely extrinsic sunspot disturbances, ζt. Hence, the full set of solutions to the LRE
model entails
%t = Φ(θ)%t−1 + Φε(θ, M̃)εt + Φζ(θ)ζt, (2)
where Φ(θ), Φε(θ, M̃) and Φζ(θ)1 are the coeffi cient matrices.2 The sunspot shock
satisfies ζt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2ζ). Indeterminacy alters the solution in two distinct ways.
1Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) express this term as Φζ(θ,Mζ), whereMζ is an arbitrary matrix.
For identification purpose, we impose their normalization such that Mζ = I.





First and foremost, purely extrinsic non-fundamental disturbances, i.e. sunspots,
affect model dynamics through endogenous formation of expectation errors. Second,
the propagation of fundamental shocks are no longer uniquely pinned down and this
multiplicity of equilibria affecting the propagation mechanism is captured by the
arbitrary matrix M̃ .
Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we replace M̃ withM∗(θ)+M and in the
subsequent empirical analysis set the prior mean for M equal to zero. This strategy
selects M∗(θ) by using a least squares criterion to minimize the distance between
the impact response of the endogenous variables to fundamental shocks, i.e. ∂%t/∂ε
′
t,
at the boundary between the determinacy and the indeterminacy region. Analytical
solution for the boundary in this model is infeasible. Hence we follow Justiniano and
Primiceri (2008) and Hirose (2014) and resort to a numerical procedure to find the
boundary by perturbing the parameter ψπ in the monetary policy rule.
3 In a later
section, we also check the robustness of our results to an alternative perturbation
for tracing the boundary.
4 Econometric strategy
This section sets up the estimation procedure, lists the data and discusses the cali-
bration and priors.
4.1 Bayesian estimation with Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)
algorithm
We use Bayesian techniques for estimating the parameters of the model and test
for indeterminacy using posterior model probabilities. In our estimation, we employ
the Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm proposed by Herbst and Schorfheide
(2014, 2015) which is particularly suitable for irregular and non-elliptical posterior
distributions. An added benefit of using an importance sampling algorithm like SMC
is that the process does not require one to find the mode of the posterior distribution,
a task that can prove to be diffi cult particularly under indeterminacy.
First the priors are described by a density function of the form
3This methodology has been used in previous studies, such as Benati and Surico (2009), Doko
Tchatoka, Groshenny, Haque and Weder (2017), Haque (2017), Hirose (2007, 2008, 2013, 2014) and
Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017).
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p(θS|S).
Here S ∈ {D, I} where D and I stand for determinacy and indeterminacy respec-
tively, θS represents the parameter of the model S and p(.) stands for probability
density function. Next, the likelihood function
L(θS|XT , S) ≡ p(XT |θS, S),
describes the density of the observed data andXT denote observations through period
T . By using Bayes theorem we can combine the prior density and the likelihood
function to obtain the posterior density




in which p(XT |S) denotes the marginal density of the data conditional on the model





We employ the SMC algorithm of Herbst and Schorfheide (2014, 2015) to build a
particle approximation of the posterior distribution through tempering the likelihood.






where φn is the tempering schedule that slowly increases from zero to one and is





where δ controls the shape of the tempering schedule.
The algorithm generates weighted draws from the sequence of posteriors {πn(θ)}
Nφ
n=1,
where Nφ is the number of stages. At any stage, the posterior distribution is repre-







whereW in is the weight associated with θ
i
n
and N denotes the number of particles. The algorithm has three main steps. First,
in the correction step, the particles are re-weighted to reflect the density in iteration
n. Next, in the selection step, any particle degeneracy is eliminated by resampling
the particles. A rule-of-thumb measure of this degeneracy, proposed by Herbst and
Schorfheide (2014, 2015), is given by the reciprocal of the uncentered variance of the











where W̃ ni is the normalized particle weight. Following Herbst and Schorfheide (2014,
2015) we use systematic resampling whenever ÊSSn < N2 . Finally, in the mutation
step, the particles are propagated forward using a Markov transition kernel to adapt
to the current bridge density. Here, we use one step of a single-block Random Walk
Metropolis Hastings (RWMH) algorithm.
Note that in the first stage, i.e. when n = 1, φ1 is zero. Hence, the prior
density serves as an effi cient proposal density for π1(θ). That is, the algorithm is
initialized by drawing the initial particles from the prior. Likewise, the idea is that
the density of πn(θ) may be a good proposal density for πn+1(θ). In our estimation,
the tuning parameters N,Nφ and δ are fixed ex ante. We use N = 10, 000 particles
and Nφ = 200 stages and set δ at 2 following Herbst and Schorfheide (2015).
To assess the quality of the model’s fit to the data we use log marginal data den-
sities and posterior model probabilities for both parametric regions, i.e. determinacy
and indeterminacy. The SMC algorithm-based approximation of the marginal data














where w̃in is the incremental weight defined by
w̃in = [p(X|θin−1, S)]φn−φn−1 .
4.2 Data
We define the set of observables, ϑt, which contains quarterly growth rate of real per-
capita GDP, consumer price index (CPI), core consumer price index (Core CPI), real
wage, and the Federal Funds rate. Wages come from the BLS (hourly compensation
for the NFB sector for all persons). Hourly compensation is divided by the CPI in

















where g∗ is the quarterly steady state net output growth rate, π∗ is the steady
state net inflation rate, R∗ stands for the steady state net interest rate, ĝy,t denotes
the growth rate of output, π̂c,t is consumer price inflation, π̂q,t is core consumer price
inflation, ĝw,t is the growth rate of real wages (deflated by the consumer price index),
and R̂t denotes the nominal interest rate. Hatted variables stand for log deviations
from the steady state. To test for indeterminacy and estimate the model parameters,
we consider two sample periods in our benchmark analysis: 1966:I to 1979:II and
1984:I to 2008:II. We do not demean or detrend any series.
4.3 Calibrated parameters
We calibrate a subset of the model parameters. We set the discount factor β to
0.99, the steady-state markup at ten percent, i.e. ε = 11, and the inverse of the
labor-supply elasticity to one. Following the computations in Blanchard and Gali
(2010), we calibrate the shares of oil in production and consumption to α = 0.015
and χ = 0.023 for the first sample and α = 0.012 and χ = 0.017 for the second
sample. Furthermore, we assume that shocks to the growth rate of technology are
i.i.d., i.e. ρz = 0, since the process already includes a unit root. We also fix the au-
toregressive parameter of the commodity price shock at ρs = 0.995, in order to have
the commodity price be very close to random walk yet be stationary. In our bench-
mark estimation, we abstract from price indexation. We estimate all the remaining
parameters with Bayesian techniques.
4.4 Prior distributions
The specification of the prior distribution is summarized in Table 1. The prior for
the parameter determining the central bank’s responsiveness to inflation, ψπ, follows
a gamma distribution centred at 1.10 with a standard deviation of 0.50 while the
response coeffi cient to output gap and output growth are centred at 0.125 with
standard deviation 0.10. We use Beta distribution with mean 0.50 for the smoothing
133
Table 1: Prior distributions for parameters
Name Density Prior Mean St. Dev
ψπ Gamma 1.10 0.50
ψx Gamma 0.125 0.10
ψg Gamma 0.125 0.10
ρR Beta 0.50 0.20
τ Beta 0.50 0.20
π∗ Normal 1.00 0.50
R∗ Gamma 1.50 0.25
g∗ Normal 0.50 0.10
ξ Beta 0.50 0.05
γ Beta 0.50 0.20
h Beta 0.50 0.10
ρd Beta 0.70 0.10
ρν Beta 0.70 0.10
σs Inv-Gamma 5.00 2.00
σg Inv-Gamma 0.50 0.20
σr Inv-Gamma 0.50 0.20
σd Inv-Gamma 0.50 0.20
σν Inv-Gamma 0.50 0.20
σζ Inv-Gamma 0.50 0.20
Ms,ζ Normal 0.00 1.00
Mg,ζ Normal 0.00 1.00
Mr,ζ Normal 0.00 1.00
Md,ζ Normal 0.00 1.00
Mν,ζ Normal 0.00 1.00
Notes: The inverse gamma priors are of the form
p (σ|υ, ς)∞σ−υ−1e−
υς2
2σ2 where ν = 4 and ς = 0.38 for all shocks
but commodity prices while for commodity price shock
ς = 3.81. The prior probability of determinacy is 0.51.
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coeffi cient ρR, the parameter governing the weight on headline inflation in the Taylor
rule τ , the Calvo probability ξ, the real wage rigidity γ and habit persistence in
consumption h. The prior distribution for the persistence of the discount factor shock
and the labor supply shock is also a Beta with mean 0.70 and standard deviation
0.20.
For the standard deviations of the innovations, the priors for all but one follow
an inverse-gamma distribution with mean 0.50 and standard deviation 0.20. The
exception is the oil price shock for which we centre the prior at 5.00 with a standard
deviation 2.00 to account for its higher volatility.
Finally, in line with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), the coeffi cients M follow
standard normal distributions. Hence, the prior is centered around the baseline
solution of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). The choice of the priors leads to a prior
predictive probability of determinacy of 0.51, which is quite even and suggests no
prior bias toward either determinacy or indeterminacy.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Model comparison
To assess the quality of the model’s fit to the data, Table 2 presents marginal data
densities and posterior model probabilities for both parametric zones. We find that
determinacy unambiguously prevails in both the pre-Volcker and the post-84 sample
periods. In other words, the posterior puts all its weight in the determinacy region.
The finding that determinacy prevails in both the sample periods might be surprising
given that the literature has established the high inflation episode of the 1970s as
characterized by self-fulfilling inflation expectations. A natural question that arises
is: what drives this result?
To shed light on our finding, we would like to start by bridging the gap between
the current paper and the existing literature. As such, at first we shut down oil in the
model by calibrating the oil share in consumption and production to zero. As a result,
the model boils down to a simple Generalized New Keynesian (GNK) model with
positive trend inflation ala Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009) and Ascari and Sbordone
(2014). To maintain continuity with the existing literature, we estimate this nested
GNK model with only three observables: the quarterly growth rate of real per-capita
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Table 2: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy
Log-data density Probability
Model Determinacy Indeterminacy Determinacy Indeterminacy
1966:I-1979:II -228.89 -241.06 1 0
1984:I-2008:II -230.03 -251.05 1 0
Notes: According to the prior distributions, the probability of determinacy is 0.51.
GDP, the Federal Funds rate and quarterly CPI inflation rate. Moreover, we set the
weight τ in the Taylor rule to one as there is just a single concept of inflation in the
simple GNK model with no distinction between headline and core. This then makes
our set up similar to Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017). One exception
is that the current paper employs a model with homogenous labor following Ascari
and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) while Hirose, Kurozumi and Van
Zandweghe (2017) use a model with firm-specific labor following Kurozumi and Van
Zandweghe (2017). Table 3 reports the log-data densities while Tables 4 and 5 give
the posterior estimates. In line with the findings in the existing literature, the first
row in the table confirms that the estimation favors the indeterminate version of the
model in the pre-Volcker period.
Having bridged the gap with existing empirical studies, we now sequentially move
on by adding one feature at a time. At first, we turn on oil in the model by resetting
the values of α and χ to their benchmark calibration. This set up gives us a New
Keynesian model with micro-founded cost-push shocks, a feature that is reminis-
cent of the environment in the 1970s, yet one that is missing in existing empirical
investigation on (in)-determinacy. However, we continue to use three observables
in our estimation. Furthermore, since we are still using one inflation series as an
observable, τ is not identified. Hence, we calibrate this parameter to one such that
the central bank responds solely to headline inflation. Once again, indeterminacy
unambiguously prevails in the pre-Volcker period.
According to the posterior estimate of the innovation to oil-price shock σs, we
find that the posterior is virtually indistinguishable from the prior suggesting possible
identification issues. In fact, using only one inflation measure as an observable, i.e.
CPI inflation alone in this case, does not provide suffi cient information to pin down
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Table 3: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (1966:I - 1979:II)
Log-data density Probability
Det. Indet. Det. Indet.
GNK (∆yt, Rt,πc,t) [α, χ = 0; τ = 1] -121.14 -118.81 0.09 0.91
GNK with Oil (∆yt, Rt,πc,t) [τ = 1] -123.01 -118.28 0.01 0.99
GNK with Oil (∆yt, Rt,πc,t, πq,t) -157.93 -157.56 0.41 0.59
GNK with Oil (∆yt, Rt,πc,t, πq,t,∆w1t ) -228.89 -241.06 1 0
GNK with Oil (∆yt, Rt,πc,t, πq,t,∆w1t ,∆w
2
t ) -279.02 -292.54 1 0
oil-price shocks. Hence, in our next exercise, we simultaneously treat both headline
and core inflation as observables. Thus, our dataset now includes four variables.
This step enables us to properly identify the oil-price shocks (or more generally
commodity price shocks). Also, we estimate the weight τ in the Taylor rule which
is now supposedly identified. Table 3 (third row) shows that the finding is now
ambiguous: the probability of indeterminacy is 0.59. Phrased alternatively, we can
neither rule in nor rule out indeterminacy. Moreover, as anticipated, the innovation
to the oil-price shock σs is now better identified. Table 4 shows that the posterior
mean estimate is significantly higher than the estimate we obtain when using only
three observables.
A key parameter in this model is the degree of real wage rigidity γ. As Blanchard
and Gali (2007, 2010) argue, the presence of real wage rigidity generates a trade-off
between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the output gap. Accordingly, higher real
wage rigidity generates a more severe trade-off. To sharpen the identification of this
feature, we next add real wage data, i.e. we employ five observables to estimate
the model. We use observations on “hourly compensation for the non-farm business
sector for all persons”as a measure of nominal wages. To get real wages, we then
divide this proxy by the CPI price deflator. This then gives us our benchmark
setup. The fourth row in Table 3 reproduces the log-data densities and posterior
model probabilities from Table 2 for the pre-Volcker period. As argued above, the
pre-Volcker period is then explicitly characterized by determinacy and a high degree
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of real wage rigidity.
Our argument can be summarized as follows. It is well known that commodity
price shocks in general and oil price shocks in particular were an important source
of economic fluctuations in the U.S. during much of the 1970s. For instance, there
were episodes of large increases in the price of oil triggered by the Yom Kippur war
in 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1979. Such adverse cost-push shocks generated
a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the output gap for the Fed-
eral Reserve. Existing empirical investigations on the effi cacy of monetary policy in
the 1970s find that policy failed to respond suffi ciently strongly to inflation thereby
generating indeterminacy. However, these studies abstract from modelling the role
of commodity price fluctuations and the associated policy trade-off. Our first con-
tribution is to employ a New Keynesian framework with positive trend inflation and
an explicit role of oil in both consumption and production. In our framework, we
also allow for a mechanism, i.e. the presence of real wage rigidity, which generates a
quantitatively meaningful trade-off faced by the central bank following commodity
price shocks. Our second contribution is to test for indeterminacy by estimating this
model over the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation period. In this endeavor,
what further sets us apart from existing empirical work is that we pay particular
attention in identifying key features of the model through careful elucidation of ob-
servables. Our finding that determinacy prevails in the pre-Volcker period, therefore,
rules out self-fulfilling inflation expectations or sunspots as an explanation of the high
inflation episode in the 1970s.
As illustrated above, we follow Blanchard and Gali (2007, 2010) and Blanchard
and Riggi (2013) by assuming real wage rigidities as a source of real imperfection
which breaks down the divine coincidence with respect to commodity price shocks.
In our empirical investigation, we find that real wage rigidity turns out to be sig-
nificantly higher when we allow for wage data in the estimation and the parameter
estimates of the Taylor rule turn out to be such that the data explicitly favors de-
terminacy. However, as pointed out by Blanchard and Gali (2007, 2010), this way
of modelling real wage rigidity is admittedly ad hoc but still a parsimonious way of
capturing slow adjustment of real wages to labor market conditions arising due to
some (unmodelled) labor market imperfection or friction. Nonetheless, the fact that
we match a particular empirical wage inflation series to the latent concept of wage
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inflation in the model might have some bearing for the higher posterior estimate of
the real wage rigidity parameter γ. In this line of thinking, we next depart from the
assumption that wage inflation in the model is measured by a single series and draw
on the methodology proposed by Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and recently adopted
by Gali, Smets and Wouters (2011) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013).
We match the wage inflation variable in the model with two data series. The first
series is the same one as used in the estimations so far, i.e. “hourly compensa-
tion for the non-farm business sector for all employees”. The second measure is the
“average hourly earnings of production and non-supervisory employees”. Following
Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013), we further assume that both series
represent an imperfect match to the concept of “wage” in the model and capture
this mismatch through i.i.d. measurement errors. This assumption is important as
Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013) find that most of the high frequency
variation that characterizes the individual series on compensation is due to mea-
surement error. More concretely, the estimation involves the following measurement




















where ∆ logNHCt and ∆ logHEt denote the growth rate of the two measures
of wages in the data (deflated using CPI), λ is a loading coeffi cient relating the
second series to the latent concept of wage inflation in the model, and e1,t and e2,t




distributions for the loadings and measurement equations are λ ∼ N(1.00, 0.50) and
σe1 , σe2 ∼ IG(0.10, 0.20). Once again, the degree of real wage rigidity turns out to
be substantially higher and as a corollary determinacy unambiguously prevails in the
pre-Volcker period.
5.2 Parameter estimates
Tables 4 and 5 report the posterior mean and the standard deviation of the para-
meters under alternative specifications for the pre-1979 and the post-1984 sample
periods respectively. First of all, we find that the estimated response to inflation
4The other loading is normalized to 1 as standard in factor analysis.
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in the Taylor rule is passive for the GNK model estimated using three observables
and for the model with oil estimated using either three or four observables. This
finding is in line with the literature’s view that the policy response to inflation was
passive during the Great Inflation period. However, once we allow for wage data in
our estimation (either using just one wage series or using two series following Boivin
and Giannoni’s (2006) methodology), we find the degree of real wage rigidity to be
significantly higher: the point estimate turns out to be around 0.9. As argued above,
such a high degree of real wage rigidity worsens the trade-off faced by the central
bank in the wake of commodity price shocks. Now the estimated response to inflation
now turns out to be active during the pre-1979 period. Moreover, the response to
output gap turns out to be substantially lower while the response to output growth
and the degree of policy-rate smoothing turns out to be higher. This finding confirms
our intuition that the parameter estimates of the Taylor rule during the pre-Volcker
period might possibly be biased if the empirical investigation does not take into ac-
count the effect of commodity price shocks and the associated trade-offs faced by
the central bank. Combined together, such changes in the parameter estimates of
the Taylor rule push the posterior distribution toward the determinacy region of the
parameter space.
Moving across the sample period while focusing on the parameter estimates of
the GNK model with oil estimated using six observables (i.e. two wage series), we see
that the policy response to inflation and output growth almost doubled while trend
inflation fell considerably. The Federal Reserve also moved its focus away from re-
sponding to headline inflation during the pre-1979 period toward core inflation during
the post-1984 period. Among the other structural parameters, habit persistence in
consumption decreased slightly while the degree of price stickiness remained roughly
unchanged. Furthermore, qualitatively in line with the findings of Blanchard and
Riggi (2013), we find a substantial decline in real wage rigidity. However, our esti-
mate still points toward the presence of moderate degree of rigidity while Blanchard
and Riggi (2013) document perfect real wage flexibility. This divergence might be
due to the different estimation strategies that we employ. While Blanchard and Riggi
(2013) adopt a limited information approach that matches impulse responses to an
oil price shock in the DSGE model and in a structural VAR, we use full-information
Bayesian estimation with multiple shocks.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates (1966:I-1979:II)
GNK (Indet) GNK-Oil (Indet) GNK-Oil (Indet) GNK-Oil (Det) GNK-Oil (Det)

















































































































































































































λ − − − − 1.07
(0.24)
σe1 − − − − 0.37
(0.10)
σe2 − − − − 0.46
(0.10)
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates (1984:I-2008:II)
GNK (Det) GNK-Oil (Det) GNK-Oil (Det) GNK-Oil (Det) GNK-Oil (Det)











































































































































































λ − − − − 0.29
(0.08)
σe1 − − − − 0.66
(0.07)
σe2 − − − − 0.38
(0.04)
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In terms of the standard deviations of the innovations, there is an increase in the
volatility of commodity price shock and labor supply shock. As argued by Blanchard
and Gali (2010), the increase in the size of commodity price shock is due to its limited
variation before the 1973 crisis, despite the two large spikes in that year. On the
other hand, the innovation variance of monetary policy shock and discount factor
shock declined quite notably while the size of the technology shock remained fairly
stable.
Finally, there is a substantial change in the estimate of the loading coeffi cient
λ. In the pre-Volcker period, the estimate of λ is quite close to one implying a
similarity in the two wage inflation series during that period. However, in the post-
1984 period, it turns out to be much lower: the posterior mean estimate is 0.29.
This further justifies the differences in some of the parameter estimates of the model
for the post-1984 period depending on whether we employ the first empirical series
alone as in our five observables case versus when we use both wage inflation series
as in the six observables case.
5.3 Implications of the model for macroeconomic volatility
In this section, we assess the ability of the model to account for the Great Moderation,
i.e. the marked decline in macroeconomic volatility in the second sub-sample. Table 6
summarizes the model’s implications for the volatility of the inflation (both headline
and core) and output growth at the posterior mean of the model parameters along
with the data-based standard deviations over the indicated sample. The estimated
model is able to replicate the observed drop in volatility.5 We find a fall of output
growth variability of 45% and a drop of headline and core inflation volatility of
about 56% and 70% respectively. The figures are similar to those reported in the
literature. For instance, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) report a fall of output
growth variability of about 25% and a drop of inflation variability of about 75%. The
numbers in Smets and Wouters (2007) read 35% and 58% respectively. Despite the
fact that our model is relatively small-scale in nature compared to the medium-scale
models in these studies, we find it reassuring in terms of the empirical plausibility
of our estimation results.
5Although it overestimates the standard deviation, such mismatch is also present in medium-
scale models as well. See Smets and Wouters (2007).
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Table 6: The Great Moderation
1966:I-1979:II 1984:I-2008:II Percent Change
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Headline Inflation 0.68 1.04 0.38 0.46 -44% -56%
Core Inflation 0.60 0.89 0.28 0.27 -53% -70%
Output Growth 1.01 1.14 0.53 0.63 -48% -45%
6 Trade-off between inflation and output gap sta-
bilization
In this section, we illustrate the importance of real wage rigidity in generating a
quantitatively meaningful trade-off faced by the central bank in stabilizing inflation
and output gap volatility in the wake of commodity price shocks. Figure 1 plots the
impulse responses of headline inflation, core inflation, the welfare-relevant output gap
and price dispersion to a one standard deviation commodity price shock under three
alternative calibration of the real wage rigidity parameter. The structural parameters
as well as the policy parameters are calibrated to their estimated posterior mean
values for the pre-1979 period.
First of all, we see that in the absence of real wage rigidity, headline inflation in-
creases while there is a decrease in core inflation, the output gap and price dispersion.
The rise in headline inflation is somewhat obvious since part of the increase in oil
prices is reflected mechanically in the oil component of the CPI. On the other hand,
there is a reduction in core inflation owing to our assumption of real wage flexibility.
With perfectly flexible real wages, an increase in the real price of oil reduces the con-
sumption real wage and hence lowers the marginal cost. As a result, there is a fall in
desired price as well as price dispersion. Moreover, the output gap goes down as well.
To the extent that the central bank’s objective is to stabilize both headline inflation
as well as welfare-relevant output gap, it faces a trade-off even in the absence of real
wage rigidity. However, divine coincidence holds when the central bank focuses on
stabilizing core inflation instead as both output gap and core inflation goes down.
In fact, one might argue that core inflation is a more natural reference point for
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Figure 1: IRF to commodity price shock under alternative degree of real wage rigidity
monetary policy as policy can only affect the sticky price component. Hence, we
qualify the results documented in Alves (2014) who argues that a non-zero steady
state level of inflation makes it impossible for monetary policy to simultaneously
stabilize inflation and output gap in response to preference and technology shocks.
In any case, the response of the endogenous variables to a commodity price shock is
quantitatively negligible when γ is set equal to zero.
In contrast, for high levels of real wage stickiness, policymakers face a quanti-
tatively meaningful trade-off between output gap and inflation (either headline or
core) stabilization. This trade-off arises from the fact that even in the equilibrium in
which output gap is stabilized, desired prices are not constant in general. With real
wages being rigid, an increase in the real price of oil will result in an increase in the
firm’s marginal cost, and hence in both desired price and core inflation. Due to fluc-
tuations in desired prices, firms that reset their prices in different periods will charge
different prices. This resulting increase in price dispersion will lead to instability in
price inflation. Therefore, higher real wage rigidity generates a more severe trade-off
faced by the central bank in the aftermath of commodity price shocks. A stable
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Figure 2: Estimated IRF to commodity price shock
welfare-relevant output gap is thus inconsistent with either stable headline and/or
core inflation. As such, the parameter estimates of the Taylor rule during the 1970s
might possibly be biased if the empirical investigation leaves out real wage rigidity
and the associated trade-off faced by the Federal Reserve in the wake of commodity
price shocks.
7 Propagation of commodity price shock
This section studies the propagation of commodity price shock as well as how it
has changed over time. Figure 2 depicts the estimated mean impulse responses of
headline inflation, core inflation, nominal interest rate and output growth for both
sample periods along with the 90 percent probability interval. As evident from the
figure, the effects of commodity price shocks have changed significantly over time.
Our estimates point to much smaller effects on core inflation, real activity and interest
rate in the second sub-sample despite the fact that the shocks are slightly larger in
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Commodity Price Shock


































Figure 3: Counterfactual IRFs to commodity price shock
size. The only exception is the response of headline inflation, whose impact response
is very similar, albeit with a reduced persistence. This is intuitive since, as argued
above, part of the rise in oil prices is reflected automatically in the oil component of
headline inflation. This finding is reassuring as it matches with the empirical VAR
evidence put forth by Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Blanchard and Riggi (2013).
Next , we conduct counterfactual experiments to disentangle the driving force
behind these changes over time. We divide the experiments into two categories.
First, we combine the posterior mean estimates pertaining to the Taylor rule, i.e.
ψπ, ψx, ψ∆y, ρR, π
∗, τ , of the post-1984 sub-sample with the remaining parameter
estimates of the pre-1979 period which is called ‘post-84 policy’. This exercise is
designed to capture the role of monetary policy in the reducing the effect of a given
change in commodity prices. In the second category, we combine the posterior mean
estimates of the pre-1979 period (including the policy parameters) with the estimated
(lower) real wage rigidity from the post-1984 period, labelled ‘post-84 wage rigidity’.
This scenario is designed to capture the role of the decline in real wage rigidity as a
possible explanation.
Figure 3 depicts the impulse responses to a one standard deviation commodity
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price shock under the two alternative scenarios while calibrating the remaining pa-
rameters at the posterior mean estimates of the pre-1979 period. Looking at the
figure, we can see that the decline in the effects of commodity price shocks is mainly
explained by a reduction in real wage rigidity. As argued earlier, real wage rigidity
generates a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization. A shift to-
ward more flexible wages implies a reduction in this trade-off thereby explaining the
smaller effects of the shocks in the more recent period. Thus, our finding corrobo-
rates one of the hypothesis put forth by Blanchard and Gali (2010) and is also in
line with the empirical evidence documented in Blanchard and Riggi (2013).
8 Sensitivity analysis
We now conduct sensitivity of our results in various directions that involve (i) in-
dexation to past inflation, (ii) alternative Taylor rule, (iii) alternative formulation of
the boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy region, (iv) flexible-price
output gap, (v) estimation over the entire parameter space, and (vi) real oil price as
an observable. For all these cases, the estimation is conducted using six observables,
i.e. including both wage series ala Boivin and Giannoni (2006). Table 7 reports the
log-data densities and the posterior probabilities while the parameter estimates are
reported in Tables 8 and 9 in the appendix.
8.1 Indexation
In light of the result of Cogley and Sbordone (2008) regarding the lack of empirical
support for intrinsic inertia in the generalized NKPC, the model is so far estimated
by assuming absence of rule-of-thumb price-setting. Hence, we now estimate the
model while allowing for indexation. To facilitate identification, we follow Ascari,
Castelnuovo and Rossi (2011) by calibrating the relative degree of indexation µ to
one and estimating the degree of indexation to past inflation ω in line with Benati
(2009). While we find some support for moderate degree of indexation, our finding
that the pre-Volcker period is characterized by determinacy remains robust.
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Table 7: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (Robustness)
Log-data density Probability
Det. Indet. Det. Indet.
1966:I-1979:II Indexation -277.70 -291.52 1 0
JPT Taylor rule -286.71 -292.01 1 0
Boundary -279.02 -282.33 0.96 0.04
Flex-price Output Gap -276.25 -285.12 1 0
Entire Parameter Space -279.27 1 0
Core CPI & Oil -504.85 -515.42 1 0
1984:I-2008:II Indexation -287.87 -342.15 1 0
JPT Taylor rule -281.56 -317.89 1 0
Boundary -275.20 -361.36 1 0
Flex-price Output Gap -280.87 -312.90 1 0
Entire Parameter Space -275.71 1 0
Core CPI & Oil -619.62 -658.99 1 0
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8.2 Alternative Taylor rule
Next we investigate the sensitivity of our findings with respect to an alternative
formulation of the monetary policy rule. Following Justiniano, Primiceri and Tam-
balotti (2013), the specification of the rule now features a systematic response to
deviations of annual inflation from a positive constant trend inflation (featuring
weighted response to both headline and core inflation) and to deviations of observed
annual GDP growth from its steady state level.6 It also includes interest rate smooth-
ing and response to welfare-relevant output gap as before. Thus, we re-estimate the























We find a stronger response to output growth in both periods which is somewhat
similar in magnitude to what Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013) reports.
Other than this, the remaining results remain quite robust.
8.3 Boundary
As discussed earlier, the presence of positive trend inflation enriches the dynamics of
the model and the usual Taylor principle (ψπ > 1) is no longer a suffi cient condition
for local determinacy of equilibrium. Due to the higher-order dynamics, it is not
feasible to analytically derive the indeterminacy conditions. To continue solving
the model via Lubik and Schorfheide’s (2004) continuity solution (where M∗(θ) is
selected such that the responses of the endogenous variables to the fundamental
shocks are continuous at the boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy
region) one needs to resort to numerical methods. In our applications so far, we follow
Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Hirose (2014) by perturbing the response to
inflation ψπ in the monetary policy rule to numerically trace the boundary. However,
6Strictly speaking, Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013) consider deviations of annual
inflation from a time-varying inflation target.
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due to the presence of trend inflation, the boundary becomes a complicated function
of ψπ along with other Taylor rule and structural parameters. As such, the (in-
)determinacy test might be susceptible to how we trace the boundary. Hence, as an
alternative, we now drag both the response to inflation ψπ as well as the response
to output gap ψx. This then possibly gets us to a different region of the boundary
in the parameter space. Nonetheless, we still find that the data favors determinacy
and the response to inflation is active even during the Great Inflation period.
8.4 Flexible-price output gap
We have argued earlier that allowing for wage data in the estimation helps us ac-
count for the higher real wage rigidity in the 1970s and generates a quantitatively
meaningful trade-off faced by the central bank in the model economy. In the face of
such trade-offs, our posterior estimates suggest an active response to inflation and
a virtually negligible response to output gap during the pre-Volcker period which
combined together push the posterior toward the determinacy region. In line with
Blanchard and Riggi (2013), we have focused on welfare-relevant output gap, defined
as the gap between actual and effi cient output. Blanchard and Riggi (2013) justify
their assumption by arguing that natural or potential level of output may move a
lot with respect to oil price shock in a model with real wage rigidities whereas the
effi cient or welfare-relevant output moves much less, looks like a smooth time trend
and appears to be what the Federal Reserve looks at. However, one could rightfully
argue that natural or potential output is a better reference point for monetary pol-
icy as monetary policy is neutral in the long run and thus cannot offset fluctuations
in the welfare-relevant output gap. As such, we replace the effi cient output gap
with the flexible-price output gap, defined as the gap between actual and potential
output. We find that the estimate of the response to output gap during the pre-
1979 period turns out to be somewhat higher this time. Yet, the findings that the
pre-Volcker period is characterized by determinacy and active response to inflation
remain unchanged.
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8.5 Estimation over the entire parameter space
In our applications so far, follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and estimate the
model twice, first under determinacy, then under indeterminacy. While Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) possibly did so because of the sampling technology available back
then which was Random Walk Metropolis Hastings (RWMH) algorithm, an impor-
tance sampling algorithm like SMC can use a single chain instead to explore the
entire parameter space. Hence, to take full advantage of this algorithm, we now
estimate the model simultaneously over both determinacy and indeterminacy region
following Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017). The likelihood function is
then given by
p(XT |θS, S) = 1{θS ∈ ΘD}pD(XT |θD, D) + 1{θS ∈ ΘI}pI(XT |θI , I),
whereΘD, ΘI are the determinacy and indeterminacy regions of the parameter space,
1{θS ∈ ΘS} is the indicator function that equals 1 if θS ∈ ΘS and zero otherwise,
and pD(XT |θD, D), pI(XT |θI , I) are the likelihood functions under determinacy and
indeterminacy respectively. All our results, including the fit of the model and the
parameter estimates, stay unaltered.
8.6 Oil as an observable
Lastly, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to directly using real oil price as
an observable. In our effort to pin down the cost-push shocks, until now we have
simultaneously employed both headline and core inflation measures as observables.
This choice identifies the cost-push shocks as commodity price shocks in general
(which includes the price of food and other commodities as well). To the extent
that there were other driving forces of inflation in the 1970s other than oil price
shocks, using both inflation measures simultaneously is a sound identification strat-
egy. For instance, the two inflationary episodes in the 1970s also featured sizeable
food-price hikes as documented by Blinder and Rudd (2012). Since food has a much
larger weight in the price indexes than energy, ignoring them might constitute a key
omission. Nonetheless, we also check the robustness of our results to directly using
percentage change of the real price of oil as an observable to identify the episodes of
oil price shocks in isolation. As such, we use the West Texas Intermediate oil price
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data from FRED II (2007).7 We deflate the nominal oil price by the core consumer
price index to be in line with the concept of real oil price in the model. The resulting
series is then demeaned by it’s sub-sample mean prior to estimation. We continue to
use data on quarterly growth rate of GDP per capita, core CPI, the two (real) wage
inflation series and the Federal Funds rate. Our results still remain robust.
9 Conclusion
This paper estimates a New Keynesian model with trend inflation and oil entering
in both consumption and production. While allowing for indeterminacy, it examines
the interaction between oil price shocks and monetary policy with a particular focus
on the Great Inflation. First, when considering the model without any role for oil,
we find that indeterminacy prevails in the pre-Volcker period while determinacy gets
favoured in the post-1984 period. Next, when we introduce oil in the model, we find
mixed evidence for indeterminacy in the 1970s. Yet, key features of the model, such
as oil price shocks and the degree of real wage rigidity, are not properly identified.
Hence, even after being hit with oil price shocks. there exist no quantitatively mean-
ingful trade-off faced by the central bank between stabilizing inflation and the output
gap. Therefore, to sharpen the identification of these important aspects, we then re-
estimate the model using additional observables. We find that the pre-Volcker period
in unambiguously characterized by a unique rational expectations equilibrium with
a high degree of real wage rigidity. In this environment, the oil price shocks create
an acute trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization. Faced with this
trade-off, we find that the Federal Reserve responded aggressively to inflation and
output growth, but not to the output gap, thereby ruling out indeterminacy. There-
fore, the finding that pre-Volcker period is characterized by a unique equilibrium has
important implications for interpreting the Great Inflation and reassessing Federal
Reserve’s policy. We also estimate the model over the Great Moderation period and
document that oil price shocks are no longer as inflationary as they used to be due to
lower real wage rigidity, allowing the Federal Reserve to respond less aggressively to
a given oil price shock. Therefore, this finding goes hand in hand with the hypoth-
7Nakov and Pescatori (2010) use this same oil price series in their empirical exercise and find
that oil played an important role in the Great Moderation.
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esis of Blanchard and Gali (2010) that the decline in real wage rigidity partly helps
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t (Ct − hCt−1) ≡MRSt (2m)
Following Blanchard and Gali (2007a,b) and Blanchard and Riggi (2013), we


















































































q,t + (1− ξ)p∗q,t(i)1−ε (11m)






























ln st = ρs ln st−1 + εs,t (16m)
ln gt = ρg ln gt−1 + εg,t (17m)
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ln dt = ρd ln dt−1 + εd,t (18m)
ln νt = ρν ln νt−1 + εν,t (19m)
The Log-linearized Model
Following Ascari and Sbordone (2014), we take a log-linear approximation around
a positive steady state trend inflation. Here hatted variables denote log-deviations
from steady state or trend levels.




































Following Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti
(2010), we normalize the labor supply shock such that it enters the labor supply
equation with a coeffi cient of one. In this way, it is easier to choose a reasonable
prior for the standard deviation of the shock.
Ξ̂t = R̂t − Etπ̂c,t+1 + EtΞ̂t+1 − Etĝt+1 (3L)






Q̂t = αM̂t + (1− α)N̂t − ∆̂t (5L)






(1− α)ŵt + µ̂t + {α + χ(1− α)}ŝt +
1
ε
∆̂t = 0 (7L)
p̂∗q,t(i) = κ̂t − φ̂t (8L)
157
κ̂t = (1− ξβπε(1−ω))
[
(1− α)ŵt + {χ(1− α) + α}ŝt + Q̂t + Ξ̂t
]
+





















−µωεπ̂q,t−1 + επ̂q,t + ∆̂t−1
]
(12L)











π̂c,t = π̂q,t + χ(ŝt − ŝt−1) (14L)
R̂t = ρRR̂t−1 + (1− ρR)
[




ŝt = ρsŝt−1 + εs,t (16L)
ĝt = ρgĝt−1 + εg,t (17L)
d̂t = ρdd̂t−1 + εd,t (18L)
ν̂t = ρν ν̂t−1 + εν,t (19L)
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A.2 Derivation of the Output Gap
Effi cient Allocation (First Best)
We derive the effi cient allocation by assuming perfect competition in goods and
labor markets following Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Blanchard and Riggi (2013).
From the firms’side we have
(1− α) ŵt = − (α + (1− α)χ) ŝt,
and from the consumer’s side
ŵt = ϕN̂t +
h
g − hĝt +
g
g − hĈt −
h
g − hĈt−1 + ν̂t.
At first, we substitute the aggregate resource constraint Ĉt = Q̂t − χŝt and





g − hĝt +
g
g − hĈt −
h
g − hĈt−1 + ν̂t
}
= − (α + (1− α)χ) ŝt.
Using the reduced-form production function Q̂t = N̂t− α1−α ŝt and after rearrang-
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ν̂t.
Given first-best employment, first-best output Ŷ et can be written as
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]
ν̂t.
Therefore, we can write the welfare-relevant output gap defined as the difference
between output and its first-best level
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]
(ŝt − ŝt−1) +
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g − h
(g − h)ϕ+ g
]
ν̂t.
Flexible Price Equilibrium (Second Best)
We derive the second-best level of employment and output by assuming that
prices and wages are flexible. As before, from the firms’side we have
(1− α) ŵt = − (α + (1− α)χ) ŝt
ŵt = −
(




and from the consumer’s side




g − hĝt +
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where again we normalize the labor supply shock.
As before, we substitute the aggregate resource constraint Ĉt = Q̂t − χŝt and
combine both equations to get
−
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Using the reduced-form production function Q̂t = N̂t− α1−α ŝt and after rearrang-
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ϕ (1− γ) (g − h) + (1− γ) g
]
ν̂t.
Given second-best employment, second-best output Ŷ ft can be written as
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ϕ (1− γ) (g − h) + (1− γ) g
]
ν̂t.
Therefore, we can write the welfare-relevant output gap defined as the difference
between output and its first-best level
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Table 8: Parameter Estimates, Robustness (1966:I-1979:II)




























































































































































































































σζ − − − − 0.44
(0.17)
−
Ms,ζ − − − − −0.01
(0.97)
−
Mg,ζ − − − − 0.00
(0.98)
−
Mr,ζ − − − − 0.01
(0.97)
−
Md,ζ − − − − 0.08
(0.98)
−








































Table 9: Parameter Estimates, Robustness (1984:I-2008:II)




























































































































































































































σζ − − − − 0.47
(0.17)
−
Ms,ζ − − − − −0.10
(1.00)
−
Mg,ζ − − − − −0.11
(0.95)
−
Mr,ζ − − − − 0.03
(0.96)
−
Md,ζ − − − − 0.06
(0.95)
−
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V Conclusion
This thesis contributes to our understanding of U.S. monetary policy over the Great
Inflation and the Great Moderation, including the period of loose monetary policy
in the early 2000s. The three self-contained papers apply Bayesian estimation tech-
niques to investigate the adequacy of monetary policy by assessing the quantitative
relevance of equilibrium indeterminacy through the lens of structural New Keyne-
sian models. In doing so, this thesis furthers our comprehension of the drivers of the
high and volatile inflationary episodes of the 1970s, the decline in macroeconomic
volatility and inflation gap predictability since the mid-1980s, and the issue of loose
monetary policy in the early 2000s.
The first paper examines monetary policy following the 2001 recession and its
alleged link to the enormous macroeconomic instability of the Great Recession and
establishes a number of new insights. It finds a violation of the Taylor principle for
most of the 2000s when using CPI to measure inflation, thereby supporting the al-
legations made by Stanford economist John Taylor that Fed policy during the early
2000s was as loose as in the 1970s. In stark contrast, when measuring inflation us-
ing core PCE, monetary policy appear to have been quite appropriate and adhering
to the Taylor principle, thus corroborating the claims of former Fed Chairman Ben
Bernanke. However, these findings create a puzzle since the conclusions are so heav-
ily dependent on the particular measure of inflation being used in the estimation.
Moreover, the simple New Keynesian model features a single concept of inflation.
Yet, it is possible that while households undeniably care about headline inflation,
the central bank focuses on core inflation. To resolve the ambiguity, the paper ac-
cordingly turns toward an artificial economy that structurally distinguishes between
core and headline inflation. Estimation results from this extended model indeed find
that the Fed was responding mainly to core PCE and was suffi ciently aggressive to
inflation, thereby validating the assertions of Bernanke.
The second paper investigates the drivers of both the Great Inflation and the
Great Moderation. The paper makes two contributions. First, it documents that
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the Federal Reserve has pursued a time-varying inflation target which captures the
permanent component of inflation. As a corollary, policy has responded aggressively
to the inflation gap not only during the Great Moderation as suggested by the
literature but also during the Great Inflation. Second, the paper documents that
both good policy, in terms of a stronger response to the inflation gap and a better
anchored inflation target, and good luck, in terms of smaller aggregate technology
shocks hitting the economy, are jointly required to explain the Great Moderation.
The final paper considers the impact of commodity price fluctuations on monetary
policy with a particular focus on the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Arguably, those
shocks generated a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and the output gap for the
Federal Reserve and we model such a trade-offarising due to the presence of real wage
rigidity. Indeed, the 1970s were times of strong labor unions. The paper finds that
wage rigidity was, in fact, higher during the Great Inflation and in this environment
the oil price shocks did create an acute trade-off. Faced with this dilemma, the paper
shows that the Fed responded aggressively to both inflation and output growth, but
not to the output gap, thereby ruling out self-fulfilling inflationary expectations or
sunspots as an explanation of the Great Inflation. Finally, the paper shows that oil
price shocks are no longer as inflationary as they used to be, allowing the Fed to
be less aggressive and therefore explaining the absence of stagflationary outcomes in
the 2000s.
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